President William Ruto claims that his ex-deputy Rigathi Gachagua blackmailed him, demanding Ksh10 billion or else he would make him a one-term president.

In the same interview, Ruto recounted how he had to mediate several infantile clashes between his deputy and junior State House staff.

He painted Gachagua as an incompetent and petty man, who sensed slights that did not exist. Gachagua has hit back with damning claims of his own. He accuses Ruto of being the mastermind and beneficiary of major corruption.

It’s impossible to tell who between Ruto and Gachagua is telling the truth, which in itself is a grave indictment of the two. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given that both men did not start their political careers as altar boys.

Ruto began his career as a key member of the shady vehemently and violently pro-Kanu outfit dubbed YK’92. Gachagua was a vicious District Officer, mercilessly enforcing decrees of the Kanu dictatorship. Those are hardly training camps for nurturing truthfulness and integrity.

But that be as it may, the exchanges between the two, given our status as a poor Third World country faced with seemingly insurmountable problems, paint a picture of a leadership totally unsuited to the Herculean job at hand.

The exchanges beg the existential question: Kenya, where are we headed?

In the 1960s, Kenyan scholar, Abdilatif Abdalla, posed in a famous poem: ‘Kenya Twendapi” – Kenya, where are we headed? He was promptly detained without trial by the Jomo Kenyatta regime. But his question is more urgent today than it was then.

I say this because, even though by the late 1960s there was a universal sense that we were not headed towards prosperity, equity and freedom, the population remained largely subdued. The country was easily manipulated by tribal rhetoric.

Many were persuaded by government propaganda that democracy was divisive and would undermine development. Other people could still not believe that their own African government could betray the goals of the freedom struggle. By the time people began to speak out , the dictatorship was solidly entrenched.

Today however, we have an educated youthful population that has grown up in the post-Kanu era. They have tasted a little freedom, and now want all of it.

They do not want reduction in thievery; they want its complete stoppage. They do not want to replace one member of the current political class with another; they demand a generational change of leadership. They are not satisfied with traditional economic policies.

They want a rethinking , reimagining, and reinvention of the political economy. They do not want a piecemeal approach to development; they want an approach that will leapfrog into the future. They do not want token reforms of the broken system; they want its complete overhaul.

The present political class – ruling and opposition – are part of the problem, not part of the solution.

They are culturally and ideologically not equipped to lead a Kenyan renaissance.

US President Donald Trump has put my continuing education into overdrive. There are tabs open in my browsers on several devices covering topics like the persistent problem of neoliberal economics, mental illness in adult males, how the width of the Suez and Panama canals have an effect on cargo ship sizes.

I am including queries like “what are tariffs” even though I live in a port city where small retailers survive by asking questions like “do you want the receipt with that?”

Obviously, the good citizen answer is “yes!”, but you have to realise we ask each other these questions shamelessly because during such transactions we are really asking whether we believe our taxes work for us.

Obviously the good citizen answer to that question is “Bruh. Public school teachers are underpaid while politician spouses get allowances, and they keep firing the Auditor and Comptroller General. Receipt for what?”

But back to Mr Trump. This man has me questioning my sanity as I try to understand how he is able to do and undo all kinds of nonsense in a brief period of time with complete impunity.

Like: what even is a ‘mature and stable’ country if American systems can be punched in the face by a fully chaotic head of state, and they’re the current hegemon?

It. Doesn’t. Make. Sense.

The United States of America is an enviably well-documented polity. Their history has been recorded — complete with biases and omissions — ever since the first European genocidaires landed on what they hoped was ‘available’ land to do their thing. Of course, it is morally questionable — it is an empire complete with a deeply problematic habit of violence.

There is a school of thought that the American state is fragile because of the brutality of its birthing process that remains in its political DNA.

Perhaps, but remember how well-documented it insists on being? This transparency makes it easy to track their experiment in democracy as it grows over time, often through great effort.

That dead sexy belief in freedoms and rights and participation and laws helped sell democracy as a viable, desirable option for a modern nation state.

A large part of what gave this whole thing credibility over time was the squashing of hereditary privileges, literally trying to forge a new way of doing power that was the antithesis of monarchy.

Only to land in 2025 with a superannuated head of state with a hefty Mad King vibe, a handful of billionaires who have all the money and an anxious citizenry that is realising they’ve been herded into an economy in which they struggle to afford eggs.

That is why I have all these tabs open. The Trump presidency is happening in a polity with hundreds of years of experience trying to systematise government so that no individual could dominate it, and I am a systems girl.

The Trump apologists are utterly useless at explaining why they are flirting with potential state failure, and everyone else is having a hard time piecing the explanations together.

But we do need an explanation: there has got to be more to human striving than this ridiculous pendulum swing between long periods of deifying rich male tyrants and brief respites when we remember our dignity. I am sure the answer is online somewhere.

One last observation about ‘developed’ vs ‘developing’ countries: when “no taxation without representation” fails, self-inflicted tariff blitzes crush the working class and the State becomes obviously predatory? ‘Receipt for what?’ starts to make a grim kind of sense doesn’t it? Third world skills for a third world government. Don’t knock ‘em.

Scholarship as Comfort.

But we do need an explanation: there has got to be more to human striving than this ridiculous pendulum swing between long periods of deifying rich male tyrants and brief respites when we remember our dignity. I am sure the answer is online somewhere.

Recent weeks and days have seen several climate and environmental events and reports, small and big, that have left East Africa teetering between catastrophe and opportunity.

A toxic algae bloom in Lake Victoria, caused by the shameful level of pollution of the waters by the three East African Community countries who share it, left an unbearable stench along its shores in Uganda.

Several people, overcome by the smell, fled their homes. A South Sudan that is threatening to relapse yet again into war, reported drowning wetlands. Reports told of the dying glaciers of East Africa’s mountains.

Severe floods devastated the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly the capital Kinshasa, due to torrential rains causing the Ndjili River to overflow. Nearly 40 people have died. Roads, and infrastructure were destroyed, displacing thousands and affecting over 200 households. Major roads, including Lumumba Boulevard, became impassable.

There has always been a cocktail of contradiction—an alliance of hopefuls and harbingers, of markets and mayhem.

Now, more than ever, the region finds itself on the edge, with nature, politics, and insecurity all conspiring to influence events. Here we look at five critical issues that might be off many people’s radars.

Al Shabaab climate crisis bounty

The climate crisis in Somalia, marked by severe droughts and floods, has intensified hunger, displacing millions and devastating livelihoods. This desperation creates fertile ground for al Shabaab, a militant group exploiting the crisis to gain support.

By controlling scarce resources like water and food, they exert influence over vulnerable communities, offering aid where the government fails.

Somalia’s accession to the EAC should have been a win. While the terror group isn’t about to sweep Mogadishu Taliban-style as seemed likely a fortnight ago, it still controls about 20–30 per cent of Somalia and is nibbling at the edges of reclaimed areas.

Somalia’s fragile institutions struggle to govern beyond the capital, and if al Shabaab regains even symbolic dominance, the EAC may find itself with a Trojan horse of insecurity in its fold.

Raising the scary question: If al Shabaab were ever to prevail, would EAC leaders give them a seat at the Jumuiya table?

How floods pose risk to South Sudan

While DRC’s capital has been ravaged by floods, South Sudan has been at it longer. It is a story that big media no longer see.

South Sudan is sinking—literally. Nearly 10 per cent of the country, particularly in the Sudd region, is submerged during peak flood seasons. And this is not your typical seasonal flood that dries up after a few weeks; climate patterns have mutated.

In 2024, reports showed that nearly 7.4 per cent of South Sudan remained underwater even during the dry season. That’s not flooding anymore - that’s a redrawing of the map.

The humanitarian consequences are brutal. If this flooding becomes permanent, and projections suggest it might, the EAC is looking at its first climate-induced state failure in real-time.

Lake Victoria is dying. Uganda may be dying with it

The toxic algae that is stinking up the Lake Victoria regions in Uganda, are just a small part of the crisis facing the lake.

Kisumu Governor Anyang’ Nyong’o might have said it best: Lake Victoria could be dead in 50 years. Frankly, we might not have that long.

Nutrient overloads, algal blooms, and fish die-offs are already routine. Uganda, which hugs 45 percent of the lake and leans on it for hydropower, fishing, and Kampala’s water supply, is skating on ecological thin ice.

In Kampala, parts of the lake are already so polluted they’re almost undrinkable without heavy treatment. Uganda’s dependence is near-total. Lose the lake, and you lose electricity, food, urban stability - and possibly political calm.

Kenya has options. Tanzania might pivot. Uganda? Not so much. In this aquatic tragedy, Uganda is the hero most likely to drown.

The vanishing glaciers: A metaphor and a warning

Mount Kilimanjaro, Mount Kenya, Mount Rwenzori—call them what you will: icons, water towers, ancestral beacons. Now all of them are melting monuments. Kilimanjaro is reported to have lost 91 percent of its ice since 1912. Mount Kenya’s is by 96 percent. Rwenzori’s has dwindled by 95 percent.

It’s not just about aesthetics or tourism dollars, though those will go too. These glaciers feed rivers, which feed farms, which feed families. Less ice means less water, more drought, means more hunger. Add this to the already flaming climate volatility and the picture isn’t pretty.

Food: The Great East African lottery

The EAC is facing a food security crisis not seen since colonial famines—and this one is self-inflicted, nature-assisted. Droughts that used to occur every 12 years now hit every 2.5 years, the World Bank says. Over 9 million livestock died between 2021 and 2023 in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia.

Floods displaced thousands from arable land. And yet, the hunger isn’t evenly spread.

South Sudan and Somalia are on the cliff edge, staring into famine. Ethiopia’s crop yields could crash by 40 percent if the next rains fail. But not all news is bad.

