As the World Bank and International Monetary Fund host the Spring Meetings in Washington this week, Africa’s development priorities hang in the balance.

With no high-level discussions on climate or gender — issues that are central to the continent’s growth and resilience — the agenda seems increasingly disconnected from the systemic challenges facing African nations. Instead, the focus remains on "Jobs and Macroeconomics," a framing that recalls the failed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 90s.

Under the guise of growth and stability, these policies imposed austerity, deregulation and fiscal cuts that decimated public services, deepened inequality and burdened Africa with unsustainable debt. The current direction threatens to repeat this damaging legacy, while the institutions responsible for financing fossil fuel expansion and undermining climate resilience evade accountability.

In this context, Mission 300, launched at the Africa Energy Summit in Dar es Salaam in January, stands as a critical initiative. Led by the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union, and the government of Tanzania, Mission 300 aims to provide electricity to 300 million people across Africa by 2030.

But ambition without justice is not progress. And promises without integrity are not solutions. The truth is, Mission 300 risks becoming just another top-down, donor-driven project that fails to answer the fundamental question: whose development, on whose terms, and at what cost?

In line with this year’s Spring Meetings’ theme "Jobs and Macroeconomics,” we must critically assess whether Mission 300 will create clean, sustainable jobs that benefit communities across Africa. Will it empower young people in rural Kenya or women in informal settlements in Ghana — or will they be concentrated in urban industrial corridors and foreign contractor payrolls?

According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (Irena), Africa accounts for only 3 percent of global renewable energy jobs, despite its vast potential and growing population. If Mission 300 is to reverse this trend, it must move beyond megaprojects and pipelines, and instead prioritise community-led, decentralised energy systems that generate not just electricity but equitable, decent work rooted in local contexts.

Yet, early indications are troubling. The inclusion of fossil gas as a transitional energy source — backed by the World Bank and reflected in Senegal’s National Energy Compact — is a signal that the same polluting industries responsible for destabilising our climate are being rebranded as part of the solution.

Natural gas may offer short-term job spikes during construction, but these are neither green nor future-proof jobs. Moreover, the International Energy Agency has made it clear that no new oil and gas fields are compatible with net-zero by 2050.

The financing model raises equally serious concerns. Much of the funding promised under Mission 300 comes in the form of concessional loans. Even at a one percent interest rate over 40 years, this is debt — and for a continent where 40 countries face rising debt levels, and at least 19 are at high risk of debt distress, adding more liabilities to public balance sheets to fund fossil-dependent infrastructure is not development — it is exploitation.

African nations sink deeper into debt crisis. Their external debt has reached a staggering $11.4 trillion in 2023. According to a report by Christian Aid, across Africa, 32 countries now spend more on debt than healthcare, with $85 billion paid to external creditors in 2023, projected to increase to $104 billion in 2024.

As debt burdens grow heavier across the continent, the wave of billion-dollar pledges and commitments deserves careful attention.

The Africa Energy Summit generated headlines with pledges of over $5 billion from donors like the Rockefeller Foundation, AIIB, and Islamic Development Bank, but bigger numbers don’t always mean better outcomes.

With over $50 billion now committed to Mission 300, including $48 billion from the AfDB and World Bank by 2030, there is still no public guarantee of how these funds will be deployed.

This lack of transparency and the sidelining of critical climate concerns only amplifies the deeper contradictions within the World Bank/IMF policies and deeply alarms African civil society and vulnerable communities in Africa.

The World Bank committed at the 2023 Annual Meetings in Marrakech to a new mission: A liveable planet, in addition to poverty eradication. This new vision is now marginalised possibly due to fears of withdrawal by the Trump administration, revealing a major contradiction.

Regarding climate finance, Bretton Woods institutions must strengthen their climate financing capacities, particularly in ways that don’t create additional barriers for developing countries. The September 2024 report on MDB’s Joint Report on climate finance shows that MDBs contributed a record $125 billion in 2023.

But these funds often come in the form of debt and non-concessional finance, which limits the fiscal space of developing countries already struggling with climate impacts and high debt levels. There is an urgent need to significantly increase grant-based and highly concessional finance within their portfolios.

Gender has also been sidelined in World Bank discussions for far too long. Despite the Bank’s ambitious Gender Strategy for 2024-30, which promises to prioritise gender equality in global development, the reality remains far removed from these claims. Women’s needs, particularly in vital sectors like energy access, continue to be neglected.

