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Will Mbabazi take on Museveni or is it just another false alarm?

Saturday October 11 2014
EAMBABAZIII

Analyst says it is difficult for former prime minister Amama Mbabazi 'to fight because his capability in the military and intelligence is still unclear.’ AFP PHOTO | MICHELE SIBILONI

Is former prime minister Amama Mbabazi planning the mother of all showdowns with President Yoweri Museveni?

If so, how fierce will the battle be? Can the National Resistance Movement secretary general upstage his party chairman in a bare-knuckle election fight? What will he need to succeed? Or will the showdown fail to materialise?

These are some of the questions in the minds of observers and analysts.

READ: Amama Mbabazi’s silence puzzles foes as they ponder his next move

“Mbabazi’s objective was never to stand against President Museveni; he wanted to rupture the party and seize it and the national leadership,” said Charles Rwomushana, an NRM supporter and former Internal Security Organisation operative.

According to Rwomushana, by building a power base within NRM, Mbabazi “was taking a deliberate risk knowing that once he is caught that would be the end of him with Museveni.”

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He added that Mbabazi has been with Museveni long enough to know that “the president does not forgive subversion.”

Rwomushana said that Mbabazi cannot wrestle the presidency away from Museveni.

“Even if he (Mbabazi) were to win in a showdown with Museveni within the party, Museveni would leave the party and form another one and still win the national presidency,” he said.

Mbabazi was dropped as prime minister three weeks ago, following nine months of an uneasy relationship with Museveni.

READ: Mbabazi had it coming, Museveni shocked him

The disagreements between the two came into the open at a retreat of NRM MPs at Kyankwanzi, the party’s political doctrine school, in February when Mbabazi was caught unawares by a motion seeking to declare Museveni the party’s sole candidate for the presidency in 2016. Museveni was in attendance despite not being an MP.

Mbabazi’s situation at the retreat was so shaky that he signed the resolution that targeted him. But on return from Kyankwanzi, he said that the resolution was not binding on the party since the NRM Caucus is not one of its formal decision-making organs. 

With subsequent efforts to have Mbabazi back down in favour of Museveni for 2016 ending in failure, the designs for the real showdown are in the works.

According to Mwambutsya Ndebesa, a political historian at Makerere University, the Museveni-Mbabazi election battle, if it comes to that, will be waged mainly “the two Ms” — the military and money.    

Is Museveni’s military power challengeable?

Mr Ndebesa referred to the military as “the spine of Museveni’s electoral system.” He said that even when some voters appear to willingly vote for Museveni, “they do so with the understanding that they have no option; that Museveni has the military backing to enforce his will.”

The question of where the military’s allegiance lies is ever present in Uganda’s electoral system.

When Dr Kizza Besigye broke away from NRM in 2001, for instance, he claimed to have 90 per cent support in the army. He was branded the “hammer” which would knock the “cotter pin” out of the Ugandan power system. Museveni had earlier referred to himself as the cotter pin.

Given Mbabazi’s long association with intelligence services and the military, speculation rages on how much clout he holds within those circles. But he has previously been criticised by some bush war fighters as having been aloof and being favoured by Museveni.

Maj-Gen Pecos Kutesa, for example, wrote in his memoir that on a visit to Nairobi during the bush war days, Mbabazi — on account of how he carried himself, the clothes he wore and car he drove — seemed to be far removed from the war.

Maj-Gen (Rtd) Jim Muhwezi, a former minister and MP, has been involved in previous attempts to pull down Mbabazi while Maj Gen (Rtd) Kahinda Otafiire even tried to wrestle the secretary general slot from Mbabazi in 2010.

But, Mr Ndebesa said, “Circumstances may dictate that these bush war fighters now approve of Mbabazi better than they would approve of the young Turks in the army led by Museveni’s son, Brig Muhoozi Kainerugaba.” 

Mr Ndebesa says that with heightened concerns that Mr Museveni could be preparing Brig Muhoozi, now commander of the Special Forces Command, to take over from him as president, “the old guard may be more willing to listen to the man from their generation (Mbabazi).”