Tanzania, with 51 percent of Lake Victoria and a relatively stable climate, could become a breadbasket—if it invests in irrigation and storage. If food becomes power—and it will—then Tanzania might write the region’s next chapter.

East Africa doesn’t do boring. But this current moment feels different—more high stakes, more urgent. Nature is no longer a neutral backdrop; it’s an active participant.

Yet, there are opportunities. A rebalanced food economy could empower new players. Tanzania could lead with its water and land. But only if the EAC stops acting like a ceremonial club and starts behaving like a union forged in fire.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the «Wall of Great Africans». X@cobbo3

We want the coming elections to be open, transparent, fair, just and free that will do justice to all the participants without exception.

We want these elections to observe the laws, rules and regulations which our country has adopted as the norms of organising elections for some time now.

We want these elections to offer equal space to all the participants and not to discriminate against anyone on the basis of any criterion that is not based on a recognised law or norm.

We want these elections to be organised by a credible electoral organ that is and is seen to be fair, just and independent, and not only in name.

We want the electoral commission running these elections to be composed of Tanzanians who can be believed by fellow Tanzanians as being ethical, independent and desirous to be fair-minded and to do justice.

We want the electoral commission to be equipped with a public service of employees which will be answerable only to the responsible only to the electoral commission and to no one else, We want the electoral commission to have an autonomous budget and have no necessity to ask for financial support from any other body.

We want the electoral commission to have security of tenure to make it really independent.

We want all aspirants to be allowed to present themselves without unnecessary restrictions placed in their way.

We want all parties and candidates to have freedom of access to all the documents relating to the elections including voter registration rolls and to be able to raise any issues relating to the integrity of such documents.

We want to have domestic as well as international observers to witness how the elections are conducted and to make known their findings.

We want the police to play no role that interferes with the electoral process, specifically we want the police to desist from any illegal actions, such as introducing illegal ballot papers into the voting process.
We want the police to act legally under the instruction of the electoral commission officers.

We want school children and other children under voting age to have no part in the election, and for them not to be led by their school masters to carry out activities that sabotage the integrity of the elections. (Corrupting such young minds is a sure way to corrupt en masse a whole future generation, and our children should be protected from it).

We want our people to be and to feel safe during the whole period of the elections, not to be threatened, beaten up, arrested or killed because of elections, This is because we are tired of elections being periods of burials and orthopedic amputations.

We want police and national secret service agents to have no role which allows them to smuggle fake “votes” into the electoral process, and we want them to stay at a distance to carry out strictly law-and-order services.

We want the voters or their agents to observe the whole electoral process from start to finish and to witness every stage of the operation, such as it is done, for instance, in Ghana and in Botswana.

We want all the election results at all the levels of competition to be questionable in the courts of law, including the ward, parliamentary and presidential levels.

We want our people to enjoy their electoral processes as a festive process and to sing and dance, not to mourn and bury their dear ones.

We are making these demands with more vigour than before because in our experience in the past civic and general elections in 2019, 2020 and 2024 these demands, though duly stated by ourselves, were not met. This time we intend for them to be respected.

We want practical assurance that they will be met, and we state if they are not met we shall make this charade impossible.

These are, in brief, what I understand the opposition in Tanzania to be demanding under what they have termed “No Reforms, No Election,” and the campaign has been gathering massive attendance in those parts of the country where they have been able to go.

The Constitution and the laws and rules (such as they stand today) are supposed to govern the running of elections.

What is happening is that the opposition is demanding that the government do what is written down in the texts, and to eschew hooliganism no more.

It is true that government agents, including police officers and security agents, have been sabotaging elections, including introducing fake “votes” into the voting process, and not allowing the prescribed processes to take place.

This particular ball is squarely in President Samia Suluhu’s park, the buck stops right at her feet.

The whole reform agenda has been repeatedly sabotaged by the government that said it wanted to do reforms but has seemed to speak from both ends of the mouth, first by Jakaya Kikwete’s self-aborted constitutional reforms, and now by Samia’s “reforms and reconciliation” promise— all too sweet but containing nothing but air.

Still, if there is goodwill there is still time to save our country. There is still half a calendar year before the proposed election, enough time in which to push a draft of amendments through parliament – who said rubber-stamps are totally useless?—and get everyone to do these elections.

But watch this space.

The 2025 Global Terrorism Index released this week has confirmed what many African analysts, soldiers, and experts in general have long known: Africa’s war against terror is being waged without a map.

While global headlines have moved on, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa remain locked in a vicious cycle—governments weakened, jihadist groups emboldened, and foreign partners distracted or withdrawn.

What we are witnessing is not merely the persistence of terrorism, but the collapse of strategic coherence in African security policy.

In 2024, the Sahel shouldered the world’s deadliest wave of terrorism, with the region alone responsible for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths across the globe.

Among the hardest hit were five countries—Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon—where violence has become alarmingly routine and state authority is increasingly contested. Yet Africa’s premier continental institution, the African Union, remains several steps behind.

The scale of the crisis has outpaced the frameworks built to contain it. The reality is that Africa isn’t just being outgunned by insurgents—it’s being outmanoeuvred by its own outdated security architecture.
Over the Horn of Africa, the story is equally grim.

Al Shabaab, the Somali militant group, continues to hold territory, extort the public, and deepen its grip on southern and central Somalia. The AU’s latest mission—known as the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission (Aussom)—was meant to be a reset, a bold new chapter after African Union Transition Mission in Somalia.

Now, barely off the ground, it’s already faltering: underfunded, politically unclear, and strategically adrift. Instead of marking a shift in momentum, it risks becoming another hollow intervention. Without a clear doctrine, Aussom risks becoming another placeholder mission, rather than a turning point.

What links the Sahel and the Horn is not just rising jihadist activity—it is the absence of African strategic agency. The continent continues to outsource its security doctrine to external actors: France, the EU, the US, Russia, China, Turkey, each projecting influence through partnerships that fracture rather than unify African responses.

In the Sahel, this has led to the rise of the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), a new regional bloc that has rejected Ecowas and turned eastward to Russia and China for arms, training, and diplomatic cover.

But this pivot does not constitute strategy. Replacing one set of foreign dependencies with another is not sovereignty, it is substitution.

Africa’s failure is not due to a lack of capacity, but a lack of political will to build long-term institutions, coordinate intelligence, and assert continental ownership over peace enforcement. The African Union Peace and Security Council remains stuck in workshop mode, issuing communiqués while jihadist groups are redrawing national borders in blood.

While the AU debates mandates, terrorist groups have entered a new phase. AI-powered propaganda, encrypted networks, and cross-border economic lifelines through gold smuggling and extortion have transformed these groups into agile, resilient actors.

Read:  After six decades of foreign aid, time for Africa to chart own progress

Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISK) now produces multilingual recruitment videos—from Arabic and Urdu to Russian and English. They no longer need physical territory to recruit; they operate through broadband and belief.

And yet, across African capitals, there is no coordinated response to this threat environment. Ministries of Information remain outdated, national security strategies are locked in Cold War paradigms, and digital counter-narratives are relegated to donor-funded side projects.

If Sahel and Horn are to be reclaimed, Africa must redraw its security map, both figuratively and institutionally.

First, continental institutions must move from mission mandates to strategic doctrines. Aussom cannot succeed unless it is backed by an African vision of security, grounded in local legitimacy, political reconciliation, and state-building.

The same applies to the Sahel, where the African Union should mediate the fractured relationship between the Economic Community of West Africa (Ecowas) and the three Sahel states (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso).

Second, Africa must reclaim control over its information domain. Terrorism thrives on narrative dominance. We need continent-wide strategic communications units, embedded in AU and RECs, to craft localised, culturally resonant counter-messaging.

Third, we must treat resource governance as a core security pillar. In the Sahel, gold and uranium are not just commodities—they are the currencies of insurgency. National resource maps should be part of national security strategies, and artisanal mining must be brought under state oversight through community-driven agreements, not elite contracts.

Fourth, we need pan-African security coordination.

The silence between Somalia’s intelligence agency Nisa and Nigeria’s DSS, or between Mali’s intelligence services and Kenya’s NIS, is the sound of failure. A continental intelligence fusion centre, with rotating leadership and secure platforms, must be built now—not in another summit report.

We are running out of time. As the index shows, terrorism in Africa is not just persistent—it is evolving, adaptive, and politically embedded. If we do not meet this evolution with African clarity, we will be forced to respond to its consequences with perpetual crisis management.

The strategic question is simple: Will Africa lead or be led? If we choose the former, we must shed the illusion that peace is imported. The AU and its regional blocs must wake up—not to new donor templates, but to a continental security consensus rooted in African reality.

Because if we fail to redraw the map, others will do it for us—with drones, mercenaries, and missions that outlast their mandate but not their usefulness.

Abdisaid M. Ali is chairperson of the Lomé Security Forum

This last weekend I was standing on the side of a mountain road watching some young boys in shorts and knock-off Crocs carrying hefty loads up rocky hills with the ease of long familiarity and I thought to myself: Where is their school? What are their dreams? Might they be future Nobel Prize winners?

Do they know that we adults are about to vote to try and determine their future? Is this what 60 years of Independence has got us? Is this it?

Our poverty as a society bothers me in a way that is hard to articulate well, perhaps because I have never found a way to move beyond my conviction that it is largely unnecessary.

I am told that this is a juvenile perspective, which is a compliment considering the justifications I have heard for why it is fine for us to spend on frivolities like a national airline when we cannot provide adequate childhood nutrition and basic literacy yet. Adults see the logic of this, which makes us folks of dubious character at best. 

I was standing on that mountainside having rode into town on a swanky new electric train from the metropolis of Dar es Salaam that delivered me unto this pristine landscape in which tough kids were carrying heavy loads up a hill.

