Could East African Community part ways again as West African bloc has just done?

If the collapse of EAC, and now ECOWAS, teaches us anything, it is that the greatest risk to regional blocs is men in uniform, with medals on their chests, and carrying pistols.

Photo credit: Joseph Nyagah | Nation Media Group

On January 29, 2025, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali formally pulled out of the West African bloc ECOWAS, a move they announced last year.

In the military coups that swept through these three countries since 2020, and the subsequent ostracism by ECOWAS, the mostly radical junta leaders—Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré, Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tchiani, and Mali’s General Assimi Goita—picked up their balls and walked off the field. They formed their entity, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

A stunned ECOWAS, apparently not expecting such a strong reaction, tried to play soft, hoping they would mellow, but the soldiers weren’t for turning.

Acting as grown-ups, ECOWAS has decided that citizens of these countries will retain their visa-free movement privileges to the bloc, continuing some backdoor regional cooperation.

As an alliance of radicals, the AES has been making serious anti-imperialism noises. They have either seized mines and other national assets from what they claim are exploitative multinational firms or aggressively renegotiated contracts and concessions to secure bigger shares of natural resource revenues. They also ran the French out of town.

However, jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have significantly increased their activities in these countries. Burkina Faso, in particular, has become an epicentre of terrorism in the Sahel, with jihadists controlling or influencing vast swathes of territory, including areas close to major towns. The security situation has worsened, with the number of violent events involving jihadist groups almost doubling since 2021.

The formation of AES was intended to enhance mutual defence. However, its effectiveness in countering jihadist forces remains uncertain, and the decision to leave ECOWAS has led to increased regional isolation, potentially reducing international support and cooperation needed to address the jihadist threat.

It is, therefore, not unreasonable for ECOWAS to keep a window open. After all, in the years to come, when this new wave of military rule has burnt out, and the three return to more traditional governance (which might include the junta leaders casting off their uniforms and donning suits or colourful West African robes), they could return to the ECOWAS fold.

In some respects, West Africa is where the East African Community was 48 years ago in July 1977 when the bloc—then comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—was officially terminated.

EAC had been in turmoil for some years, rocked by political and economic tensions among its member states. The biggest reason for the break, ultimately, seemed to be the ascendance to power by General Idi Amin in Uganda in a January 1971 coup.

While Kenya and Tanzania had bitter ideological feuds, presidents Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta would have held their noses and let the EAC limp along into a coma. Amin, however, was too volatile and disruptive a force. His threats culminated in his invasion of Tanzania in October 1978, barely a year after the divorce.

With the Democratic Republic of Congo government, currently hopping mad over what it alleges is Rwanda’s support for the March 23 (M23) rebels, which just routed Kinshasa in the key eastern city of Goma, and are now marching on Bukavu, some fear the EAC could, in reverse, have its own ECOWAS moment, with DRC and its ally in the war, Burundi, quitting the club.

Rwanda, in turn, is furious at Kinshasa for adopting the FDLR forces blamed for the Genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, and while denying direct support for M23, says it is maintaining a defence posture at its border against the threat they pose.

Rwanda has had a long time to learn how to bite its lip and will stay. Not so DRC, particularly President Felix Tshisekedi, who is said to be given to temper tantrums.

However, if the collapse of EAC, and now ECOWAS, teaches us anything, it is that the greatest risk to regional blocs is men in uniform, with medals on their chests, and carrying pistols. When they take off their uniforms and civilianise, they become a safer bet.

Being an eight-member organisation might also be a blessing. ECOWAS had 15 members (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo), enough for a reasonable number to split off and form an organisation that might work. However, it is insane considering that Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali are all landlocked.

There are also some dyed-in-the-wool integrationists like Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, who is unlikely to leave an abusive East African marriage and will stay for the sake of the children. That will provide a pull force that will keep a reasonable number of members in the EAC.

That said, as in relationships, divorce should not be the first option. Those who stay might need a cool-off period, where they go away to reorganise their thoughts, learn to meditate, do yoga, and return when their spirit has been strengthened.

Because of this, the EAC could consider an amendment to its treaty to provide for a trial divorce. It would set out what a member who wants out can do until it feels the conditions are right for it to return.

That ECOWAS idea of retaining freedom of movement in the bloc for their citizens is smart. And of course, every year in late December, the EAC Secretary-General would also send them a Christmas and Happy New Year card.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans.” X (Twitter) @cobbo3