Nearly 900 million people in Africa still rely on harmful biomass for cooking, and the burden falls disproportionately on women. This is not merely a climate or environmental issue— it’s a health crisis, a significant economic vulnerability, and an unaddressed inequality. Reliance on polluting fuels costs $791.4 billion annually, with health-related impacts accounting for $526.3 billion.

The Spring Meetings must be seized as a turning point. While the hopes may be tempered by the complexities and challenges ahead, giving up is worse. Expectations are low, given the history of unfulfilled promises and empty rhetoric. Yet, this moment presents a critical opportunity for African leaders to reject outdated models of debt-driven growth, fossil-fuelled development, and gender-blind planning.

Dr Wafa Misrar is the Campaign and Policy Officer at CAN Africa, and Said Skounti is a researcher at IMAL Initiative.

In Uganda, there is a similarity between this year’s Easter week and that of 1979 – unstable power supply. In 1979, the blackouts were related to an external (military) force entering Uganda; today they are related to an external (business) force exiting Uganda.

The war that removed Uganda’s military government with the overrunning of Kampala on April 11 had started six months earlier in Kagera, the north-western region of Tanzania.

On the eve of Uganda’s Independence Day, October 8, 1978, the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces finally returned the fire to the plundering Uganda Army which had earlier invaded and annexed Kagera region, even provocatively naming a Ugandan district commissioner for it.

In February 1979 as the war advanced northwards on Ugandan soil, the country started experiencing power blackouts. Rumours attributed this to sabotage by Ugandan guerrillas working with Tanzanians to overthrow President Idi Amin.

By the time of the Catholic Centenary in Uganda on February 17, power cuts had become daily. Guests from all over the world including the main celebrant from the Vatican (it was a world Catholic event courtesy of the 22 Uganda Martyrs) had a taste of what celebrating amid wartime darkness is like.

As Amin fled eastwards after losing power on April 11, a new fear arose over the safety of Owen Falls Dam at Jinja and its vital bridge that connects Mombasa/Kenya to Kampala.

For in his last broadcasts over Radio Uganda, he had promised dire consequences should he lose power to invaders and their “unpatriotic collaborators”. However, Amin passed Jinja without blowing up the dam and exited Uganda to exile where he died peacefully 25 years later.

After Amin’s exit that 46 years ago threatened to reduce Uganda’s hydro electricity generation from 150MW to 0, the country’s generation continued deteriorating for two decades, until the Museveni government with partners like HH The Aga Khan got production capacity growing again and has now grown 15 times higher to over 2,000MW.

Partnering with the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Uganda expanded power distribution that had shrunk due to a deteriorating grid network, now 10 times up from 250,000 to now 2.5million connections.

Then this April, with the exit of the CDC-led distribution consortium called Umeme, the long-forgotten power outages returned, hopefully temporarily. But citizens aged 50 and above can relate this Easter season to the power cuts of April 1979 when Amin was exiting.

Read: Uganda scrambles to fund Umeme exit as deadline looms

The power cuts related to the Umeme exit of March 31 could have been due to two or more reasons. First, the expected physical stripping by junior technicians unsure of their jobs under new management could have ‘disappeared’ a few kilometres of wire from the grid and a few thousand litres of transformer oils and other consumables.

Second is the stalled investment in grid maintenance (which should be constant) that must have arisen during the lengthy uncertain transition when the distributor was on the way out.

The replacement —the state agency for whose mandate Umeme had been executing —the Uganda Electricity Distribution and Corporation Ltd (UEDCL) — is subject to government procurement procedures that are lengthy and bureaucratic.

But grid maintenance and expansion are all about procuring transformers, wires, poles and securing passage across thousands of kilometres, period.

Last week UEDCL was engaging the government procurement agency to waive bureaucratic delays, otherwise the vultures that influence public tenders can reverse the gains of grid expansion and consistent power supply backwards by three decades in a short time, aggravating inconsistent lighting this Easter to widespread blackouts by Christmas and total darkness by the time of the general election time next year. We don’t want that, do we?

Buwembo is a Kampala-based journalist. Email: [email protected]

In 1977, Kenya police banned the performance of Ngaahika Ndeenda by Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii. The actors were small-scale farmers and workers in and around Kamirithu Village.

The play, directed by Kimani Gecau, was performed in an open-air makeshift theatre in the middle of the village. Before its stoppage, thousands of people had travelled from afar to watch the play.

The play showed how the church allied with the political class to keep the poor in subjugation. It narrated the story of how ordinary people rose up against British colonialism. It disputed the depiction of African culture as savage.

The play showed that the anti-colonial ideals were the true basis for a more progressive and democratic country. The play utilised the dramatic resources of art to tell its multi-themed story.