The sheer wealth in the city that I had left behind is astounding. Going from the towers of glass and steel to the red soils and bare feet of the villages in the space of a couple of hours was jarring. Like, why do we withstand such discrepancies? Because “Tanzania is a poor country” as I have been told my whole life.

Read:  Why voting should be compulsory for us to enjoy fruits of democracy

Also, “Tanzania is a rich country” as I have been told my whole life. Schrodinger’s Tanzania, we exist in a state of economic superposition that is either great or not appalling according to the observer.

Ruling party politicians see an economy that has propelled us to middle-income country status. Teachers and doctors outside the major urban centres experience an economy in which textbooks and safe childbirth are still scarce.

Me? I wonder what we are doing. 

Of course Tanzania is rich — the European colonial project is absolutely correct in its estimation of the potential of this continent. When we got ourselves some measure of freedom from the yoke of direct colonial administration, I figured we would tackle inequality and underdevelopment with fervour. And maybe we did, for a couple of decades? Maybe? 

Then we took a wrong turn somewhere. It is evident in the world of difference between the convenient electric train that I took out of the metropolis, and the hinterland it delivered me to in such comfort. It is in the airplanes and the overpasses, the swanky new hotels and the immensely comfortable ferries to Zanzibar. 

We have much to show for the investments that we made in these past few years — but we invested heavily in things and not so much in people. What is that about?

My generation is finally coming of age to lead the country. We have been slaving away at the economy, raising the young and paying the taxes and we have the requisite grey hairs to prove it. Which makes the fate of the children of this country, and our future as a society, finally our responsibility.

I guess my question is, are we the political class who might have the courage to put people ahead of things, at the ballot and everywhere else? It made for a lengthy stare out the window, riding back from the Tanganyika of neglect to the Dar es Salaam of infinite and inequitable possibility. 

Elsie Eyakuze is an independent consultant and blogger for The Mikocheni Report; E-mail: [email protected]
 

When a very senior assistant to the chair of Tanzania's ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), comes up with some explanation of why that party failed to observe the stricture that election campaigns should not kick off before parliament winds up its business, people will listen, and this time they did.

The issue was, apparently, an explanation as to why the ruling party had not followed its own rules governing the process of naming a presidential candidate, which requires that a national electoral conference be called with the specific agenda of electing one member who will be the presidential candidate.

This is the system that was followed all the election years since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s, which rule was observed with unfailing regularity every five years since 1995.

Now the newly installed vice-chair of the CCM party recently found it necessary to explain why this aberration had taken place.

In a statement made at a public meeting, the veteran politician let it be understood that there had been a group within CCM that had intended to torpedo Samia’s candidacy, which prompted her (declared) supporters to take the unusual step of pushing the agenda of her candidacy in a meeting that had not been called for that specific purpose.

That is interesting for a number of reasons, but first of all, it comes as confirmation that all is not well within the long-standing ruling party, which should hardly be surprising. This is a 70-year-old arrangement that has led Tanzania forever and which shows all the signs of breathlessness and decay, and is hardly recognisable as the party Julius Nyerere founded.

From the early dream of social equity promoted by its founder, this party had frayed and collected rust and fatigue, having lost most of its appeal as a liberation movement and gone the way of other parties on the continent, mired in corruption and absentmindedness.

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From the erstwhile vehicle for the emancipation of the down-trodden, it slowly morphed into a vehicle for accessing state power, leading to easy enrichment in the hands of a small clique of individuals who cannot today explain their wealth.

There is no suggestion anywhere that this is unique to Tanzania, as it looks like the norm in every African set-up.

But what makes it especially unacceptable in Tanzania is the fact that despite the cluelessness of the ruling elite in finding solutions to the endemic economic problems of the country and its people, CCM has grimly held onto power, often using guile and brutality, mostly depending on a police force that has become the main force of that party.

By the admission of its own top dogs, elections are run in such a way as to ensure the foregone conclusion is never left in doubt, and that means results in favour of the ruling party.

Matters took a turn for the worse when John Magufuli was elected president in 2015 and vowed to do away with the opposition parties, not through persuasion but rather through coercion and police brutality.

It is thus that every election time since then has become a season for brutality in which opposition candidates are harassed, arrested, beaten up, or killed, anything to stop them from doing politics.

But now the main opposition, CDM, has this time around come up with a call to counter that situation by declaring a campaign to stop the holding of this year’s election unless steps are taken to reform the way the elections are organised.

However, they are running into difficulties with their own members who would like to bid for positions in these elections, and who see this campaign as threatening their political aspirations.

How that party handles that issue will be interesting to watch, but for the time being it has been made public that the old CCM veteran alluded to above has publicly stated that his party is willing to talk to the opposition to see how the issues raised by CDM can be resolved.

Read:  Election: Tale of the three wise monkeys in Tanzanian politics

That may lead the country to a place of hope, for otherwise the country might be in trouble, especially with the habit of excessive police force deployed against unarmed civilians. (In 2001 tens of Tanzanians from Zanzibar were killed and others ran as refugees to Kenya, for the first time creating Tanzanian political refugees).

It does not help matters this is a time when the economic conditions are becoming more dire, with inflationary trends becoming more acute, particularly the rise of fuel prices triggered by a lack of the US dollar.

Caught between the naysayers in her own party (who still resist her leadership) and the re-energised opposition (headed by Tundu Antipas Lissu, recently supported by ACT-Wazalendo), Samia’s CCM will increasingly find itself between the oven and a hot place.

A young and impatient population will not listen to the tired platitudes of old politicians whose only claim to fame is having “brought independence” half a century ago.

They want jobs and a decent life, and any government that cannot provide that had better be careful when trying to rig an election or spreading silly rumours about the opposition collecting Ebola viruses to sabotage the elections.

Watch this space.

Ulimwengu is now on YouTube via jeneralionline tv. E-mail: [email protected]

Few plane crashes have hit harder or faster than the one that killed Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana on April 6, 1994.

Habyarimana and Burundi’s Cyprien Ntaryamira died when their plane was shot down over Kigali.

Fingers quickly pointed at Habyarimana’s enemies, and by morning on April 7, Rwanda had become a slaughterhouse. Up to one million people—mostly Tutsi, along with moderate and opposition Hutu—were butchered in 100 days.

The rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its armed wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), led by Paul Kagame, struck back. By July 4, 1994, they had toppled the genocidal regime, ending the Genocide Against the Tutsi and a war that had been raging since 1990.

The defeated government forces and their extremist ally, the Interahamwe—who later established the controversial Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—fled and set up shop in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, fueling a conflict that still roils the region.

What’s surprising about Habyarimana’s death and its aftermath is how it created deep fissures within the international community and Africa. While many outside observers saw it as the ultimate failure of global diplomacy, others noted the slow and inadequate response of the United Nations and Western countries to the genocide that followed.

In fact, countries like France and Belgium were seen as aiding and abetting the killings. Habyarimana’s death and the genocide it triggered led to a profound shift in how the world handles humanitarian crises, eventually contributing to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

On December 23, 2003, the UN General Assembly recognised April 7 as the International Day of Reflection on the Genocide in Rwanda via Resolution 58/234. In 2018, after Rwanda pushed to name the Tutsi as the primary targets explicitly, Resolution 72/550 refined it to “1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda.” Rwanda’s Kwibuka—remembrance—kicks off on April 7, runs for 100 days, and concludes on July 4.

That Kigali crash wasn’t Africa’s only sky-shaking tragedy. These weren’t just powerful men falling from the sky; they were geopolitical earthquakes, rattling borders, alliances, and global politics. Some sparked shifts no one saw coming, leaving marks long after the wreaths had withered.

Take Barthélemy Boganda, the Central African Republic’s independence torchbearer. On March 29, 1959, his plane exploded near Bangui, shredding CAR’s dreams mid-flight.

Read: OBBO: Faye, Ruto and Malema have same political father, different mothers

The official cause was put down to an explosion—possibly sabotage—but the failure to determine who was behind it left an air of conspiracy that would haunt CAR for decades. Was it the French, desperate to maintain influence? Rivals within the CAR leadership? The lack of answers fueled distrust, not just of France but among Africans themselves.

Boganda’s death gutted CAR’s trajectory. His absence left a void soon filled with weak and corrupt leaders. Without its independence icon, the country slid into division, misrule, and brutal dictatorships. That crash seeded a cycle of chaos that still spins today.

Two years later, on September 18, 1961, the world lost Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, when his plane crashed near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).

He was chasing peace in Congo’s messy crisis—a success that might have reshaped post-colonial Africa. Instead, the circumstances surrounding his death—ranging from accusations of sabotage to suspicions of CIA or colonial involvement—left Africa trapped in geopolitical uncertainty.

Hammarskjöld’s fall didn’t just kill a mission; it strained the UN’s credibility in Africa. The lack of clear answers cast doubt over its peacekeeping role, scepticism that persists today, especially in places like Congo, where outside powers have deep vested interests.

It mirrored Africa’s post-independence dilemma—self-rule versus foreign meddling. Leaders and citizens alike wondered: Could the UN be trusted? Some argue that this scepticism nudged Africa toward Pan-Africanism, pushing for homegrown solutions over foreign promises.

Machel: A revolutionary dies, apartheid’s shadow grows

Africa’s skies weren’t done.

On October 19, 1986, Samora Machel, Mozambique’s revolutionary president, died when his Tupolev Tu-134 crashed near Mbuzini, South Africa. A towering figure in the anti-apartheid struggle, Machel’s death screamed foul play—South Africa’s apartheid regime topped the suspect list, though pilot error got the official nod.

If Hammarskjöld’s crash made Africa wary of global peacekeepers, Machel’s turned the lens inward. Was this apartheid’s bloody reach?

The South African government was already waging a brutal guerrilla war against liberation movements in southern Africa. What many saw as a targeted attack on Machel showed the violent lengths apartheid forces would go to maintain control.

