By TEE NGUGI

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The recent diplomatic war between Kenya and Somalia has been long in the making. In the sixties, Kenya fought against separatists supported by Mogadishu. The separatists sought to make north-eastern Kenya a part of Somalia.

Neighbouring Ethiopia was involved in a similar fight against separatists once again backed by Somalia. These separatist movements in Kenya and Ethiopia were part of a grand idea to create a “greater Somalia” by bringing all historically Somali ethnic regions under one Somali homeland.

After the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991, different regions of Somalia declared themselves autonomous or independent entities: Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland and others. Although Somalia officially gave up on the idea of “Greater Somalia”, bringing these breakaway regions under the control of the central government has remained an important national project. Therefore, Somalia has always viewed Kenya’s overt and covert support of Jubaland — ostensibly as a buffer zone against the Al-Shabaab jihadist group — as inference with its internal affairs. What really got under Somalia’s skin was the — for all intents and purposes — state visit to Kenya by President Muse Bihi of Somaliland.

It is unclear why Kenya decided to ‘up the ante’. But there is no doubt that Kenya was greatly aggrieved by Somalia’s decision to take the dispute over a potentially rich marine area to the International Court of Justice for resolution. Kenya had preferred to resolve the matter through a bilateral agreement or through mediation by regional bodies like the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The increasingly overt and robust support of the administration in Jubaland and the visit to Kenya by President Bihi might be Kenya’s attempt to acquire leverage in the maritime dispute — withdraw the case at the ICJ and we will discontinue recognition of and support to Somaliland and Jubaland.

Whatever the motivation was for the actions by the two countries, the cost of the fallout is clear and damaging. The trade in miraa that has for long sustained the Meru region of Kenya will leave thousands destitute. Additionally, reduced cross border trade will leave businesspeople on either side bankrupt. Also, Somalia will look elsewhere in the region for companies to rebuild their infrastructure or for provision of essential services. Kenyan experts — ranging from teachers, university dons or doctors — will find it impossible to get visas and work permits. And what will happen to the Somali refugees in Kenya? What will happen to humanitarian work in Somalia that is administered from Nairobi?

The bottom line is that Somalia and Kenya cannot afford bad blood. There is too much at stake in terms of trade, tourism, humanitarian work, cultural ties, and security wise. Therefore, both should grab the earliest opportunity to begin a comprehensive discussion of all their areas of disagreement.

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political commentator