Same old script as new AU Somalia mission takes position

Ugandan peacekeeping troops stand during a ceremony at Mogadishu airport in Somalia.

Photo credit: Reuters

Partners involved in attempt to restore security in Somalia find themselves in familiar territory as another force comes through the Horn of Africa nation’s revolving door of peacekeeping missions that come and go without addressing strategic issues that would end violent extremism and insurgency.

On January 1, 2025, the new mission—the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (Aussom)—began its five-year tenure with a mandate that the African Union proposed four years ago, but was rejected by Somali military leaders and donors. The duo is now backing the latest mission.

Now, the entry of Aussom marks the start of Somalia’s third transition in six years, a situation that was not envisaged when the Somali Transition Plan (STP) took off in 2018. The STP ended in 2021 without attaining the phases of transition, leading to the authorisation of another mission.

Meanwhile, Uganda’s military has been placed on standby to secure additional territory in the new peacekeeping mission as part of the AU’s realignment of its force supporting the Somali army in combating the jihadist insurgent group alShabaab.

The additional territory is the Middle Shabelle region – also referred to in peacekeeping terms as Sector 5 – which has been primarily secured by Burundi National Defence Forces (BNDF) since 2014, when the AU mission in Somalia created and assigned a sector to each troop-contributing country contingent.

This comes amid the latest shakeup in the troop-contributing countries to peacekeeping missions to Somalia following the authorisation of a new force.

“We have been given additional areas of responsibility in Sector 5,” said Brig-Gen Felix Kulayigye, Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) Public Information Officer.

He indicated that this task may require deploying more troops to Somalia.

Burundi, which secures Middle Shabelle, is recalling its forces while Egypt, the would-be replacement, is yet to deploy troops to Somalia.

Still, sources close to the mission say that Cairo will send several battalions “in June or if earlier, around late March”.

Another military source confirmed that the UPDF is on standby to take Middle Shabelle. But The EastAfrican understands that there are ongoing discussions between Somalia and Burundi for a bilateral arrangement that will determine if BNDF remain deployed in the Horn of Africa nation. “If Burundi pulls out, we may occupy Sector 5 if blessed by the top leadership,” Brig-Gen Kulayigye said.

But Defence Minister Jacob Oboth Oboth appears to dispute this development: “UPDF is still in charge of Sector 1 only, until otherwise decided by the AU,” he told The EastAfrican.

Sector 5 is part of Somali territory that was liberated and placed under AU peacekeepers.

Despite returning forward operating bases in its area of responsibility to the Somali security forces, UPDF maintains security in large swathes of territory that are densely populated and vulnerable to attacks by al-Shabaab, using improvised explosive devices and mortar fire.

Uganda military’s presence in Somalia covers a combined area of 70,285 square kilometres in the Banadir region, which includes Mogadishu, Somalia’s industrial and commercial hub, and political and diplomatic capital.

The UPDF also deploys in the Lower Shabelle region, the country’s agricultural heartland.

With addition of the Middle Shabelle region – 60,000 square kilometres -- and a 400-kilometre coastline along the Indian Ocean under its responsibility, this expansion means the Uganda contingent may need to increase its troop numbers beyond the current deployment.

Bilateral arrangements

Security analysts suggest that the increased demand on UPDF has budget implications. It will change the deployment dynamics, potentially compelling Kampala to send more troops than its current quota of 5,000 under Aussom.

Aussom is authorised to deploy up to 12,626 troops from Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt, and Ethiopia until June this year, and 11,826 troops thereafter.

Analysts say Uganda will follow in the footsteps of Egypt and Ethiopia, which are pushing the envelope by deploying the quotas of troops allocated to them in Aussom but also maintaining a bigger number of soldiers on Somali territory under bilateral arrangements with the government in Mogadishu.

Despite appearing to deny the Uganda contingent’s imminent takeover of Sector 5, Oboth says sending extra troops to Somalia would not be out of the norm, since UPDF has had troops in the Horn of Africa country for the longest period.

In November 2024, Oboth and his Somali counterpart Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur signed an Implementation Agreement which, among other things, allows the two countries to explore bilateral arrangements under which they can deploy to address national and regional security matters.

The agreement followed discussions initiated in 2023 by Uganda President Yoweri Museveni and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud when the Somalia leader visited Uganda.

His host pledged not to abandon Mogadishu after the expiry of the Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis) tenure on December 31, 2024.

Lawyer and regional security analyst Edgar Tabaro says that the downsizing of the UN-mandated AU missions in Somalia is inevitable due to new conflicts preoccupying the global north and its allies, leaving the initiative to frontline states like Kenya and Uganda to maintain a presence in Somalia.

This is on the basis that the stability of Somalia is of significance to forestall the growing threats of terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons that fuel insecurity in eastern Africa, in places such as Wajir, northern Kenya, Uganda’s Karamoja sub-region and South Sudan.

Indeed, the recently authorised Aussom is already facing challenges, including funding and a diplomatic row between the Somali government and Burundi, a key troop contributor.

The dispute stems from the allocation of 1,040 troops to Burundi in Aussom, which has led Gitega to signal its intention to recall its soldiers from Somalia, where BNDF has been deployed since 2007.