Machel’s death ultimately fueled the global isolation of South Africa. His passing, along with those of other African leaders, became a rallying cry for stronger sanctions against the apartheid regime.

His death—whether accident or conspiracy—had global reverberations, further pushing the apartheid state toward its inevitable collapse.

These crashes—Habyarimana’s, Boganda’s, Hammarskjöld’s, Machel’s—weren’t just tragedies. They were pivot points in history.

Habyarimana’s death sparked a genocide, but from its ashes emerged a new Rwanda. Boganda’s demise plunged CAR into turmoil from which it has never recovered, along the way opening a path for the bizarre spectacle of Jean-Bédel Bokassa crowning himself emperor without an empire.

Hammarskjöld’s fall shook Africa’s trust in international peacekeeping, and left the UN in a tangled relationship with Congo in which it still trapped. Machel’s death intensified the final push against apartheid.

Africa’s skies have a brutal way of rewriting the script. And no one ever sees it coming.

Charles Onyango-obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the «Wall of Great Africans». X @cobbo3

Two recent incidents have revived debate about the place of traditional culture in a modern society: The killing of a 17-year-old girl in Wajir County and the brutal assault of a widow in Kisii.

The girl’s “crime” was refusing a forced marriage to a 55-year-old man. The husband and his associates beat her and then set her on fire.

Her family was complicit in the forced marriage. Deep inside, the family must have known that the marriage violated the girl’s humanity, but they went along with it in the name of culture.

The widow in Kisii was brutalised for refusing to perform a traditional ritual at the burial of her husband. She was whipped and punched by a bunch of men as a crowd of mourners watched. The crowd was restrained by a belief that the torture was necessitated by culture.

Why does culture, a social construct, override an innate sense of justice? People believe that culture is a set of truths given to their community on creation day and passed down generations. These cultural truths are immutable and unerring.

Breach of these truths is seen as inviting a curse on the transgressing individual, her family and community. Quite often, cleansing rituals – some comical and others dehumanising - are reenacted. In the 21st Century, “voodooism” still holds captive millions of people in Africa and the world.

Read:  The church is not wrong on this culture of lies

And yet nothing could be as false as the notion of an eternal cultural truth passed down through millennia. Culture is a function of worldview, which in turn is a function of historical change. No society on earth has retained its worldview and attendant cultural practices since its creation.

Societies have always reinvented themselves to cope with historical change. A society that fails to reinvent itself in the face of historical change either stagnates or perishes. Therefore, the culture, in the name of which you torture and kill non-conformists today, might not even have existed a century ago.

If we could go back in time, we would be shocked to discover that, a few centuries back, our communities had totally different cultural practices. Along the way, they invented new practices or borrowed some from neighbouring communities.

There was no creator who gave your ancestors the “10 commandments” of your culture; your ancestors have all the time been inventing, borrowing and discarding cultural practices. The practice of forced marriage might not have existed in that cultural community centuries ago. The ritual, for which the widow was tortured, might not always have been part of that cultural community’s customs a century ago.

Many people were incensed by the two gruesome events and called for justice for the victims. Police have arrested the perpetrators.

Hopefully, these calls for justice will inspire renewed activism against other crimes committed in the name of culture, like FGM, disinheritance of widows, or forcing widows to sleep in the same room with their dead husbands.

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political commentator

How wonderful to be alive today! This year’s Easter could symbolise the most realistic Resurrection for Africa since colonialists came to the land they called the Dark continent and demonised all things cherished by the natives, many of whom started hating themselves and wishing they were Europeans.

The 90-day suspension of foreign aid by the new US administration was announced on January 20, when President Donald Trump signed an executive order halting US foreign assistance programmes.

This period is therefore set to end as the feast-loving Africans conclude the Easter festivities which start after the 40 days of Lenten introspection, prayer, and preparation for renewal.

There couldn’t be a better opportunity for African leaders, many of whom profess Christianity, to reassess their relationships with foreign “donors” and moneylenders, and work towards real independence and sustainability.

The dawn of the second Trump administration that hit the ground running with its Department Of Government Efficiency (DOGE) should have alarmed Africans who had got accustomed to US aid, as it was not targeted at Africa alone, but the whole world.

If that was not enough, the way the European governments went into emergency planning mode on realising that even their political alliance called Nato was not spared Trump’s cash-trimming knife, should have jolted even the most complacent African leader into mental hyperactivity.

So the 40 days of reflection should have been dominated by figuring out the future without US aid, except maybe for those who just do not care about the future of their countries.

For the days of blatantly arrogant African leaders are largely gone, and we no longer expect a president to declare himself emperor and proceed to physically crown himself. Nor do current presidents make a big show of importing their drinking water from Europe.

So, we expect them to individually and collectively come up with inspiring post-aid plans for their countries and the continent respectively.

Read:  Aid cuts will not change African rulers; try proving they can kill

Mr Trump’s January 20th Executive Order should also have sparked enough mental activity to start melting the ice coating the brain of African economists who rely on foreign money lenders to think for them.

Forty days are enough to thaw the ice around the thickest skull, so different national economists should by April 20th have at least provisional plans on how to move on with zero aid/foreign loans on their budgets.

And suppose Mr Trump magnanimously declares at the end of the 90 days that the US will resume half, or most or all of the aid, Africa should even be more suspicious.

For a man who set out to ‘help’ American taxpayers stop throwing away their money like drunken sailors cannot after three months just resume throwing it around. Not after the early exposures his team did regarding the obscene ways some of the aid billions are allocated. Aid resumption could thus be be a sinister bait, hiding a deadly hook from which Africa would require centuries to resurrect.

So April 20 should find African leaders and economists standing courageously on their feet, no longer writhing on the floor like a spoilt kid whose mom has said No to more ice cream. It is indeed a wonderful time to be alive.

For if the leaders and economists make the right moves, then we can rejoice.

But if they start looking for and begging new foreign donors who sympathise with them, then we should still rejoice for we shall know for sure it is now every individual soul for itself of the 1.5 billion of us all on the continent. And the truth will set each of the souls free to adjust for the new slavery rebranded, here or abroad.

Either way it is a turning point this Easter, but don’t be shocked if African leaders don’t rise to the occasion.

Buwembo is a Kampala-based journalist. E-mail:[email protected]

Six years ago, I protested about climate injustice in my hometown of Kampala, Uganda. I was alone. But not for long.

I never imagined that protest would lead to the incredible opportunities I’ve had, from speaking on global stages to meeting the daughter of the inspirational Prof Wangari Maathai.

But what gives me most hope is knowing that I am not alone in the fight for climate justice.

Today, thanks partly to the grassroots activism of thousands of youth-led networks across the continent, millions of Africans are effecting and demanding a fairer future and for developed countries to pay their climate debt and do their fair share in ambitious climate action. 

Next week, the sixth Africa Climate Talks take place in Kampala building up to the second Africa Climate Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and COP30 in Belem, Brazil. 

These talks are a crucial component of Africa’s voice in the debate, and with children in 98 percent of African countries at high or extremely high risk of the impacts of climate change according to Unicef, African children have more at stake than anyone. 

My message to those negotiating on their behalf is to have these children in your minds and your hearts.

Africa has the world’s youngest population and children comprise around 50 percent of many African nations. Climate talks need to better consider the unique needs of children, who are disproportionately affected by and uniquely susceptible to climate impacts, from babies being stillborn due to heatwaves, to schools closing during natural disasters.

Children and young people will inherit a planet stripped of biodiversity with record temperatures and increasingly severe floods, droughts and cyclones. It’s only right that their voices and needs are heard in this debate.

Read: Africa needs a climate action centred on people, not carbon

Despite this, children – comprising half of those living in extreme poverty – are often treated as an afterthought in the global response to climate change. 

Less than half of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in Africa are evaluated as child-sensitive and just 2.4 percent of multilateral climate financing was allocated to child-responsive projects between 2006 and 2023.

It was encouraging that COP28 called for the first ever expert dialogue on the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children and to explore related solutions, something Unicef has campaigned for so that children can be heard in the negotiations.

 Unicef has also supported national networks of young climate activists across the globe so their perspectives and solutions can be heard. 

As a Goodwill Ambassador, I stand with Unicef in calling for governments to better plan for children’s survival and futures under a changing climate, and call on all countries, particularly developed countries, to show climate leadership and ambition in their third generation NDCs ahead of COP30.

The statistics and projections can be daunting, but children and young people are clear on their rights and understand the cost of inaction will be higher.

We cannot afford for world leaders to backtrack on their promises when storms are destroying our schools, wildfires are harming our lungs, consecutive droughts are amplifying water and food insecurity and malnutrition for millions of children, and our homes and health services are being washed away.

Last year, at COP29, the target agreed for climate finance was $300 billion per year, with ambition to mobilise $1.3 trillion per year.

Read: At COP29, Africa bets on $1.3trn in demand for climate justice

$300 billion is far from what is needed to tackle the climate crisis, but, even so, this target must be followed by concrete action – action which is desperately needed by the world’s 2.4 billion children. I hope to see the unique and disproportionate impacts of climate change on children thoroughly addressed in the upcoming Global Goal on Adaptation.

As a young African woman, I will be watching to check that the needs of my generation and future generations are well represented at the upcoming talks. I know millions of young people will be doing the same because we know our voices matter. 

Climate justice isn’t just about adaptation, it’s an opportunity, and one that Africa could seize to its fullest potential. We have the fastest growing youth population in the world and by 2025 this young workforce will be bigger than China and India’s.

 The green transition is an opportunity for new skills, more jobs, stronger communities and safer environments. We come from countries which in some cases are already operating with 80-90 percent renewable energy. 

We grew up knowing the price of extraction and exploitation. We know the cost of living on the frontlines of climate change. 

Our government's climate negotiators know that we are the continent that is leading on green innovation and entrepreneurship. All eyes should be on Africa as we make a green and just transition, which is possible, if rich countries live up to their commitments and invest in the children and young people who are already leading the way. 