The banning of the play was the less harsh response by Jomo Kenyatta’ s regime. Ngugi wa Thiong’o was abducted at night and detained without trial at Kamiti Maximum Security Prison.

Kimani and Mirii evaded a police dragnet and escaped into exile. Later, the police descended on the theatre in Kamirithu and in avenging fury razed it to the ground.

In 2022, Ngaahika Ndeenda was performed at the Kenya National Theatre. I took my Gen-Z daughter and nephew to watch the performance. I listened carefully to their assessment. They remarked on the dramatic and comedic elements.

Neither of them said they were inspired to commandeer a tank to storm government buildings. We emerged from the theatre to find throngs of mostly young people excitedly debating the merits and demerits of the performance.

The play was an artistic experience, not a call to arms. If there was any revolutionary seed planted, it was in their understanding of history, and the hypocrisy of individuals and society.

History has repeated itself. A few days ago, armed Kenya police raided the venue of a secondary schools' drama festival to stop the rehearsal and performance of a play.

Echoes of War by Cleophas Malala was to be performed by Butere Girls School. Police threw tear gas to disperse the girls and reporters.

Echoes of War talks about the cultural and political divide between the older and younger generations. The characters decry bad governance.

Like their real-life Gen-Z counterparts, the characters use social media to criticise bad governance and corruption. In the end, the dictator in the play agrees to listen to his youthful critics, and they all resolve to work together for the good of the country.

Echoes of War, like Ngaahika Ndeenda, does not call for violent rebellion. The play is a simple dramatisation of normal political discourse we have daily on TV and radio. Only fully fledged or fledgling dictatorships can be so thin-skinned.

The violent overreaction even embarrassed the ODM side of the regime. Had the regime allowed the play, we might never have heard of it, and Ruto’s regime would not have dug itself even deeper in the hole of ignominy.

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political and social commentator.

The East African Community (EAC) Council of Ministers is meeting in Arusha this week to discuss issues affecting the region, including the deteriorating security situation in eastern Congo and budgetary constraints hampering the operations of the Secretariat.

The ministers are expected to review the interventions of the joint EAC-SADC (Southern African Development Community) initiatives to restore peace, security and stability in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

A paper from the Secretariat notes that since the start of the year, more than 700,000 people have been displaced in the Congolese provinces of North and South Kivu due to the resurgence of the M23 armed group.

“The resurgence has also worsened the humanitarian situation in the two provinces,” the EAC says.

The ministers will also review the bloc’s financial situation, which has affected the implementation of its mandate and the payment of statutory obligations, including staff salaries.

Read: EAC on the brink: Cash crunch bites as defaults mount

Somalis movement

Meanwhile, Somalia has complained to the Secretariat about the challenges its citizens face when travelling within EAC member states.

Mogadishu says Somali officials, including those holding diplomatic and service passports, face obstacles in obtaining visas in advance, hence hindering their ability to travel and participate fully in regional initiatives.

“In this respect, member states are reminded of their commitment to observe and implement the provisions of the [Common Market] Protocol and to provide reciprocal treatment to citizens of partner states in matters enshrined in the Protocol,” the Secretariat says.

South Sudan's army said it had recaptured a key town in Upper Nile state that it lost to an ethnic Nuer militia in March in clashes which led to the arrest of First Vice President Riek Machar and a spiralling political crisis.

President Salva Kiir has served in an uneasy power-sharing government with Machar since a 2018 peace deal ended a civil war between fighters loyal to the two men which killed hundreds of thousands of people.

Machar's detention under house arrest, for trying to stir up a rebellion through his supposed support for the White Army militia in Upper Nile, has ignited international fears of renewed conflict along ethnic lines.

Spokespeople for the military and White Army, which Machar's party denies backing, said Nasir town was re-captured on Sunday without a fight.

"We were just taking a tactical withdrawal," said Honson Chuol James, White Army spokesperson, adding that 17 people were killed during heavy bombardment of the nearby village of Thuluc.

Army spokesperson Lul Ruai Koang said the military were able to avoid an ambush in Thuluc thanks to close air support.

"They were spotted when they were grouping, and they were fired on, and then they dispersed," Koang said.

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni visited Kiir earlier this month after deploying his army to help secure South Sudan's capital Juba amid the heightened political tensions.

Uganda's military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who is also Museveni's son, claims his troops have since killed 1,500 fighters from the White Army, which fought alongside Machar's forces in the civil war.

Earlier this month Machar's SPLM-IO party appeared to be starting to splinter. One faction declared it had temporarily replaced Machar as party chairman, while the armed wing said it remained loyal to their detained leader.

Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé has many friends in the Great Lakes region. They include Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Congolese counterpart Felix Tshisekedi and Angola’s João Lourenço.

Now it seems these contacts could come in handy, or the friendship will be tested.

This week, he formally took up the position of African Union-backed mediator in the Congolese crisis, where Kinshasa and Kigali have traded barbs over the years.

He made a whirlwind visit to Kinshasa, where he had a face-to-face meeting with President Tshisekedi. Earlier on Wednesday, President Gnassingbé was in Luanda, where he met President Lourenço, the former mediator in the crisis between the DRC and Rwanda.

Gnassingbé is thus taking over from the Angolan Head of State, who is now the AU chairman. Until last week, the Togolese leader hadn’t been a top name on mediation matters. Now, he has come to take the pulse of the Great Lakes conflict and understand the contours of the Luanda Process as led by Angola, which has since been merged with the Nairobi Process led by former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta

“This choice, far from being symbolic, confirms a leadership recognised for its discretion, consistency and effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflicts,” the Togolese Presidency said on April 16.

The work will not be easy in this region where diplomatic initiatives are multiplying without ever extinguishing a crisis that has been shaking the region for 31 years now.

First, he has to overcome the rivalries between the parties involved and win the trust of Rwanda, the DRC, the rebels (M23/AFC and other armed groups).

Read: New track for Congo talks? AU proposes Togo leader as new mediator

On his latest visit to the region, he avoided Kigali.

Nicaise Kibel Bel, an expert on military issues in the Great Lakes region, said this should not pose any problem to his mission.

“Everyone knows that the Togolese Head of State has great respect for President Paul Kagame,” he said.

On January 19 this year, Gnassingbé paid a working visit to Kigali, where he signed cooperation agreements with Kagame on agriculture, trade, green financing and energy.

The Togolese president has inherited a task that Mr Kenyatta and Mr Lourenço failed in, not because they did not try, but because they came up against a multifaceted conflict. The first complexity lies in the geographical position of the DRC.

The country belongs to both the SADC and East African Community, as well as to the Community of Central African States and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, organisations with sometimes divergent views and agendas on Congo.

The Congo seems to be opening up more favourably to the SADC, whose armed mission (SAMIDRC) is still on Congolese soil in spite of being ordered to pull out by the bloc’s Summit.

The EAC is seen by Kinshasa as an axis dominated by countries with evil designs against Congo. Rwanda is accused of supporting the M23/AFC with arms and troops.

Speaker of National Assembly Vital Kamerhe and others have also accused Uganda of participating in the aggression against Congo.

This mistrust extends to Kenya, whose president William Ruto is accused of partiality towards the Rwandan president in the conflict with the DRC.

RedRead: Ruto chairs Congo peace facilitators

As chairman of the EAC, Ruto will certainly be one of Gnassingbé’s interlocutors on the Congolese question. The Togolese leader will also have to talk with the SADC. What will he do to remove himself from the influence of the two blocs to conduct effective mediation?

The AU is attempting to regain control of a conflict in which diplomatic initiatives and the names of mediators seem to collide.

On the one hand is the Emir of Qatar, whose diplomacy has been silent, but who in a very short time seems to have moved the peace process forward, managing to bring together Kagame and Tshisekedi on March 18, to everyone’s surprise.

Türkiye had offered mediation but its proposal was rejected by the DRC, which argued “African solutions to African problems.” The EAC and SADC initially proposed mediation led by Kenyatta, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and former Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn.

But a five-party mediation was chosen instead. It comprises former presidents Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia), Kgalema Motlanthe (South Africa), Catherine Samba-Panza (Central African Republic), Obasanjo and Kenyatta.

All this, added to the Security Council’s initiative, with Resolution 2773, which calls for peace.

The United States of America is not to be outdone. The Joe Biden administration was very active in pushing ceasefire. And the Donald Trump administration recently sent an envoy to the region. Despite all these initiatives, dozens of ceasefires have been violated.

Even today, “the situation has not changed, the fighting continues, and the humanitarian situation is as dramatic as ever in North and South Kivu,” Congolese Foreign minister Thérèse Kayikwamba told the UN Security Council on Wednesday.

Gnassingbé is certainly aware of Rwanda’s concerns about the FDLR rebels in the DRC, and DRC’s accusations about Kigali’s support for the M23/AFC.

