In the aftermath of the horrific Westgate Mall events in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21, I found myself thinking about rational and educated explanations to the irrational and inhumane events that took place. It wasn’t easy.

As Kenya, and indeed East Africa, picks itself up from the worst terrorist attack since the 1998 US embassy bombings, we are left with more questions than answers.

Once the dust settles, a key question that will arise is whether the attacks could have been prevented and, more important, whether Kenya’s intelligence apparatus missed key signals.

Prior to sending troops into Somalia, Kenya was the only partner state of the East African Community not to have sent troops into a foreign territory. As a result, when KDF entered Somalia in October 2011, many security experts warned of blowback from Al Shabaab.

It is critical to understand that terrorist groups like Al Shabaab, as well as Al Qaeda, play the long game. If they strike back, there shouldn’t be an expectation that they will do so within months or a year. So perhaps talk of the demise of Al Shabaab was premature; they were just waiting for the opportune time to strike.

In March 2013, with the support of my colleagues at the Society for International Development, I wrote a brief titled Kenya’s Existential Elections. In the brief, I tried to look beyond election day and stayed away from predicting an election result.

This is what I wrote about the challenges the new president would have to face:

Surprisingly missing from the campaign debates is the Somalia question. How long will KDF troops remain in Somalia? What is the end game? How will a Kenyatta presidency unfold if the West and international partners isolate it? Can they risk isolating Kenya especially after all the progress made in Somalia by Kenya via the African Union Mission in Somalia?

The next president will have to navigate these rocky issues while expecting that a vengeful Al Shabaab could cause some headaches within the country.

For Mr Kenyatta, Somalia can be the trump card that prevents the Western powers from implementing sanctions because there is a clear understanding that the country is crucial to keeping Somalia stable and Al Shabaab at bay… Somalia and Al Shabaab may have been invisible during the political campaigns.

They will reassert themselves very quickly once the president-elect takes the oath of office.

The absence of Somalia discussions demonstrated how distant the war felt to both politicians and the citizenry.

The New York Times wrote of the Westgate Mall attack, “Witnesses said several militants had toted G3 assault rifles, a bulky weapon that Kenyan security services use. Intelligence analysts say this may mean the militants acquired their weapons from corrupt Kenyan officers, who are known to sell or rent out their guns, charging as little as a few dollars an hour.”

Such allegations are quite disconcerting because they indicate how much the intelligence apparatus has been breached. There were also reports that the assailants had rented a shop inside the Westgate mall where they could stockpile their weapons slowly.

This perhaps answers why the siege lasted so long. How was it possible that the terrorists never ran out of ammunition? Clearly, they had enough weapons and ammunition to hold off the entire Kenya Defence Force.

What this demonstrates is how you can get away with almost anything at a price. Corruption has always been a governance and service delivery issue. However, we have now reached a point that it has permeated the entire fabric of our society.

What the Westgate attacks showed us, and it should be a warning to the entire region, is that corruption is now a national security threat. If security can be breached at a price, then we are at a point of no return.

In Tanzania, there have been instances at the Julius K. Nyerere International Airport of non-passengers being able to pass through the first round of security to escort departing passengers after paying a bribe.

Non-passengers are not allowed to go past the first initial security checkpoint and check-in counter. However, if you pay a small “facilitation fee,” you can do so.

This may seem trivial, but in the broader context of safety and security it is actually quite frightening. If a small bribe can allow you to breach security on a low level like escorting your friend and family to the check-in counter when it is against the rules, what can a hefty bribe get you?

Soul-Searching

Kenya and the entire East African region will need to look at themselves in the mirror, to re-examine their intelligence and security apparatus.

A Westgate can happen anywhere and at any time. The truth is, we are utterly unprepared for any kind of attack. We don’t need a terrorist attack to remind us how unprepared we are for dealing with a crisis.

If we look at the maritime disasters that happened in Tanzania, mudslides in Uganda and various floods that have left many cities in the region under water, a consistent theme develops.

One, that there are no contingency or response plans, and two, the constant request for external help, whether it is a submarine from South Africa to search for victims following the maritime disasters in Tanzania or FBI/Mossad/Interpol agents assisting with the current investigations in Nairobi.

How much longer can we do this? If we cannot prevent, manage or solve a crisis by ourselves, then we are accepting that our governments are unable to protect their citizens. As a result, we can no longer complain when foreign governments issue travel advisories and warnings.

A crisis of confidence

Confidence in the Kenyatta administration has taken a severe hit; that will be one of the major long-term consequences of the Westgate attack. This is not so much due to the first 24-48 hours after the attack, but the days after and the severe deficit in communication.

The security and intelligence apparatus of Kenya has been breached; in fact the entire security apparatus in the region has been undermined. Of course, blaming it on the Kenyatta administration alone would be unfair, considering the Somalia incursion was undertaken by the Mwai Kibaki regime.

Nevertheless, Kenyatta and his government will now have to fight battles on two fronts with the charges of the International Criminal Court lingering over their heads.

There will also be an added pressure to respond to the attack, perhaps militarily, in order to demonstrate resolve. This has to be done delicately, and fears of backlash against the Somali community in Kenya have heightened. There are concerns that the security authorities will clamp down hard on highly concentrated Somali neighbourhoods like Eastleigh.

This will have negative economic consequences, considering that Somalia and Somalis have a huge stake in Kenya’s economy.

Regardless, isolating the Somali community would be a mistake considering how the multinational composition of the terrorists demonstrated that the Shabaab is no longer a Somali group and problem. Westgate announces the arrival of the nouveau terrorist.

Ahmed Salim is a programme manager with the Society for International Development. He is based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.