Vanessa Nakate is a Unicef Goodwill Ambassador

For over sixty years, the United Nations and the global development machinery have operated across Africa, bringing with them an ever-growing network of aid missions, donor agencies, and international NGOs.

These actors arrived with the stated mission of fighting poverty, strengthening governance, and accelerating growth.

Yet after decades of generously funded programmes and meticulously crafted strategies, the impact on the ground tells a different story. Progress has been patchy at best, and in many places, painfully absent.

The distance between what was promised and what people actually experience in their daily lives has grown so wide that it’s no longer just the failures being questioned—but the very purpose and priorities of the aid system itself.

This is not due to African incapacity, nor to a lack of effort. It is the result of a fundamentally flawed model of development—a model designed elsewhere, delivered from above, and rooted in managerial bureaucracy rather than in the historical, political, and strategic realities of the continent.

The international development system has institutionalised a hierarchy of power that places African governments in a subordinate role to donor agencies. In many countries, the UN and international NGOs operate not as partners of the state but as parallel structures.

They establish massive offices in capital cities, hire foreign technical experts at salaries often exceeding that of entire government departments, and control strategic sectors through external funding channels. The very institutions that should be empowering African states to lead their own transformation have instead replaced or weakened them.

Read:  Aid cuts will not change African rulers; try proving they can kill

The gap between Europe’s post-war recovery and Africa’s development experience is glaring. After World War II, the US launched the Marshall Plan in 1948, channeling aid directly to European governments. The assumption was simple: recovery had to be led from within.

There was no army of foreign consultants or parallel agencies—just a clear trust in national leadership to steer the reconstruction process. These resources helped rebuild industries, repair shattered infrastructure, and revive essential public services, all under the control of domestic institutions that were empowered, not bypassed.

Crucially, it was a strategy rooted in sovereignty, one that treated European states as capable partners in their own recovery. Africa, by contrast, was drawn into a vastly different aid regime—one that cast its governments not as drivers of change, but as passive recipients of external assistance and support.

In Africa, the opposite became the norm. Donors bypassed the state, created non-state implementing partners, and established elaborate systems of control.

Over time, this led to the atrophy of domestic institutions and a distorted incentive structure in which ministries compete for donor attention rather than public legitimacy.

What emerged was a sprawling aid industry that measures progress by activities—workshops held, strategies launched, reports written—rather than by tangible outcomes such as water access, electricity coverage, road networks, or education quality.

This dynamic is not accidental. It reflects a broader attitude problem: a view of Africa not as a partner but as a project. As Francis Fukuyama has argued in his critique of post-colonial state-building, institutional capacity must come before external reform agendas.

Without a strong, coherent state, development initiatives become fragmented and unsustainable.

Yet, the development system has persistently focused on peripheral issues—trainings, sensitization campaigns, consultative meetings—while the core functions of government remain hollowed out and underfunded.

In many African countries, the UN presence resembles a parallel sovereign entity. These agencies maintain their own priorities, their own communication channels, and their own development goals, often with little coordination with the actual government. The result is fragmentation, duplication, and inefficiency on a massive scale.

Read: Africans should take Trump's aid cuts in stride

The energy of reform is channeled not into public institutions but into donor-funded “projects” that disappear the moment funding dries up.

This must change. The time has come for a radical restructuring of the international aid system in Africa—one that begins by acknowledging that the old model has failed. African governments must reclaim their centrality in the development process.

The UN and other aid agencies must limit their in-country presence to a skeletal administrative footprint, with the rest of their personnel seconded to government ministries where they work under local leadership and in line with national plans. No international office should replicate or override the role of a public institution. The goal must be to strengthen the African state, not substitute for it.

This also means abandoning the fixation on soft, symbolic programming. Development aid should no longer be spent on workshops, conferences, “awareness” initiatives, or endless pilot projects.

These have created a culture of motion without movement. The real needs of African communities—access to healthcare, electricity, clean water, roads, and functioning schools—remain unmet, even as millions are spent on capacity-building sessions and donor coordination retreats.

Africa does not need saviors. It needs partners who respect its sovereignty and who are willing to invest in the long, complex, and often difficult process of building state institutions.

This requires trust, patience, and a willingness to transfer control—not just funds. It means recognising that true development cannot be outsourced, and that no amount of external expertise can replace the legitimacy of local leadership.

The failures of the past 65 years must not be extended into the future. Africa is not a blank slate. It is a continent of layered histories, contested sovereignties, and evolving institutions. Any development effort that does not engage these realities with seriousness and humility is doomed to fail.

As African strategists, policymakers, and thinkers, we must push for a new consensus—one that centers African agency, dismantles the aid-industrial complex, and insists on a development approach grounded in sovereignty, meritocracy, and service delivery.

The future of Africa will not be built in donor coordination offices. It will be built in the halls of African ministries, in the streets of our cities, and in the everyday struggles of our people to claim the dignity they have long been denied.

When the final chapter of the March 23 (M23) rebellion in eastern DRC is written, it will either tell of the birth of the Kivu Republic, a federalised Congo, the fall of President Félix Tshisekedi, or a power-sharing deal with the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). Two meetings will stand out as turning points.

There is another possible outcome—M23’s defeat. However, this seems improbable. Unlike in 2012, it now dominates North and South Kivu, controlling much of the DRC’s mineral wealth.

Militarily, it outstrips Kinshasa in recruitment and efficiency. Tshisekedi lacks the guile of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, whose experience in guerrilla warfare helped him fight previous rebellions to a draw.

As an article in The New York Times reported last week: “M23, once a ragtag militia, now behaves like a governing entity in buzzing cities… mines and strategic border crossings. Its immigration officers stamp passports… M23 has imposed strict public order in newly conquered territories,” it said.

The article also noted a demoralised and corrupt DRC army, which often flees in the face of M23, and reported that experts see the group as “growing more powerful and sophisticated.”

Perhaps one of the most telling remarks came from Vivian van de Perre, deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma, who told the publication: “I have dealt with the Houthis in Yemen and rebel groups in the Central African Republic, but this [M23] tops everything I’ve seen.”

The DRC army, riddled with corruption and battlefield desertions, can no longer keep up. M23 is the dog that has sunk its teeth deep into the bone—and isn’t letting go.

These realities loomed over two major meetings. The first was the historic February 8 joint summit of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Dar es Salaam.

Read: DR Congo says still open to direct dialogue with the M23 rebels

With M23 in full control of Goma and closing in on Bukavu, African leaders grasped for a plan. The summit emphasised direct talks involving all parties, including the M23 rebels, and proposed merging the stalled Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, potentially with additional facilitators from across Africa.

The Luanda process, led by Angolan President João Lourenço, has been mediating the DRC conflict since July 2022. The Nairobi process was initiated in April 2022 by then-Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who continued leading it after leaving office in August 2022.

The summit condemned “uninvited foreign armed forces” in the DRC—probably a veiled reference to Rwanda and FDLR, an eastern DRC-based force comprising elements who committed the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

The fact that the summit even took place was seismic. African disunity is a cliché, but this meeting, bridging two regional economic blocs, rattled observers.

However, its momentum faltered. The EAC-SADC military chiefs, ordered to meet within five days, failed to do so, fuelling whispers of external sabotage. When they finally convened in Harare on March 17 (together with defence ministers)—more than a month late—Kinshasa and M23 were en route to Luanda for long-awaited direct talks.

Then, the dominoes fell. On the same day as the Harare meeting, the European Union—firmly in Kinshasa’s corner—slapped sanctions on M23 and Rwanda.

These included asset freezes, and travel bans on nine individuals, such as M23 leader Bertrand Bisimwa, Rwandan Defence Force commanders, and the North Kivu governor.

Additionally, the EU sanctioned the CEO of Rwanda’s Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board and Gasabo Gold Refinery in Kigali, accusing them of illicitly exporting Congolese minerals.

These measures aimed to pressure Rwanda to end its alleged support for M23 and address the exploitation of DRC resources fuelling the crisis. The sanctions instead backfired, souring Africa-led peace efforts and hardening positions.

Meanwhile, in the shadows, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani was brokering an audacious diplomatic gambit: A direct meeting between Kagame and Tshisekedi in Doha.

Among the agreements reached was a commitment to an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire” in eastern DRC, borrowing a line from the EAC-SADC joint resolution. The fact that the meeting had taken place stunned many, and evidence of it only emerged when a photo surfaced of Al Thani with Kagame and Tshisekedi, accompanied by a brief statement—not one of those lengthy 10-page communiqués—describing the encounter as “cordial.”

They also supported the integration of the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes and the EAC-SADC mechanism as the primary framework for resolving the conflict.

Read: How shift in regional forces killed Congo peace bid

With the EU sanctions undermining Luanda, M23 walked away. In a scramble to regain the initiative, EAC-SADC leaders convened a virtual summit on March 24, led by Kenya’s President William Ruto and Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, the current SADC chair.

But just as quickly, another card dropped—Angola abruptly quit its mediator role, citing a shift in focus to African Union priorities under President Lourenço’s chairmanship.

And so, the great Congolese chessboard remains in motion. M23 holds sway, the West fumbles yet another intervention, and Africa—caught between unity and self-interest—watches, wondering whether another peace effort will stagger into uncertainty.

A recent report showed AFC/M23 leader Corneille Nangaa meeting UN officials in Goma. His beard was neatly trimmed back, and he wore a sharp blue suit in an office befitting a president rather than a rundown bush headquarters.

There was no sign of uncertainty in his demeanour nor among the M23 troops swarming eastern DRC. They are likely feeling, as the Ugandans say, that the “gods who gave them (this time), didn’t lie to them”.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. Twitter: @cobbo3

External actors who gathered in London on Tuesday failed to secure the much-needed ceasefire in Sudan, disappointing rights watchdogs who had hoped for a turning point in the conflict.

