Understanding South Sudan’s current levels of mediation has to be a process through which Igad needs to provide procedural assistance to all the parties who matter.

With each level, there is a process that varies from other mediation in terms of context, forms, values and interests, underlying philosophy, history and implementation.

While Igad has been suggesting possible solutions in the South Sudan peace talks, the parties have been asking to make own decisions on what outcomes will best meet their interests. Putting all the actors in such level of interests has been hard for Igad. Rather Igad ended up being criticised and cautioned not to serve as a judge or an arbiter.

In my view, the actors of the negotiation tracks, (Track I, Track II, and others) are the SPLM-In Government, SPLM/A-In Opposition, armed break-away individuals or groups, militarised civilians like the “White Army” and of course those involved in communal conflicts, independent minded-generals, civil society representatives, religious leaders, community-based organisations, youth leaders, women’s associations and others.

Track I of the Igad process is mainly dealing with official diplomacy using mediation, negotiation, conciliation, threats of diplomatic sanctions and coercive diplomacy, many local and regional hot lines, management of crisis and war diplomacy, using other good offices of European Union and United Nations and White House, several informal consultations, unilateral goodwill gestures and more.

Track II is non-official diplomacy, which Igad has not been putting visibility and resource on. Yet, Track II links up with the official diplomacy. Track II works best whenever there is support to indigenous dispute resolution and legal institutions, support to peace commissions, promotion of non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops, humanitarian diplomacy and cultural exchanges among others.

Another level is military tracks, including terminating arms control agreement and arms proliferation, cutting military aid, alternative defence strategies, deterrence, arms embargo and blockades, promoting non-aggression agreement, restructuring and integrating military forces, setting up of military to military programmes, collective security arrangements, limiting military intervention, keeping demilitarised zones, confidence-building on security measures, forced and voluntary disarmament, and more.

For many reason given by the government of South Sudan whose claims are taking care of the citizens security, Igad has not done much.

At the economic and social tracks, reforms are needed, reparation or resettlement of refugees and displaced people, joint projects — funding for the peace process (Igad’s Partner’s Forum) that was a Sudan and South Sudan coming from 16 countries needs to be encouraged, agricultural programmes cooperation, inter-communal trade, communication and interactions, more humanitarian assistance, economic sanctions against notorious spoilers, improved development assistance, wide-based private economic investment, improved and developed social services like health assistances, schools, roads, etc.

‘Too many cooks’

While Igad tries to bring many stakeholders into the process following the above levels and tracks, many have alluded to the phrase that such multi-stakeholder representations may not define lasting solutions; rather, they are one of the “too many cooks that will spoil the soup”. To me, Igad was lacking clear definitions of the tracks for where each group should make better influence.

In South Sudan, there has also been the constant and steady demand of Equatoria to have a federal Republic. Somehow, this particular demand was mixed up with the Igad-led peace process that focuses on the parties to the conflict, when in fact it is what South Sudan, as a country will have to embrace.

Regionally, the interests, values and recommendations are also coming from Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, Somalia, South Africa, China, The Troika (Norway, the US and United Kingdom).

In fact, all the actors mentioned above have their interests and values that Igad has to deal with. All these have brought in many new dynamics, changing demands, spoilers, and entrepreneurs.

Issues of inclusivity in the mediated government structure have moved the process to another mediated peace level of power-sharing. Some scenarios have emerged.

The existing government is continuing with its leader Salva Kiir as the president of the republic, and is getting all the support it needs as a government; the issue of shared administration (50/50) is to be decided after the next session.

We cannot rule out the prolonged conflict, in which the fighters have to win and take it all on their sides. This option is not preferred, but buying guns and heavy artillery has been taking place.

The international community has threatened to impose sanctions against individuals who are perceived to be spoilers or even put South Sudan under the UN Trusteeship. This model of imposing experts and technocrats may have serious implications too.

This last option may also need to consider the level of operation and outcomes of the Human Rights Commission of the AU led by former president of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo.

In any of these levels of mediation, the outcome that can lead to reconciliation requires that SPLA’s background of amalgamation of soldiers who were serving in the Sudan Army, and others have to reconcile at that level. Many of these soldiers and generals did not have shared culture. There is no difference and shift from politics of war to politics of peace.

As said above mediated peace that brings in governance should also help in designing diversification of economy, and not rely only on oil revenues.

Reforms — military, political, economic, social — have to focus on re-building institutions, systems and structures of governance to allow mediated peace and governance work smoothly and faster. Mediated peace and governance has its lifespan, but it must put accountability to its core work, where the rule-of-law will operate. This is where the Obasanjo report can play a big role.

Levels of reconciliation

Finally, we can talk about levels of reconciliation. The first level should target political leaders, which I call political reconciliation. It does include generals and to some extent military force. In fact, Riek Machar and Salva Kiir need to demonstrate to the people of South Sudan and the world that they have reconciled.

The second level of reconciliation is to weave in institutional reforms that trickle down to the communities. This level may focus on community-based peace dividends promotion like common markets, common schools, hospitals for all, etc.

That will facilitate the next level of reconciliation, which is social reconciliation, where communities that have fought one another for years begin to evaluate the war against peace. Finally, South Sudan needs structural reconciliation.

By this I mean, the structures of the society, military and civilians have to move from where it is to another level. The country needs new thinking, new actors, and improved local structures to work with.

Structurally, federalism has to be clearly defined, as to what form of federalism is needed. At the current structural operation, we have the central form of government (national) that relies on state-run decentralised system (regional) and the local government (ethnic).

Federalism may work in South Sudan if the centre is strong, but it is weak and divided. In Ethiopia, which has an extremely strong centre, other regional nationalities can be forcefully directed.

Nigeria has a levelled decentralised system, but the centre became corrupt and the entire state takes on the centre. Otherwise federalism can easily lead to separation, anarchy, and widespread corruptions.

Dr Sunday Okello Angoma is a senior researcher on African peace and security with special focus on the Great Lakes Region.