President Pierre Nkurunziza’s government has turned to escalating the internal conflict in Burundi, taking it beyond the borders by punishing perceived enemies from the outside.

Last week, it expelled the First Counsellor at the Rwandan embassy in Bujumbura and this week requested Belgium to replace its ambassador, saying it had “no more confidence in him.” Media reports indicated that it had expelled some Rwandans while some businesses owned by their kin were attacked.

Rwanda has so far kept its counsel while the Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesperson was quoted as saying his government viewed the act as “unfriendly.” So, if we may ask, what’s going on, and what’s Nkurunziza’s calculated endgame?

One way to comprehend the goings-on would be to start with the allegation by Bujumbura that Rwanda is harbouring its enemies and training rebels to destabilise it. It can then be deduced that the expulsion of the diplomat is “retaliation.” And while there hasn’t been a specific “crime” labelled against Brussels, it seems Belgium is paying for its recent decision to cut aid to the strife-stricken regime.

Maybe this is a result of Nkurunziza’s anger at his perceived double standards with how his “third-term project” has been received by the world — condemning it than any other in the region. But interpreting his external posture or policy following his “victory” thus would be to miss the probable larger strategy — legitimise the contested electoral outcome.

Firstly, the problem in Burundi is, by and large, internally — not externally — generated. Had Burundians consensually endorsed the third term without bloodshed or sustained contestation, no one in the region would probably complain — and all Nkurunziza would be left to do is convince his Western donors to “forgive” him.

Secondly, since the RPF took power in July 1994, it has never been hostile to CNDD-FDD. In fact, instead of aligning with then president Pierre Buyoya during the conflict, it backed the Arusha peace process that handed Nkurunziza power.

The only time this relationship seemed to have been jeopardised was after the birth of the so-called “coalition of the willing” when Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete suggested that Rwanda talk to the genocidal FDLR rebels. Even then, relations seemed to have remained cordial — to the extent that President Paul Kagame met Nkurunziza in Butare, Rwanda, on April 13 as protests against the third term raged in Bujumbura.

A related incident that could have affected relations is when, according to The New Times of May 9, 2015, President Kagame told China Central TV, amid the protests: “If your own citizens are telling you ‘we don’t want you to do this or to lead us’, how do you say ‘I am staying anyway whether you want me or not’?”

On deeper inspection, it doesn’t seem that Nkurunziza’s new policy towards Rwanda is informed by the former’s perceived hostility or lack of support; rather, it seems more a strategy to sub-contract responsibility for the latter’s troubles.

If Rwanda has no interest in fighting Burundi — except for its “crime” of giving sanctuary to displaced Burundians, a payback for the world’s past hospitality to Rwandans — one can interpret his objective as to manufacture an external enemy to rally the population against, thereby easing internal pressure.

Part of this strategy, it seems, is to ethnicise the conflict, with the minority sold as aggressors of the majority. So far, this tactic hasn’t worked but it seems to be the outcome power-holders in Bujumbura want.

Doing that and naming Rwanda as the aggressor would not only make the standoff easy to explain but also achieve these objectives: Divert attention from and exonerate Nkurunziza from accusations of raping the Constitution; turn him into the defender of the majority Hutus; and earn him the hand of Rwanda’s enemies. The ultimate objective being to legitimise the contested electoral outcome and keep power.

It would therefore be far more advisable for Rwanda — however much it might be concerned at the possibility of the FDLR turning Burundi into a new launchpad for aggression — to deny Nkurunziza and his handlers the opportunity.

What Rwanda should instead do is to deploy diplomacy — explain to the world Nkurunziza’s intentions and strategy, advocate a peaceful resolution to the conflict and convince East African Community leaders to proactively engage the protagonists.

Dr Christopher Kayumba, PhD, is a senior lecturer at the School of Journalism, the University of Rwanda, and managing consultant at MGC Consult. E-mail: [email protected]; Twitter: @CKayumba