Advertisement

It seems no one knows how to deal decisively with the FDLR issue

Saturday June 07 2014

The Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), seems to be at its weakest in as many years as a fighting force committed to the overthrow of President Kagame.

Its public display of laying down their arms comes after a series of declarations — all unfulfilled — where they committed to ending the path of armed struggle as their primary vehicle for a return to Rwanda and a regime change.

Following the defeat of the Congolese Tutsi-dominated March 23 Movement, famously or infamously known as M23, it would be the turn of the Congo-based Rwandan Hutu FDLR to face the wrath of the very capable Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the United Nations Mission in Congo.

This FIB, a crack brigade, had proved its mettle against seasoned fighters of the M23. Therefore, it would be inevitable that an engagement with the FDLR would certainly annihilate the latter, who, unlike M23, would have no safe haven in any of the countries directly neighbouring Congo, overland.

Therefore, their surrender can be framed around this possibility of their inevitable defeat if engaged by the UN-backed FIB.

On its part, the FIB has on several occasions talked of pursuing peaceful political means. How they would do this is not certain, as FDLR is branded a gang of genocide perpetrators in Rwanda, where they would inevitably have to be located in order to play any meaningful role in the political arena.

Advertisement

Otherwise, they would become one of the several political organisations trying to get a foothold in Rwanda “clandestinely” as most of their leaders are on the so-called “most wanted” list.

The response from commentators understood to be functionaries of the Kigali ruling elite paints a dim view of this latest move.

More so, the head of the Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, Jean Sayinzoga, seemed to echo the views of FDLR’s adversaries in Kigali when he poured cold water on this latest move, supporting assertions that it is a red herring aimed at deception.

The fact that the FDLR is surrendering to the Monusco and not repatriating to Rwanda could be the reason for its negative reception from officials like Sayinzoga.

Just a matter of time

If the FIB and its parent organisation Monusco are involved in a “ruse” with the FDLR and other “sponsors” in maintaining the rebel group in Congo while pretending to have laid down their weapons, it will be a matter of time before another military outfit along the lines of the M23 is reactivated in eastern DRC.

This is because the M23 was just an incarnation of earlier groups in the struggle against FDLR, among other possible reasons of existence.

In case the FDLR is wholly committed to an end of military hostilities, what is the roadmap, and how and to where do they intend to proceed if the process does not involve Rwanda?

Several of the latest sympathisers of the FDLR have urged its leaders not to give up their fight. That they should do so only under a clear, negotiated peace settlement with Kigali. This was the view taken on a recent Blogtalk Radio call-in programme.

Dr Theogene Rudasingwa, the head of the exiled Rwanda National Congress (RNC), called on the FDLR not to lay down arms.

This takes us to the next question: Is the FDLR a coherent military force with a centralised chain of command? Given that it was rooted in the Hutu refugee population in DR Congo, who were scattered in the vast territory, how is this surrender of possibly a franchised outfit going to work out?

The FDLR has sought and received a degree of support that seems to have put it on the journey to becoming a mainstream and legitimate political player.

Given the circumstances, while Kigali would hear none of that and considers the group a genocidaire terrorist organisation, how is Monusco and other international players going to manage this certainly delicate and complex situation that has roots in the politics of ethnicity of Rwanda and not Congo?

Clearly, resolving the issue of the FDLR is not going to be as straightforward as how the M23 issue was dealt with.

Frank Kagabo is an Erasmus Mundus graduate student of journalism, media and globalisation at Aarhus University, Denmark, and Swansea University, the UK, specialising in war and conflict reporting. E-mail: [email protected]