The conference co-hosted by the UK, France, Germany and the African Union ended with pledges of $1 billion in humanitarian aid but political differences among stakeholders hindered discussions on ceasefire.

The UK had hosted the meeting with intent to establish a ‘contact group’ that would push for a ceasefire especially since participating countries would carry some form of influence on warring sides. But that effort collapsed due to deep disagreements between Arab and Western countries on the text of final communiqué.

A major diplomatic setback emerged as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates refused to endorse the joint statement, highlighting the growing rift among key international players over how to handle Sudan’s nearly two-year-long civil war.

Read: Sudan bloodshed sparks the worst refugee surge in East Africa

The absence of a consensus statement reflected the international community’s inability to unite around a political path forward, despite the worsening humanitarian catastrophe.

“The hosts’ closing statement didn’t even mention the massacre unfolding in El Fasher. Gathering with the UAE, Turkey and Egypt who have flooded the country with weapons, made it feel more like an arms fair than peace talks - yet there was no mention of stopping arms shipments. At best this was a vanity project for leaders who have been asleep at the wheel,” said Will Davies, the head of war monitoring group, Avaaz’s Sudan team. He was referring to the recent shelling of el Fasher by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the warring sides.

“David Lammy promised Sudan would not be forgotten. Today was a test of that commitment - and of the Foreign Secretary he intends to be, especially in the absence of US leadership. He failed dismally,” he added, referring to the UK Foreign Secretary who was the main host of the event.

According to critics, lobbying by players involved in the conflict played a role in weakening a united stance.

While Western powers pushed for a unified stance that rejected foreign interference and called for an inclusive political solution, efforts were derailed by Arab countries’ objections to certain language concerning Sudan’s future.

The impasse led to the release of a separate joint statement by Western nations, the African Union, and the European Union, reaffirming support for a peaceful resolution and opposition to any actions that might escalate the conflict or contribute to Sudan’s fragmentation.

“The AU calls, once again, on all the Sudanese actors to demonstrate political will by committing to a durable ceasefire and to engage meaningfully in a comprehensive, inclusive, and Sudanese-led political process,” said a statement issued by the AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf.

“The AU remains committed to working with Sudanese stakeholders, regional partners, and the international community to protect civilians and restore peace, stability, and democratic governance in Sudan.” Ali was represented in London by Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.

Yet for some African countries at the meeting, the feeling was that an Arab rivalry in Sudan was eclipsing the role of African institutions in seeking the peace.

“I underscore the need for consolidating the several peace tracks in Sudan into a well-coordinated and harmonised process preferably under the African Union and driven by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the support of the United Nations,” said Kenya’s Foreign and Diaspora Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi.

“We welcome the other efforts aimed at pacifying Sudan, while also advocating for a unified and coordinated response from all, including IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League, the United Nations, and the broader international community but we need to mainstream into an African led process,” he added.

Yet Kenya’s participation, alongside Chad had been controversial because the SAF had accused the two of aiding the RSF. Mudavadi used the accusation to refute the allegation, saying Kenya had opened the door for all Sudanese groups to negotiate peace.

Sudanese entities at war, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were not invited to the meeting in which the UK government explained was meant to establish consensus among external backers of the warring sides.

But the political landscape took a darker turn after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, announced the formation of a rival ‘Government of Peace and Unity.’

Read: More intrigue as Sudan’s RSF declares parallel government

This move signalled direct challenge to the authority to the army-backed administration under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, undermining prospects for negotiations and raising concerns about a de facto division of the country.

The conflict had started as internal power struggle, but a complex war has since entangled regional rivalries and international interests, which have fuelled both the military escalation and the diplomatic stalemate.

On the ground, violence has intensified, particularly in Darfur, where RSF forces have taken control of major displacement camps as part of a broader campaign to capture El Fasher - the last major city in the region not under RSF control.

In a related development, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan has reported that RSF forces have prevented their young members from leaving Zimzam Camp in North Darfur, even as 400,000 displaced people managed to flee the area.

RSF troops seized control of the camp - located 12 kilometres southwest of El Fasher - just three days after overrunning the site, where residents have been suffering from famine conditions since August 2024.

Refugees moving from Zimzam to El Fasher face extremely dire humanitarian conditions due to severe shortages of food, clean water, and other essential supplies.

Rwanda says it will grant Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo a safe passage to pull out of the war zone, potentially earning a publicity credit in the chaos.

Rwanda's Minister for Foreign Affairs Olivier Nduhungirehe told The EastAfrican that SADC had formally sought permission to use Rwandan territory to exit, a month after the bloc’s summit had authorised the withdrawal of the troops.

The announcement is a turnaround in relations between Rwanda and SADC in general, and South Africa in particular, because Kigali had been critical of the mission deployed in eastern DRC, ostensibly to rout the M23 rebels.

The mission, SAMIDRC, was led by South Africa and included troops from Malawi, Zimbabwe and Tanzania.

President Paul Kagame argued that the mission was siding with violators in the conflict. But SAMIDRC itself ran into embarrassing episodes, including losing 20 soldiers and getting blockaded by M23.

Earlier, SADC military chiefs inked a deal with the M23 to guarantee safe exit, but the deal reached in March collapsed after the rebels accused SADC of allowing the infiltration of the Congolese army FARDC, Wazalendo and other rebels at war with the M23 to carry out operations in parts of Goma.

These attacks have dampened efforts to rehabilitate Goma airport, which SAMIDRC had agreed to do in exchange for safe passage out of the city.

South Africa had tried to avoid having its troops leave through Rwanda, which it thought would give Kigali the satisfaction of subjecting its soldiers to embarrassing body searches on camera, as it did with the Romanian mercenaries captured in eastern DRC.

Romanian mercenaries are screened by Rwanda police as they are evacuated from Goma, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo at the Grande Barrier border crossing on the Gisenyi side of Rwanda on January 29, 2025.

Read: Foreign fighters in Goma granted passage to Rwanda

It is not yet clear whether the departing troops will take their military equipment with them. The M23 deal stipulated that SAMIDRC troops would not hand over their equipment to Congolese troops or allied militias.

Prominent Trump supporter Erik Prince has agreed to help Democratic Republic of Congo secure and tax its vast mineral wealth, according to two sources close to the private security executive, a Congolese government official and two diplomats.

The agreement, aimed at reaping more revenue from an industry marred by smuggling and corruption, was reached before Rwanda-backed M23 rebels launched a major offensive in January that has seen them seize eastern Congo’s two largest cities.

The discussions now on implementing the deal with Prince come as the US and Congo explore a broader deal on critical minerals partnerships, after Congo pitched a minerals-for-security deal to US President Donald Trump’s administration.

Read: Minerals and sanctions: Trump’s terms, conditions to aid Congo peace process

Prince, a former US Navy Seal, founded Blackwater before renaming the private military company and selling it in 2010 after several employees were indicted on charges of unlawfully killing Iraqi civilians. The men were convicted but later pardoned by Trump during his first term.

The Trump administration has not said how the US might contribute to security in Congo as part of any minerals deal. Analysts and former US officials have said leaning on security contractors such as Prince could be an option.

A Congolese government source told Reuters that any agreement between Congo and Prince would need to be reviewed in light of the push for a deal with the US.

The security deal was agreed with the finance ministry, and Prince’s advisers will focus on improving tax collection and reducing cross-border smuggling of minerals, the two sources close to Prince said. There were no plans to deploy security contractors to areas of active conflict, the sources said.

Prince declined to comment through a spokesperson. The Congo presidency did not respond to a request for comment. The US State Department declined to comment.

Initial focus on copper mines, source says

The DRC has vast reserves of copper, cobalt, lithium and coltan - a mineral used widely in smartphones, computers and electric vehicles - but has been plagued for decades by violence in its eastern region.

The agreement between Congo and Prince initially involved a plan to deploy contractors to Goma, the capital of North Kivu province and the largest city in eastern Congo. But Goma is now under M23 control and that plan has been put on hold. M23 controls tracts of mineral-rich territory.

A source close to the Congolese government told Reuters an initial deployment of Prince’s advisers was expected to start in the south, far from the area controlled by M23 and its allies.

“If you just look at Katanga, if you look at Kolwezi down just off the Zambian-Congo border, they claim that there’s like $40 million a month in lost revenue of what’s going out and what’s coming in,” the source said.

A diplomatic source also told Reuters the first stage of Prince’s effort in Congo would focus on securing mines and tax revenues in copper-producing Katanga province.

One of the sources close to Prince said advisers were expected to deploy with technical experts from a company specialised in testing and inspecting commodities. The advisers would initially target larger mines and expand as revenue collection improved.

The source did not provide details on how the advisers would tackle corruption in the sector that has long drained revenue that would otherwise flow to the state.

A source in the office of Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi said an agreement in principle had been signed with Prince, but the details on where and how many advisers would be deployed remained to be established.

Prince’s work in Africa

Prince has worked in Africa for over a decade, initially providing logistics for oil and mining companies working in remote corners of the continent.

Read: Blackwater founder's firm signs security deal with Somali region

A number of Prince-controlled companies have operated in Congo since 2015. They have been involved in trucking and have also sought to get involved in the minerals sector.

The two sources close to Prince said the new agreement followed years of talks over how to improve Congo’s control over its mineral resources.

Prince previously proposed sending thousands of contractors to the eastern region during talks with Kinshasa in 2023, a UN expert panel reported that year. Those discussions did not ultimately lead to a deal.

Congo has long accused Rwanda of plundering minerals from the region, a claim supported by independent entities including the United Nations and the non-profit Global Witness. Rwanda denies that.

That loss of mining revenue is one of the key concerns that Prince’s team will seek to address, one of the sources close to Prince said.

