The debate on negotiating with terrorists is back to the centre-stage in the wake of the high-profile deal between the US and the Taliban. Washington’s “prisoner-for-terrorists” deal has not only emboldened terrorists and insurgents in Africa, but is also likely to increase pressure on African governments facing the rising tide of terrorism to initiate negotiations with extremist fighters.

On May 31, the US initiated delicate negotiations with the Taliban, mediated by Qatar, for the release of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, 28, an American soldier held captive by the Haqqani network in Afghanistan since 2009.

In exchange, America released five Taliban detainees from Guantamo Bay: Mohammad Fazl, Mullah Norullah Noori, Mo`hammed Nabi, Khairullah Khairkhwa, and Abdul Haq Wasiq. The five, who are classified as high-risk prisoners, were transferred to Qatar where their movement will be strictly monitored and they will be restricted from moving outside the country for a year.

Even as America negotiated with the Taliban, it was fully aware of a three-pronged classic argument against negotiations with terrorists, which critics have dubbed as “dirty deals.”

One, democracies must never succumb to violence. Negotiations with terrorists amount to rewarding the use of violence.

Two, negotiations legitimise terrorists and their methods, thus undermining actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means.

Finally, talks with terrorists can destabilise the political systems of negotiating governments, torpedo international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set a dangerous precedent.

Despite this, the 20th century has seen numerous examples of deals negotiated between democratic governments and terrorist groups, now gaining momentum in the 21st century. In 1988, the Spanish government entered into negotiations with the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), which six months earlier had killed 21 shoppers in a supermarket bombing.

For decades, the United Kingdom kept a secret back channel open to the Irish Republican Army, even after the group launched the deadly mortar attack on 10 Downing Street, that nearly eliminated the entire British Cabinet in 1991.

Although not known to be soft on terrorism, in 1993 Israel secretly negotiated the Oslo accords at a time when the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) still firmly refused to recognise Israel’s right to exist and continued with its terror campaign.

Perhaps the most controversial Israel prisoner swap was that of Corporal Gilad Shalit, whose release was secured in 2011 after five years and four months in captivity. This followed a swap with 1,027 prisoners. Of the released prisoners, 280 were serving life sentences on charges of planning and perpetuating terror attacks against Israel.

In its recent negotiations with the Taliban, America seems to have blurred a clear line between supposedly rational terrorists and irrational ones often drawn by Western pundits. The latter category is termed nihilistic terrorists who view violence as a means to self-realisation, have “absolute” or even “apocalyptic” goals and are, accordingly, often religiously inspired.

The former category is the more “traditional” form of terrorists, often political in their aspiration and who use violence instrumentally to achieve specific nationalist goals, and are pre-disposed to become constructive interlocutors. Taliban or Al-Shabaab are assumed to fall into the irrational category while the IRA and ETA are in the rational category.

Negotiations with terrorist groups come at a time when the world seems to be losing the war on terror.

Recent studies are showing that terrorism is spreading worldwide, with Salafist-jihadist groups like Al Qaeda growing exponentially, terrorist attacks increasing and casualties of terrorism on the rise.

Terrorism is growing fastest in Africa, taking advantage of weak states often divided along ethnic or religious lines. From the Lord’s Resistance Army and Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa to Boko Haram wreaking havoc in Nigeria and northern Cameroon, terrorist groups are becoming increasingly bolder, stronger and determined to push their agendas, threatening security and derailing development across the continent.

Caught between a rock and a hard place, beleaguered African states may find such negotiations with terror groups increasingly attractive.

Uganda blazed the trail in negotiating with terrorists. From July 2006 to April 2008, the Uganda government was engaged in talks with the Lord’s Resistance Army — a militia established in 1987 to remove Museveni from power and set up a Christian theocratic state base on the biblical Ten Commandments.

The group, initially led by Alice Lakwena and succeeded by its current leader, Joseph Kony, had been accused of abducting 135 girls from St Mary’s College Aboke in 1996 and forcibly recruiting young boys as child soldiers and young girls as “army wives.”

The LRA-government talks, held in Juba and mediated by the then South Sudan vice president, Riek Machar, collapsed when Kony refused to come out of the forest to sign the peace treaty and subsequently stepped up the group’s terror activities from bases in the Central Africa Republic and Congo.

Since then, Nigeria, West Africa’s most populous state and Africa’s wealthiest nation, has been pushed to the ropes by the activities of the extremist religious insurgent group, Boko Haram, widely accused of killing, arson and kidnapping. Boko Haram’s daring April 14 move to kidnap 276 teenage girls from their boarding school in the Chibok area has sparked an international outcry, and increasing pressure on Abuja to fast-track negotiations with the group.

Its leader, Abubakar Shekau, initially threatened to sell the girls into slavery, but has now asked the government to release imprisoned Boko Haram leaders in exchange for the girls.

Cost of terrorism

Although Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan has maintained that the government is willing to negotiate with the Boko Haram insurgents, he has ruled out any possibility of swapping prisoners for the girls.

The pressure on the Nigerian government to negotiate with Boko Haram could grow as the militia become a regional security menace. On May 16, it staged an attack in neighbouring northern Cameroon, killing one Chinese worker and kidnapping 10 others.

In East Africa, regional governments, supported by America and European Union powers, have pursued a hardline approach to the Al Qaeda-affiliated Al Shabaab group in Somalia, accused of bombing, killing and kidnapping.

Inside Somalia, Al Shabaab has targeted young girls and boys for kidnapping, using the boys to protect adult fighters and the girls to serve as their wives.

In Kenya, the group kidnaped a British female tourist in September 2011 and a French tourist, Marie Deudeu, in October 2011, who died three weeks later in captivity. This spate of kidnappings forced the Kenya Defence Forces to launch a military assault on the Al Shabaab insurgents in Somalia.

America has advanced a military argument to justify the release of top Taliban fighters in exchange for Bergdahl. “The responsibility to make sure all of our men and women in uniform return from battle, especially those taken prisoner and held during war, is deeply personal to me, as someone who has worn the uniform of my country and as someone who was deeply involved in those efforts with respect to the unfinished business of the war in which I fought,” said the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, a Vietnam war veteran.

But as in the case of Mr Bergdahl, African governments facing the menace of terrorism could find themselves caught between the rock and the sledge hammer. Failure to rein in insecurity relating to terrorist attacks is likely to continue to cause public uproar and criticism.

Yet, in starting negotiations with terrorist groups, these governments risk being accused of setting a precedent for a criminal kidnap and ransom economy as a new source of income for terrorists.

As Africa ponders the possibility of negotiating with terrorist groups like Boko Haram or Al Shabaab, it has to be alive to the risks inherent in such dialogue. In a sense, the debate on negotiating with terrorist groups has the potential of revolutionising future relations between states and non-state actors in complex conflicts like the one in Somalia.

Releasing senior captives of terrorist groups as an outcome of negotiations can end up bolstering the strength of the insurgency and prolonging the conflict with the state. The five Taliban fighters Washington released were prisoners who were classified by Pentagon as “high risk” and “likely to pose a threat,” having held senior positions in the Taliban regime that America toppled in Afghanistan in 2001.

This has roused the anger of the Republican politicians. Arizona Senator and celebrated Vietnam prisoner of war, John McCain, was particularly concerned about the risk the release of these five posed to America. “These are the highest high-risk people. Others that we have released have gone back into the fight,” he said.

Laureen Wesonga is a policy analyst with the Africa Policy Institute. Professor Peter Kagwanja is the chief executive of the Institute, and a former government advisor. This article is part of the Institute’s Citizen Security Project