As tensions rise in South Sudan over the conflict in Nasir in Upper Nile, in the east of the country, First Vice President Dr Riek Machar may also be considering how this could affect his political relevance.
The authorities in Juba have carried out a series of arrests of senior military and cabinet members of Dr Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), accusing them of being in “conflict with the law.”
The government in Juba has defended the arrests, saying the individuals were fuelling violence by the White Army militia in Nasir against South Sudanese troops.
Dr Machar himself remains outside of the dragnet, but his movement has been restricted, technically placing him under house arrest in Juba. Officials say the White Army are troops from the SPLA-IO, the armed wing of Machar’s party.
The bigger question, however, is whether Dr Machar and his party will last in the coalition government known as the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU).
TGoNU is the result of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), brokered by regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Government (Igad).
As it stands, the agreement gives Dr Machar immunity from dismissal. It also technically gives him a say in the sacking of any minister from his party. However, this has already been violated after President Salva Kiir sacked several ministers last year, despite protests from the SPLM-IO.
Now Dr Machar is in danger of losing his clout as one of the country's leading political figures after President Kiir also targeted members of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF,) who are allied to Dr Machar.
Fighting between the South Sudanese military and the White Army in Upper Nile has put Dr Machar in the spotlight. But it is not the only cause for concern. Intermittent skirmishes in other SPLM-IO dominated regions such as Abyei, Twic, Western Equatoria and Jonglei have also signalled a fragile ceasefire under the R-ARCSS.
For the first time since 2018, the SSPDF carried out an airstrike in Nasir on the night of March 16, causing civilian casualties and fires.
Since the initial peace agreement in 2015, Dr Machar has been deserted by several of his key political and military allies. The first was his former chief negotiator, Taban Deng Gai, who defected in 2016 and was rewarded with the post of vice president.
South Sudan President Salva Kiir (right) with his new vice president Taban Deng Gai at State House, in Juba on July 26, 2016.
Photo credit: AFP
Others include Johnson Olony, the former leader of the Agwelek militias that used to control the Malakal region, and more recently General Simon Gatwech, who broke away from the SPLM-IO in 2022 with a significant number of fighters to form the SPLM-Kitwang. Gen Gatwech was in February appointed the deputy commander-in-chief of the SSPDF.
According to Dr Remember Miamingi, a South Sudanese governance expert and human rights advocate, Dr Machar’s power hinged on two key pillars: unwavering ethnic Nuer support, which fuelled his military and political clout, and international legitimacy as a central signatory to successive peace deals.
But the SPLM-IO accuses Mr Kiir of systematically eroding foundations of the 2018 peace agreement. They say SPLM-IO troops are largely confined to squalid cantonment sites, fuelling disgruntlement and intercommunal strife, which in turn has fragmented SPLM-IO support base.
“This combination of poor troop conditions, divide-and-rule tactics, and government-aligned narratives portraying him as a weak leader indifferent to community suffering has rapidly drained his influence and unity of command. International frustration over persistent violence and perceived agreement violations have likewise chipped away at Dr Machar’s standing,” said Dr Miamingi.
He said that Dr Machar, however, remains marginally relevant thanks to his formal role in the peace process and the reluctance of external actors to sideline him altogether.
Ultimately, Dr Machar’s political and military fortunes depend on his ability to break free from Juba’s constraints, to re-engage with his fractured networks in Upper Nile, and rekindle external backing for a more balanced deal.
According to political commentator Akol Miyen Kuol any change or replacement of Dr Machar can only happen internally if enough members of SPLM-IO feel that his leadership is wanting.
“So, President Kiir doesn't have a right to change or replace Dr Machar as long as the revitalised deal has not come to an end,” he said.
Dr Machar has been confined to Juba since arriving in the capital in early 2020. He is not allowed to leave Juba, even for medical treatment.
In addition to engineered defections, ministries assigned to his party have been swapped and his party officials sacked, including from state governors, without his consent. In the latest wave of crisis, forces affiliated with him came under attack in all three states being administered by his party governors.
Dr Miamingi says Dr Machar may be losing relevance because he is not delivering any of the changes he talked about before arriving in Juba, such as his claims to be fighting for democratic, economic and security transformation of South Sudan.
“Anytime he releases a public statement, it is only about violations of the agreement that directly affect his party members and forces,” he said.
Lam Jok, a former official of SPLM-IO, says Dr Machar is still crucial to the peace process and his forces remain strong, but accuses Kiir's camp of trying to abrogate the R-ARCSS by antagonising some signatories.
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