US will need to be bolder in applying Sudan sanctions
Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Port Sudan on August 28, 2023. The US imposed sanctions on General Burhan, accusing him of choosing war over negotiations to bring an end to the conflict.
As the toll from the two-year-old conflict in Sudan mounts, the US Treasury Department has, in recent weeks, rolled out sanctions against the main actors in the devastating confrontation, including the country’s leader, Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, on January 16.
The action against General Burhan, who was sanctioned for pushing for a military rather than a peaceful resolution to the conflict in which thousands have died and millions displaced, followed similar moves against his nemesis, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who were sanctioned for war crimes.
Much as it raises what might turn out to be vain hopes for justice for non-Arab communities in West Darfur, the US’s move can easily be dismissed as too little too late. Was sanctioning Burhan supposed to show Washington even-handed?
The targeting of the Masalit ethnic group by the RSF and allied militias has long been flagged by human rights organisations. Mass killings of Masalit civilians through indiscriminate violence, including summary executions of men, women and children, burning and pillaging of settlements have been a feature of RSF operations.
The RSF actions are not entirely new in the region and the ethnic undertones have always been obvious. A carryover from its predecessor, the Janjaweed, who for decades during the rule of deposed dictator Omar al-Bashir, engaged in similar patterns of violence against the black population in West Darfur, the RSF’s intentions have seemed to depopulate the targeted areas, so its allied communities can occupy fertile farmland and water sources.
Elders, religious leaders, and other influential figures in the Masalit community have been targeted.
Yet the international response has been palliative or even ambivalent, focused on maintaining access to the region for humanitarian operations even as the abuse continued.
In the post-April 2023 fallout, the Biden administration’s response has been even more conflicted because of the involvement of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key ally in the complex politics of the Middle East, on the side of the RSF.
Many times, satellite imagery has surfaced to support claims implicating the UAE as a major player in keeping the RSF supplied.
Coupled with support from the Libyan National Army (LNA), an ambivalent international community and a Sudanese military that is too compromised to flush them out, Daglo and his RSF may be in a good place and not under any compelling pressure to stop their offensive.
The latest round of sanctions or any step that puts pressure on the parties to end this senseless and devastating conflict is welcome. They will create a degree of disruption but not necessarily break the back of the principal actors.
Any action that aims to bring meaningful change for the defenceless victims of this war will need to be more assertive and spread out to include the RSF’s collaborators both within and beyond Africa.
Daglo and his inner circle continue to enjoy unfettered access to power and the capitals of East Africa. Without action that loops these and other parties in, sanctions could prove to be more of tokenism than substance.