According to the AU, Sector 5 is strategically located and acts as a security buffer for Mogadishu against al-Shabaab attacks and also plays a key role in securing the main supply routes from the capital to other parts of the country.

Middle Shabelle has strategic military bases in Jowhar, Ceel Egelow, Balad, and Ceel Macaan—along the Indian Ocean coastline north of Mogadishu city—and Bio Cadale, Maslah, and Qorilow, which the AU missions handed to the Somali National Army last year.

Critics have pronounced a harsh verdict, saying that without addressing the strategic issues that have prolonged the war, there are no guarantees that the new AU-led force will be the last in Somalia or defeat the al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group Shabaab.

“The two previous transitions suffered the same fate. Aussom won’t be any different. And it won’t be the last mission because like its predecessors, it doesn’t address the infrastructure and social orientation needs of the Somalis,” said a military source who requested anonymity to speak freely.

The source said that al Shabaab has won hearts and minds with the ideological orientation of locals and the provision of social services such as water – which, ironically, the insurgents also deploy as a weapon against the AU and government forces.

The group supplied water in drought-hit areas such as Hiraan that Amisom/Atmis later would capture. Still, after losing territory, al Shabaab would destroy the borehole and leave, which forced the local population to turn against the peacekeepers for denying them access to water.

In a post on X this month, humanitarian information provider ReliefWeb said Shabaab have weaponised access to food and water during Somalia’s droughts.

This situation shows how climate change and conflict are intertwined. Last month, the International Crisis Group also flagged a similar war tactic. “As Somalia’s rural areas succumb to the effects of climate change, al-Shabaab has sought to capitalise on droughts by using access to water to pressure the population,” Crisis Group tweeted.

The first transition began in 2018 with the Somalia Transition Plan, which has three phases and was expected to continue until the end of 2021. This led to the exit of the African Union Mission Somalia (Amisom) after 14 years in the country.

It was replaced by the short-lived African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis) from April 2022 to December 31, 2024, which, going by the AU’s plan, should have exited in April 2027.

In 2021, as Amisom was being reconfigured into a transitional outfit that would transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces, the AU and troop-contributing countries proposed a five-year mission during which Atmis would undertake thorough preparation and combat mentoring of the Somali National Army (SNA).

The AU reasoned that in five years, the SNA would invest in force generation to adequately assume security responsibilities. But leaders of the Somali security forces and mission-fatigued donors rejected the plan and shortened Atmis’ duration to under three years—specifically, 32 months.

Atmis was also held to strict force drawdown timelines in three phases, which led to the dissolution of the transitional peacekeeping mission last month.

“Atmis was born out of failures by the Somali government to raise enough forces to take charge of their country’s security,” said Simon Mulongo, a Ugandan diplomat and former Deputy Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) to Amisom from August 2017 to November 2021.

“They have soldiers trained from Türkiye, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, but the fact is, Somalis lack combat experience against the Shabaab fighters who have been at it since 2006,” he said, adding that SNA’s challenge is holding onto its trained personnel who may defect to the militant group for better pay.

At its 69th meeting held on January 19, 2007, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted the decision on the situation in Somalia for the deployment of a peace support mission dubbed the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) for an initial six-month period.

On February 21, the UN Security Council approved Amisom’s mandate as adopted by the AUPSC. Subsequent six-monthly renewals were granted to the mission until October 2014, when the force, now at its peak with 22,000 troops from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, was given an extension by one year.

In December 2021, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2614 (2021) to extend Amisom’s mandate until March 31, 2022. During this period, the Council authorised Atmis to replace Amisom through Resolution 2628.

Atmis was mandated to facilitate and deliver the full transition by handing over, in phases, all forward operating bases it occupied and transferring security responsibilities to Somali forces. This led to the liquidation of the AU mission and the exit of foreign forces from Somalia by December 31, 2024.

However, the full transition failed as the Somali military that took over security responsibilities and led counter-insurgency offensive operations suffered setbacks and lost territory to a resurgent al Shabaab that overran bases in 2023 and 2024 in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states.

As a result, on January 1, 2025, a rollover from Atmis to Aussom took place, to hold fort until the official unveiling of the new mission on July 1.

Atmis would also – jointly with the SNA – undertake intensified offensive operations against Al Shabaab and the phased handover of military bases, but Somali commanders and donors, rejected the incoming force’s size, duration and also questioned the AU’s assessment of the threat Somalia faced.

In what they described as uncalculated fights, highly placed sources told The EastAfrican that Somali political leaders and military chiefs have always wanted the billions of dollars that international partners pumped into the AU-led missions since 2007 channelled to Somali security forces.

The EU, for instance, has been the main financial contributor to the creation of Amisom and Atmis, having provided nearly €2.7 billion ($2.8 billion) in funding since 2007 to cover troop salaries. But the bloc has spent significantly less money that directly supports the Somali security sector.

This attitude among Somalis against the AU peacekeepers has its foundation in the country’s highest office; as early as 2013, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, then the newly sworn-in Somali president expressed the sentiment that the continued presence of foreign troops in his country was unsustainable.

“How many more years can Amisom be in Somalia?” he said in an interview with the Rift Valley Institute on February 3, 2013. “We are expecting that old practices will be changed…We are the Somali government and we determine the type of assistance we want, and where and when we want it.”