The goal is to ensure “that extraction industries and others are operating transparently, and that their production and revenues is properly distributed in accordance with the Congolese mining code”, the source said.

United Nations and Western governments say Rwanda has provided arms and troops to the M23.

Rwanda has denied backing M23. It says its military has acted in self-defence against Congo’s army and a Rwandan militia operating in east Congo that was founded by perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.

Rwanda and Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) football club have renewed their shirt sponsorship deal until 2028, amid a spirited campaign by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for the partnership to be cancelled.

Kinshasa has been lobbying Europe’s top football clubs - PSG, Arsenal and Bayern Munich - directly and through lobbyists to cancel their sponsorship deals with Rwanda on the grounds that it is backing M23 rebels bent on militarily removing the Felix Tshisekedi government, after they captured key cities in eastern Congo, including the Kivu capitals of Goma and Bukavu.

As part of the new phase of the partnership, the Visit Rwanda logo will appear on the training kits of PSG’s academies in the US and Canada and on the sleeves of the men’s first team jerseys during the Fifa Club World Cup in 2025.

“This partnership has contributed significantly to positioning Rwanda as a leading destination for tourism and investment—and a beacon for talent, sports and cultural innovation,” said Jean-Guy Afrika, CEO of the Rwanda Development Board.

“Renewing through 2028 allows us to build on that success and create even more impact for Rwandans and the global Paris Saint-Germain community.”

Youth empowerment remains a key pillar of the renewed partnership. The PSG Academy Rwanda, launched under the initial agreement, has already provided more than 400 young Rwandans with access to elite football training, education, and mentorship.

The academy’s success was underscored in 2022, when Rwanda’s U13 team won the PSG Academy World Cup.

Since the inception of the deal in 2019, both parties say it has introduced millions of fans to Rwanda through storytelling, matchday features and branding at the Parc des Princes.

Elements such as serving Rwandan coffee to fans in Paris have also connected global audiences to Rwanda’s hospitality and culture, the parties add.

Read: Rwanda scrambles to save football deals, bike race

Victoriano Melero, the PSG CEO, said: “Together, we help showcase the cultural richness and natural beauty of Rwanda, while demonstrating that football can inspire and bring communities around the world closer.”

The partnership renewal comes at a time PSG and Arsenal -- the other top club that Rwanda has a shirt sleeve deal with -- have qualified for the semi-finals of the Champions League, which means more eyeballs on the Visit Rwanda brand.

Upon Arsenal decisively winning its two-leg tie against Spanish giant Real Madrid, on 5:1 aggregate, winning both legs of the tie, 3:0 and 2:1, an ecstatic President Paul Kagame – an avid Arsenal supporter -- took to X to congratulate them.

“M.Arteta & All Arsenal Team done us/fans & partners proud. You deserve everything...Congrats,” he posted.

Earlier, he wished PSG success against Aston Villa.

“Good partners PSG rooting for you tonight. Put this one in the bag :). Bless,” the President wrote on X.

Latest RDB figures show that Rwanda’s tourism revenues grew by 4.3 percent to $647 million in 2024, partly driven by the visibility Rwanda got through its deals with the European football clubs.

A UN trade agency is cautioning the US against imposing tariffs on developing countries, seeing certain exports from these countries as important to alleviate poverty in the long run.

The UN Trade and Development agency (UNCTAD), which helps countries build trade policies, said developing countries should generally be exempt from reciprocal tariffs, particularly those imposed on green technologies or vital goods.

UNCTAD said in a new report this week that in many cases, reciprocal tariffs risk devastating developing and least developed economies, without significantly reducing US trade deficits or increasing revenue collection.

It warns that increasing tariffs on imported goods may raise some additional revenue but will also likely increase consumer prices globally.

The report, Escalating tariffs: The impact on small and vulnerable economies was released in the aftermath of US President Donald Trump’s tariffs slap on countries worldwide, a majority of which are developing countries. It argues that tariffs were meant to inspire their development and not to retard them.

The report suggested that the poorest and most vulnerable economies be exempt from “reciprocal tariffs.”

“Small and least developed countries represent a marginal share of the US trade deficit. For example, 28 of the affected trading partners each contribute less than 0.1 percent of the total US trade deficit. Yet imposing “reciprocal tariffs” will disproportionately affect their ability to export to the US market,” the UNCTAD report said.

“Some trading partners are very small and/or economically poor with very low purchasing power. As a result, they offer limited or no export market opportunities for the United States. Trade concessions from these partners would mean little to the United States, while potentially reducing their own revenue collection.”

President Trump has since paused reciprocal tariffs to some 70 countries by 90 days but actually imposed a uniform 10 percent across board for the time being. Trump said many of these countries signaled intent to renegotiate tariffs.

Some 11 of the 44 US trading partners are classified by the United Nations as ‘Least Developed Countries’ many of which rely on tariffs for domestic revenue collection.

“Reciprocal tariffs of 10 percent in place since April 5, 2025, may reduce demand for many imported goods as a result of higher prices.

“However, even if after the introduction of tariffs, import levels were to remain unchanged at 2024 levels, the additional tariff revenue collected from poorer and smaller economies would be minimal compared to current customs duty revenues,” the report argues.

In the latest Trump’s tariffs, Kenya, Tanzania, and Burundi were among the countries that suffered most when Trump imposed a baseline of 10 percent tariffs on goods.

Read: Pain of Trump’s tariffs on African economies

They had been enjoying zero tariffs and duty free to the US under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa).

In applying tariffs across the board rather than in a targeted fashion, Trump’s proposal makes few accommodations for commodities – from coffee and vanilla to various rare earth minerals that America cannot produce at scale within its own borders.

“When you think about some sectors, they have grown based on the needs of the US market, particularly textiles from the Export Processing Zones in Kenya. The EPZs have expanded primarily the way they have because they responded to what the US market wanted from the beginning from the free access to the US market,” said Dr Winnie Rugutt, Program Lead, Africa Center for the Study of the US (ACSUS), Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi.

“So, if you put those tariffs and taxes, even if you say they look for an alternative market, for some specific items like textiles and apparels, it may not be easy to find another market for EPZs products especially in such a short notice.”

Most trading partners facing reciprocal tariffs would generate minimal additional revenue for the US, even if import volumes remain unchanged.

For 36 of them, the new tariffs would generate less than 1 percent of current US tariff revenues.

Major oil exporters, such as Guyana and Nigeria, would add very little, as oil is exempt from any additional tariffs.

Similarly, reciprocal tariffs on countries that primarily export mineral products, such as Zambia, Angola, Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, would generate negligible additional revenue for the US but would further hinder their potential to diversify and add value to their exports.

Also, several trading partners export agricultural commodities not produced in the US and for which there are few substitutes.

Examples include Madagascar’s vanilla and cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.

“Increasing tariffs on such goods, while generating some revenue, is likely to result in higher prices for consumers,” the UNCTAD report says.

For instance, in 2024 the United States imported vanilla worth approximately $150 million from Madagascar; cocoa imports from Côte d’Ivoire were close to US$ 800 million, while imports from Ghana were about US$ 200 million.

“The general pattern of tariff escalation— where higher tariffs are applied to processed goods and lower ones to raw materials— discourages the export of value-added products from developing economies, thereby reducing value addition and hindering their industrialisation efforts,” the report said.

The report also faults Trump’s tariffs in a world order governed by Trade rules under the World Trade Organization.

“Countries do not only bind their tariffs under WTO commitments but also through bilateral and preferential trade agreements. When nations enter these agreements, a significant portion of their trade is governed by preferential terms, effectively “locking in” tariff commitments, and limiting their ability to unilaterally raise tariffs,” the report says.

“As a result, the actual “true” tariff water after accounting for preferential trade agreements is often much smaller than it appears, especially in advanced economies as a significant part of trade occurs under preferential trade agreements.”

In this regard, the commitments taken within preferential trade agreements ensure stability and predictability, facilitating international trade and investment while limiting abrupt protectionist measures that could disrupt value chain operations with trading partners.

While Trump’s tariffs are justified under the US Trade laws, these tariffs are expected to have significant repercussions on global and regional value chains.

“The disruptions caused by these tariffs could lead to shifts in production and sourcing patterns, as companies and countries adjust to new trade barriers and seek to mitigate the costs of these tariffs.”

South Africa’s MTN Group Ltd made a net gain of R564 million ($29.76 million) from the sale of its 1.57 billion shares in the Ugandan subsidiary despite offering the stake at a substantial discount in a bid to comply with a requirement to offload a minimum stake of 20 percent to minority investors.

Latest disclosures through the company’s audited financial statements (2024) show that the proceeds generated from the sale of the shares (net of taxes and transaction costs) amounted to R1.03 billion ($54.67 million) resulting in a net gain of R564 million ($29.76 million).

“Proceeds generated from the sale of shares, (net of taxes and transaction costs) amounted to Ush214 billion (R1 036 million). This resulted in a net gain of R564 million recognised in equity as a transaction with non-controlling interests,” the group says.

The group disposed of 7.03 percent stake equivalent to 1. 57 billion shares in MTN Uganda as part of its localisation plan that reduced its shareholding in the subsidiary to 76.02 percent from 83.05 percent.

The transaction which was completed in June last year (2024) came after the group managed to sell a 12.97 percent stake in MTN Uganda in November 2021 through an initial public offering (IPO) that was priced at Ush200 ($0.05).

The share sale in the secondary market aimed to help MTN comply with Uganda’s local ownership rule that requires foreign telcos operating in the country to cede at least 20 percent shareholding to the public through the stock market.

The offer which ran between May and June 10, 2024, was priced at discount of Ush170 ($0.04) per share compared to the original IPO price of Ush200 ($0.05) per share.

The company also offered 30 free shares for every 140 shares allocated with the incentive shares amounting to a significant discount and making the secondary offer more generous than the IPO.