The idea that Museveni could be preparing his son to succeed him — referred to as the Muhoozi Project — was popularised by Gen David Sejusa, a former chief spy who mid last year fled into exile, alleging that there was a plot to kill him and other senior members of the government and military because they objected to the Muhoozi Project.

READ: Army man’s assassination claims put Museveni on the spot

He said those targeted included Mbabazi and Gen Aronda Nyakairima, then Chief of Defence Forces and now Minister for Internal Affairs.

Gen Sejusa expressed disquiet at the army increasingly falling into the hands of younger officers and told Museveni to “retire us to save us the embarrassment of having to salute our grandchildren.”

According to Mr Ndebesa, Museveni’s decision to strengthen the Special Forces “with almost all the modern weapons and best training,” is intended “to counter any threat the regular forces may pose.”

The military being a closed institution, it is difficult to ascertain whether Mbabazi had made any inroads there. Not even Mr Rwomushana is sure, but if he were to advise Museveni, he would urge caution.

“Mbabazi is difficult to fight because his capability in the military and intelligence is still unclear,” Mr Rwomushana said.

As far as the police is concerned, however, the picture is clearer. Mbabazi, through his wife Jacqueline, openly clashed with Gen Kale Kayihura, the police boss.

She accused him of indulging in politics instead of concentrating on police work when earlier last year Gen Kayihura was caught on tape discussing with ruling party members the extent of Mbabazi’s mobilisation work within the party and how they would “defeat the Mbabazi project.”

ALSO READ: Mbabazi’s wife calls Uganda’s NRM ‘fascist’

The police have since broken up gatherings of youths who back Mbabazi — a reminder that he should not expect any mercy from the police.

Whose bank account is fatter?

Different election observer reports indicated that money gave Museveni the decisive advantage in the 2011 elections. If his opponents do not have enough, Museveni’s financial muscle will probably once again decide the 2016 election.

And many look to Mbabazi to provide much of the anti-Museveni financial muscle.

According to Rwomushana, Mbabazi does not have a lot of money, to the extent that “he struggled to settle legal bills when his election was challenged in 2001.

“But he was not interested in money for its sake; he wanted power. That is when he started a bank.”

Mbabazi’s bank, the now defunct National Bank of Commerce, was closed by Bank of Uganda in 2012 over insolvency and ownership wrangles. But Mr Rwomushana said that was “part of the war against Mbabazi.”

“He owned a bank; he had connections, at a very high level,” Mr Rwomushana said.

The closure of Mbabazi’s bank, observers say, probably hit him hard financially. The money he got from selling his land at Temangalo to the National Social Security Fund, it is said, may have been used to buy more shares in the bank.

The Temangalo land transaction resulted in what came to be known as the Temangalo Scandal, with critics alleging that Mbabazi, then minister of security, influenced the Fund to buy his land without going through competitive bidding and that he sold it at an exorbitant price. Dr Ezra Suruma, then minister of finance, whose ministry supervised the Fund, was Mbabazi’s partner in the bank.

Even with the bank closed, Rwomushana said Mbabazi could still have a lot of money stashed away in preparation for an electoral challenge.

Many commentators say that Mbabazi has enormous fundraising capabilities internally and outside the country.

The politics

If Mbabazi has considerable support within the military and has money, then how would he fare in the political arena?

It all starts with the NRM. When Mbabazi speaks, he exudes a sense of ownership of the party. He says his contribution to building the party dates back to the early 1970s, when he helped re-organise the Front for National Salvation (Fronasa), the precursor to NRM.

He went on to play a coordinating role in the external wing as Museveni waged a five-year war against Milton Obote’s and later Tito Okello’s forces in the 1980s, mobilising finances, cultivating new connections and providing intelligence.

When they took power, Mbabazi continued with his work outside Uganda, heading the External Security Organisation before returning to take up appointments in the ministries of defence and security and later as prime minister. 

On the restoration of multiparty politics in 2005, Mbabazi was among the sponsors of the NRM Organisation at its registration and became its first and so far only secretary general.

When Constitutional Affairs Minister Maj Gen Kahinda Otafiire and former vice president Prof Gilbert Bukenya challenged Mbabazi for the secretary general slot in 2010, Museveni backed Mbabazi.

