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Rwanda now walks a tightrope in tackling emerging genocide denial

Sunday April 17 2011
genocide

Friends, relatives and sympathisers at a Rwanda genocide memorial site. Although it is understandable to specify the genocide as having exclusively been against the Tutsi, its implication for reconciliation is problematic. Photo/AFP

Rwanda commemorated the 17th anniversary of the 1994 Genocide with a focus on denial, a subject that is increasingly becoming controversial in the country.

Critics claim it is one of the government’s foremost weapons to shut up any opposition but the government insists there is no scheme against the opposition in the country.

According to Article 13 of Rwanda’s Constitution, “Revisionism, negationism and trivialisation of genocide are punishable by the law.”

The Constitution, however, does not specify how any action could amount to either one of these vices and, as such, the law has been criticised for being vague, arbitrary, and extending the government a lot of discretion to determine the boundaries of each.

But top government officials have defended its tough stance towards anyone who attempts to minimise the genocide, rewrite its history and offer interpretations that it believes have been largely discredited such as the “double genocide theory,” which holds that both Hutu and Tutsi equally suffered genocide in 1994.

Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo, while speaking on the subject at the Atlantic Council in the U.S. in July 2010 said, “Genocide takes a long time to get out of the minds of the people and definitely for genocide survivors it’s a burden and a difficult situation that they live [with] more than anybody else.”

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At the same event, Prosecutor General, Martin Ngoga, noted: “It’s very easy to talk about the law as being too vague. But it’s very difficult to look at specifics of the law that you can classify as being vague. It equally easy to talk about the law as being used to suppress political dissent. But when it comes to the specific case in which the law has been used to deal with political dissent, the [issue] can be much easier to handle when it is narrowed down into the specifics.”

Last year Rwanda arrested Peter Erlinder, a defence attorney for accused genocide perpetrators at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, for denying the genocide and endangering Rwanda’s security through his writings and pronouncements at the Arusha court, which they construe as propounding the double genocide theory.

Prof Erlinder had come to Rwanda to provide legal advice to opposition figure, Victoire Umuhoza Ingabire, who, too, had been charged with genocide denial, stirring up ethnic hatred, and collaborating with a rebel force – the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.

As with Prof Erlinder, Ms Ingabire was faulted for, among others, comments she made immediately upon return to Rwanda after 16 years in the Netherlands that Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre did not honour the Hutus that died in 1994.

According to Gerry Caplan, a noted scholar on the genocide, “It is perfectly natural and appropriate for Rwanda to have stern laws punishing genocide denial. Many other countries do as well, even where the active dangers of denial are far more remote than in Rwanda. It goes without saying that such laws should not be written in ways that allow all dissent to be punished.”

Yet Mr Caplan cautions realism: “Any government that wants to suppress criticism can find so many other ways to do so. A failure to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate dissent is one that has confounded many governments, and as a succession of Israeli governments have demonstrated, playing the genocide card is a tactic that governments find hard to resist.

“A government confident in its own strength will work hard to allow a maximum of free speech and dissent while drawing the line at obvious attempts to exacerbate destructive divisions and re-ignite old hatreds.”

Not long ago, the Rwandan government changed the genocide’s official reference from “1994 Rwanda Genocide” to the “1994 Genocide against the Tutsi,” which Mr Caplan thinks might have been inspired by the fact that denial of the genocide may be more widespread today than before.

The specificity in name is to reinforce greater determination never to forget and also to emphasise the fact that there was only one genocide and only one group targeted, even if many Hutu were murdered for refusing to join the genocidaires’ camp.

Although Mr Caplan thinks it is understandable to clearly specify the genocide as having exclusively been against the Tutsi, its implication for reconciliation is problematic.

“We already have a judicial system, consisting of the ICTR, national courts and Gacaca courts, all of which have focused solely on Hutu killers of Tutsi. I support this priority, but it has consequences. We also have commemoration banners hanging throughout the country that refer solely to the crimes against the Tutsi. It is not illogical to believe that this narrative will be seen by some as implying that all Hutu are genocidaires and all Tutsi are victims.

“Yet many Hutu had no role in the genocide, some protected Tutsi, many suffered at the hands of the extremists, and others suffered at the hands of the RPF army. On the other hand, not all Tutsi were victims, many having returned from the diaspora to the country after the genocide. It is not clear how these realities are recognised in this commemoration. This should concern all those who believe reconciliation is vital to the future well-being of all Rwandans.”

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