We’ll protect refugees, but not dissidents: Kenyan PS

It is not necessarily about the inadequacies, it's more to do with the context that has dramatically changed. So, 10 years ago, we formulated the first policy. It encapsulates five core pillars, among them the peace pillar, the economic pillar, the diaspora pillar and the cultural pillar.

The challenge, however, is that there's a sense of inflexibility and a failure to appreciate that these pillars are mutually interactive. But what is most critical, is the fact that the context has changed.

We have, first internally, to be alive to domestic realities. Secondly, there are huge changes around technology in terms of the way we communicate foreign policy.

The other dimension is that our foreign policy now is not just a function of the Executive... but other actors are beginning to have a voice. Global governance is complex.

In 2014, we were just beginning to see the seismic shift in terms of power dynamics globally. That shift has increased, with things shifting from the North Atlantic region as the centre of gravity of the world, eastward. This is the emerging multipolarity that we must be alive to.

Kenya has a reputation as a hub for refugees, including people fleeing persecution. How will this policy affect how Kenya treats those kinds of people?

This policy spells out the ambition of enhancing Nairobi as a multilateral capital in the Global South, and proposes an upgrade of our privileges frameworks, our immunities frameworks, but also our logistics framework, so that we can actually grow the international community in Nairobi, from the current 25,000 UN personnel, maybe even to about 50,000 in the next 10 years.

That would have a significant impact on our economy...the UNHCR, for example, has taken the decision to build one of the biggest complexes in here in Nairobi, it will actually launch, maybe in March or April, which will house well over 900 new personnel relocated from other locations.

We need to take advantage of the new programme the Kenya government has developed, known as the Shirika plan, around durable solutions for refugees through integration and transforming the camps, sort of into small cities that both can benefit the refugee population, but also the host community.

There is the group of politically persecuted people, like opposition leaders from other countries, who traditionally sought refuge here. Is Kenya also going to provide that kind of safety guarantee it gave in the past?

I think this would be a case-by-case basis. There will be an assessment, with emphasis being on groups of persons fleeing conflicts.

The issue around politically persecuted persons attracts some sensitivities because it can collide with larger interests...because countries in the region are becoming extremely sensitive to the political developments in respective countries.

Kenya has had a long running policy of seeking stability with partners abroad. Could you tell us how this will change in this foreign policy?

We see the stability of Kenya and its economic prosperity as being inextricably linked with the stability within this region. What the new policy seeks to do is to become more adaptive in the way we confront collective challenges with countries within our neighbourhood. We will stay on the path of good neighbourliness.

What direction is Kenya going to look once we adopt this foreign policy? West, East, or nowhere?

Where we are is something that I have described as an interregnum. We are sort of in a transition globally, where what will be is yet to crystallise, so the shape of global organs that will emerge from the current rupture and disruption is not yet clear.

It is a bit disingenuous on our part to suggest that we are facing in a particular direction, because the direction is actually unclear.

We will stay true to the principles set out in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the UN frameworks. We will be much more focused on proactivity, which would then mean that we’ve to invest more in intelligence gathering, in research, and in means by which we can engender deeper trust and cooperation.

As EAC itself expands, it means that we need to expand the frontiers of our understanding, to understand deeply a country like DRC, which we don’t necessarily have a common border with, but with whom you can see a massive increase in trade volumes.

The seven focal focus areas of this foreign policy also suggest that the traditional role of a Kenyan diplomat is going to change. How are you preparing for this based on the cost implication of running these focus points?

The reality is that diplomacy is changing, because what used to be the forte of diplomats is shifting. We never thought technology would be a big global governance issue, but it is.

I mean, we’re talking about AI that has real positive potential, but also massive adverse potential. Health is a big issue, and so we need even greater multidisciplinarity.

We are no longer looking just for diplomats from your usual catchment area, you know, guys who studied international relations, and that appeared to be the only pathway you could become a diplomat.

Because of the complexities we’re talking about, you’re looking for people with broader understanding of the world. And there has to be an investment then on building that capacity and capability.

We will be quite cautious, because at the point in time where we are the level of economic interdependence within the region, the level of political interdependence, particularly as we move towards a federated East Africa, which is the ambition of the next 10 years, that means we've got to be very transparent with regard to this category of refugees.

A lot of context has changed, yet some of the problems that we had three decades ago are still with us. When you look at the policy, there's a sense of continuity and discontinuity, because it recognises that we have similar challenges that we've grappled with for many decades.

But the number one thing really is the realisation that the architecture for dealing with them is inadequate. The African Union itself is crying out for reform.

And so there has to be reform of global and regional institutions to make them much more fit for purpose, more agile, adaptable and able to respond at scale, to the bigger problems and the bigger shocks we are faced with.

Let’s discuss the diaspora community. Some of the critics have said that even though we have reached out to them lately, we are still isolating them from contributing positively in the running of the government or providing services. How does this foreign policy address that issue?

We look at the diaspora, not just from the perspective of the remittances – which is important and which the policy acknowledges – but we look at our diaspora as a resource, because every Kenyan who leaves this country and becomes embedded in another context learns and develops a very unique experience. What we need to do is to tap that experience. One of the things we propose to do is to map where Kenyans who are making significant impact globally are and begin to convene them with a view to developing a common understanding regarding what they could contribute to the country, and asking them to become our vanguards in the outreach to different countries, helping our diplomats understand opportunities within the countries where they have gained experience.

And, as Foreign Service, one of the things this government has done is for the first time to actually have an ambassador who is from the diaspora. And that is something that we will continue to do as we go forward. And so, we're not just looking at diaspora, from the revenue side. We are looking at them much more holistically in terms of how we empower those more vulnerable, but most of them are established, highly competent, and could have so much to contribute to our country. So, we see them as a critical capital in terms of knowledge, experience, expertise that we can tap.