“We need a disciplined secretary general; not one who will drink and spill party secrets in bars,” Museveni said then.     

Museveni had also defended Mbabazi against attempts to push him out of the Cabinet in 2007 over the Temangalo Scandal.

More recently, in 2012, Museveni backed Mbabazi against demands by a group of MPs that he step aside as PM to pave way for investigations into allegations that he was “eyeing” a bribe from an oil company. 

The reality is now different. Museveni, who seems to regard any challenge to his power as a threat to the party’s and country’s stability and survival, now has Mbabazi to contend with.

“The success of the Movement was guaranteed by the blood of the masses; the Movement is not for playing with; those who want to play with it should go elsewhere,” Museveni said at a rally in Entebbe a week after sacking Mr Mbabazi.

He was addressing supporters who had been mobilised from all over the country to welcome him back from attending the 69th United Nations General Assembly in New York. Before then, Museveni used to return to the country from foreign engagements without ceremony.  

But now he has to mobilise against a new challenge. Museveni recently set up a six-member committee to, according to the brief we have seen, ensure that his 2011-2016 election manifesto pledges are implemented.

The committee, chaired by Information and National Guidance Minister Rose Namayanja, includes Presidency Minister Frank Tumwebaze and Political Mobilisation Minister Richard Todwong. None of them is above 45, a pointer that Museveni has moved away from the old guard.

Eyes on next election

Over the years, Museveni has made hundreds of pledges and, according to a recent report by a parliamentary committee, many of them remained unfulfilled. He now seems to look at this as one key area where the next election battle will be fought.

But Mr Todwong was already at work long before this assignment. At an NRM Caucus meeting held at State House Entebbe to follow up on the famous Kyankwanzi resolution, Mr Todwong was chosen to act as secretary general, the official argument then being that Mbabazi was too busy as prime minister.

One of Mr Todwong’s first assignments, The EastAfrican has learnt, was to replace a number of party administrative secretaries who had been appointed by Mbabazi at the district level. A number of administrators at the party headquarters who were deemed to be pro-Mbabazi were also pushed to the periphery.

When Mbabazi refused to surrender the register of party supporters to Museveni and his backers, a hastily assembled committee proposed that Mr Todwong’s team should move to register the party members afresh.

As Museveni’s team works to realign the party in their boss’s favour, Mbabazi maintains that he will remain the secretary general and serve the party better. But he has not done any visible work in that capacity since he was dropped as PM.

Pro-Mbabazi activities are conducted by the National Poor Youth Forum, a pressure group within the NRM Youth Forum. Adam Luzindana, one of the main sponsors of the Poor Youth Forum, said that they have a countrywide network of youths mobilising for Mbabazi against President Museveni.

“We are especially opposed to the dictatorial tendencies within the party; the talk that Museveni cannot be challenged,” Mr Luzindana said, adding that they want to see their party’s constitution emended to provide for a national presidential candidate who is separate from the party chairman.

Under that arrangement, he said, they will back Museveni to remain party chairman while Mbabazi goes for the presidency.

For Mr Luzindana’s proposal of amending the Constitution to go through, he will have to convince the top party organs, which seems to be a tall order. Mike Mukula, one of the party’s vice chairmen, has already called on Mbabazi to resign as secretary general “to avoid further embarrassment.”

Francis Babu, the NRM chairman for Kampala city, does not see Mbabazi beating Museveni within NRM.

“If he comes to stand in NRM, he is going to have a lot of problems; he cannot win the primaries,” said Mr Babu.

Not yet campaign time

Mbabazi cannot openly start campaigns to challenge Museveni just yet. The party’s constitution does not allow it. Whoever intends to compete for a party position only expresses their interest to the party’s organs weeks to the national conference.

Probed on whether he will vie for the presidency at his handover last week, Mbabazi said that he would speak on the matter later.

According to Mr Ndebesa, Mbabazi cannot do much against Museveni unless he gets out of NRM.

“Many of those whom he thought were his supporters will be rehabilitated and they will be back in the fold,” Mr Ndebesa said.

And if this happens, this episode may just pass as another false alarm within NRM.

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