Consequently, the sale of the additional shares was oversubscribed by 2.3 times, receiving subscription of three billion shares, reflecting the impact of the incentives that included free shares.

In 2019 the Ugandan government directed foreign-owned telecoms operating in the country to list at least 20 percent of their shares on the local bourse within two years to boost Ugandan ownership in the sector

The policy shift put pressure on multinationals operating in the country such as MTN, Airtel and Lycamobile to sell shares to the public.

President Yoweri Museveni complained that the country was draining its scarce foreign exchange reserves through foreign-owned telecoms repatriating their profits abroad.

Last year Airtel Africa Plc disclosed that it will also sell additional shares amounting to a 9.11 percent stake in its Ugandan subsidiary through a secondary offer to comply with Kampala’s listing requirements.

The multinational in November 2023 managed to sell 4.35 billion shares equivalent to a 10.89 percent stake in Airtel Uganda’s initial public offering (IPO) and failed to meet the ownership rule.

Airtel Africa said it had received a regulatory extension to sell the balance of 3.64 billion shares by November 2026, a move that will see it replicate MTN group which successfully offloaded a 20 percent stake in MTN Uganda in two transactions including a secondary offer conclude in June 2024

Airtel Africa sold its shares at a price of Ush100 ($0.02) per share in the IPO that also offered incentive shares on a band subscription volume to attract investors.

Retail investors who applied for more than 2,500 shares, for instance, received 10 free shares for each 100 shares allocated while institutional investors who applied for at least 1.85 billion shares were offered 112 free shares for each 100 shares allocated.

MTN group’s operations in the continent have faced several challenges including the conflict in Sudan’s capital Khartoum which started on April 15, 2023, between Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces leading to the destruction of state-owned infrastructure in the city.

The ongoing conflict in Khartoum has resulted in loss of revenue and earnings for MTN’s subsidiary due to prolonged hyperinflationary environment leading to an impairment of R11. 72 billion ($618.66 million) relating to MTN Sudan’s non-current assets.

“Accordingly, the future economic benefits that can be derived from MTN Sudan’s operations have declined,” the group says.

Last year (2024) the group gained R1.3 billion ($68.61 million) from the sale of subsidiaries in Afghanistan and Guinea-Bissau and a loss of R1.9 billion ($100.27 million) on the sale of a subsidiary in Guinea-Conakry.

The sale of MTN Guinea-Bissau and MTN Guinea-Conakry was concluded on August 1, 2024, and December 30, 2024, respectively

The group also disposed of 686 million shares in MTN Ghana to Ghanaian citizens as part of the Group’s localisation strategy reducing the group’s shareholding to 73.99 percent from 81.04 percent.

External actors who gathered in London on Tuesday failed to secure the much-needed ceasefire in Sudan, disappointing rights watchdogs who had hoped for a turning point in the conflict.

The conference co-hosted by the UK, France, Germany and the African Union ended with pledges of $1 billion in humanitarian aid but political differences among stakeholders hindered discussions on ceasefire.

The UK had hosted the meeting with intent to establish a ‘contact group’ that would push for a ceasefire especially since participating countries would carry some form of influence on warring sides. But that effort collapsed due to deep disagreements between Arab and Western countries on the text of final communiqué.

A major diplomatic setback emerged as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates refused to endorse the joint statement, highlighting the growing rift among key international players over how to handle Sudan’s nearly two-year-long civil war.

Read: Sudan bloodshed sparks the worst refugee surge in East Africa

The absence of a consensus statement reflected the international community’s inability to unite around a political path forward, despite the worsening humanitarian catastrophe.

“The hosts’ closing statement didn’t even mention the massacre unfolding in El Fasher. Gathering with the UAE, Turkey and Egypt who have flooded the country with weapons, made it feel more like an arms fair than peace talks - yet there was no mention of stopping arms shipments. At best this was a vanity project for leaders who have been asleep at the wheel,” said Will Davies, the head of war monitoring group, Avaaz’s Sudan team. He was referring to the recent shelling of el Fasher by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the warring sides.

“David Lammy promised Sudan would not be forgotten. Today was a test of that commitment - and of the Foreign Secretary he intends to be, especially in the absence of US leadership. He failed dismally,” he added, referring to the UK Foreign Secretary who was the main host of the event.

According to critics, lobbying by players involved in the conflict played a role in weakening a united stance.

While Western powers pushed for a unified stance that rejected foreign interference and called for an inclusive political solution, efforts were derailed by Arab countries’ objections to certain language concerning Sudan’s future.

The impasse led to the release of a separate joint statement by Western nations, the African Union, and the European Union, reaffirming support for a peaceful resolution and opposition to any actions that might escalate the conflict or contribute to Sudan’s fragmentation.

“The AU calls, once again, on all the Sudanese actors to demonstrate political will by committing to a durable ceasefire and to engage meaningfully in a comprehensive, inclusive, and Sudanese-led political process,” said a statement issued by the AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf.

“The AU remains committed to working with Sudanese stakeholders, regional partners, and the international community to protect civilians and restore peace, stability, and democratic governance in Sudan.” Ali was represented in London by Bankole Adeoye, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.

Yet for some African countries at the meeting, the feeling was that an Arab rivalry in Sudan was eclipsing the role of African institutions in seeking the peace.

“I underscore the need for consolidating the several peace tracks in Sudan into a well-coordinated and harmonised process preferably under the African Union and driven by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the support of the United Nations,” said Kenya’s Foreign and Diaspora Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi.

“We welcome the other efforts aimed at pacifying Sudan, while also advocating for a unified and coordinated response from all, including IGAD, the African Union, the Arab League, the United Nations, and the broader international community but we need to mainstream into an African led process,” he added.

Yet Kenya’s participation, alongside Chad had been controversial because the SAF had accused the two of aiding the RSF. Mudavadi used the accusation to refute the allegation, saying Kenya had opened the door for all Sudanese groups to negotiate peace.

Sudanese entities at war, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were not invited to the meeting in which the UK government explained was meant to establish consensus among external backers of the warring sides.

But the political landscape took a darker turn after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, announced the formation of a rival ‘Government of Peace and Unity.’

Read: More intrigue as Sudan’s RSF declares parallel government

This move signalled direct challenge to the authority to the army-backed administration under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, undermining prospects for negotiations and raising concerns about a de facto division of the country.

The conflict had started as internal power struggle, but a complex war has since entangled regional rivalries and international interests, which have fuelled both the military escalation and the diplomatic stalemate.

On the ground, violence has intensified, particularly in Darfur, where RSF forces have taken control of major displacement camps as part of a broader campaign to capture El Fasher - the last major city in the region not under RSF control.

In a related development, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sudan has reported that RSF forces have prevented their young members from leaving Zimzam Camp in North Darfur, even as 400,000 displaced people managed to flee the area.

RSF troops seized control of the camp - located 12 kilometres southwest of El Fasher - just three days after overrunning the site, where residents have been suffering from famine conditions since August 2024.

Refugees moving from Zimzam to El Fasher face extremely dire humanitarian conditions due to severe shortages of food, clean water, and other essential supplies.

Verily I say unto thee, in the month of the Roman god Janus, in the year of Our Lord 2023, Tundu Lissu came back to the city of Dar es Salaam from his exile.

And the people rejoiced, and they lined the streets to welcome him in jubilation, and they did not lay palm fronds on his path into the city because we have printed flags now, and we don’t throw those in the road, come on.

And two years later, Tundu Lissu completed his ascent to the throne of Chadema in a rather impressive display of competition within the confines of a Tanzanian political party, and he launched his bid for the presidency of the country, aided and abetted and beloved by the media which has always been one of his strongest constituencies — for good reason.

Tundu Lissu proposed to lead the people to the promised freedom through a campaign of “No Reform, No Election!” The path ahead was narrow, and it was dark, wending through the lives and fates of a citizenry whose State often stalled legal and constitutional change efforts that would support the entrenchment of genuinely inclusive multiparty politics in Tanzania.

Tundu Lissu rallied the people around him as he set forth to spread the fervent word of Chadema’s bid to rectify the elections this year.

He preached with the courage of a righteous man who survived an assassination attempt and who is as pugnacious as the AFP article on his subsequent arrest called him. He flipped the script, exhorting the masses to resist the political usury of the power brokers at the temples of our democracy.

And his exhortations touched the hearts of the people, for it raised a very necessary alarm about the upcoming elections. At every step he was accompanied by the protectors of the land, lest he excite the crowds so much with his sermons that chaos ensued.

Read: Lissu’s party Chadema disqualified from polls

Yet the spirit of tranquillity prevailed because the people are not stupid and have become increasingly adept at avoiding giving the protectors of the land ‘security reasons’ to clobber them.

And so Tundu Lissu spoke. He spoke loudly, and he spoke clearly, and he spoke long because remember he is a lawyer, and only slightly less verbose than a letter from Saint Paul.

And he issued a fiery rallying cry that I have to admit sounded quite risky, considering the context of Tanzania and its sensitivities. And lo and behold, he was arrested and eventually charged with treason.

And as they wailed in shock and protest at the unfairness of it all, the people were further burdened with the terrible news that Chadema would be barred from participating in the contestation for leadership of the land. And it was not well.

Friend, I tell you this story thusly because a chuckle during dark political times is medicine. But also, I tell you this story thusly because I agree with Jenerali Ulimwengu who recently reminded us that “Uchaguzi ni ibada.” Elections are sacred.

I pray that my government read the congregation of the United Republic of Tanzania and consider their policy of persecution against the few and the brave who defend our civic rights.

I pray that those who have placed their hands on sacred texts and taken oaths — Oaths! — of public service remember: Every chant of our national anthem is a profession of faith.

Shalom. Salaam. Peace be upon us all.

Elsie Eyakuze is an independent consultant and blogger for The Mikocheni Report; E-mail: [email protected]