DRC now says it is open to talking peace directly with the M23/AFC. But the rebels have spelt out conditions, among them that Tshisekedi makes a solemn declaration expressing the political will of his regime to conduct direct negotiations, the cancellation of all death sentences, prosecutions, arrest warrants and the offer of a reward to anyone who helps the Kinshasa regime to arrest the leaders and cadres of the AFC/M23.

They also want him to "put an end to and criminalise all hate speech, which is often followed by acts of oppression... to put an end to all acts of discrimination and denial of nationality against the above-mentioned communities; the immediate release of all civilians or military personnel arrested and/or accused of collusion with the AFC/M3 on account of their race or ethnicity, or their professional, friendly or commercial relations with members of the AFC/M23; the repeal of all other restrictive measures taken by the Kinshasa regime against the AFC/M23.”

Brigadier General Brice Oligui Nguema, Gabon’s interim leader, has emerged from last weekend’s election with a resounding mandate, securing 90.35 percent of the vote. His closest rival, former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie By Nze, garnered a mere 3.02 percent. Voter turnout reached 70.4 percent, a significant increase from the 56.65 percent recorded during the disputed August 2023 polls.

Nguema seized power on 30 August 2023, in a swift military coup staged moments after Gabon’s electoral commission declared Ali Bongo Ondimba the victor. That election, now annulled, was over before the ink had dried. The coup dismantled state institutions and abruptly ended the Bongo dynasty’s 56-year grip on power.

Ali Bongo ruled for 14 years, succeeding his father, Omar Bongo, who held sway for 41 years. Nguema, notably, is Ali Bongo’s cousin—a twist suggesting the family’s political DNA still flows through Gabon’s veins, albeit cloaked in new attire.

Yet, Nguema’s approach diverges from the playbook of Africa’s other coup leaders. He was the last of the continent’s new junta class to seize power and has become the first to organise elections.

Whether this was a genuine act of democracy or a strategic recalibration, it marks a departure. In a region where juntas often chant pan-Africanist slogans and rail against imperialist powers while postponing electoral timelines, Nguema’s approach stands apart.

Contrast this with the so-called “coup belt.” In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta, after orchestrating coups in August 2020 and May 2021, remains averse to elections. Guinea’s Mamady Doumbouya, who ousted Alpha Condé in September 2021, keeps deferring the vote.

Sudan’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who seized power in October 2021, is embroiled in a brutal war with his former deputy, Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo.

Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré, in charge since September 2022, shows no inclination to give it a democratic varnish at the polls. Niger’s Abdourahamane Tchiani, who toppled President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023, has scarcely mentioned elections.

Nguema, however, eschewed exhibitionist fiery rhetoric. Instead, he projected calm, spoke of reform, put on some deadly dance moves on stage and —crucially—delivered a vote.

Whether motivated by a quest for legitimacy, international approval, or a firmer grip on power, the result is here: another coup leader now dons a presidential sash.

This spectacle, though, is a subplot in a broader African drama unfolding for decades: the rise and reign of the soldier-statesman. The focus on this “new wave” of coups obscures a larger truth. Soldiers and guerrilla commanders have long been the architects of African power.

Africa comprises 54 internationally recognised states (55 if you include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, an AU member but denied statehood by many due to Morocco’s occupation).

Among them, the most formidable bloc is neither a regional alliance nor an ideological faction. It is the men in uniform. Twenty-three African heads of state are current or former soldiers or guerrilla commanders.

Consider the roster: João Lourenço (Angola, guerrilla commander), Ibrahim Traoré (Burkina Faso, military), Évariste Ndayishimiye (Burundi, guerrilla commander), Mahamat Idriss Déby (Chad, military), Azali Assoumani (Comoros, military), Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo Republic, military), Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Egypt, military), Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea, military), Isaias Afwerki (Eritrea, guerrilla chief), Abiy Ahmed (Ethiopia, guerrilla and military), Brice Oligui Nguema (Gabon, military), Mamady Doumbouya (Guinea, military), Umaro Sissoco Embaló (Guinea-Bissau, military), Assimi Goïta (Mali, military), Mohamed Ould Ghazouani (Mauritania, military), Abdourahamane Tchiani (Niger, military), Paul Kagame (Rwanda, guerrilla chief), Julius Maada Bio (Sierra Leone, military), Salva Kiir Mayardit (South Sudan, guerrilla commander), Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Sudan, military), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda, guerrilla chief), Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe, guerrilla commander), and Brahim Ghali (SADR/Western Sahara, guerrilla chief).

Read: Gabon coup leader Nguema elected president with landslide victory

These are not merely coup-makers or victorious rebels; a few have turned out to be state-builders and narrative-shapers. Some govern with technocratic finesse, others blend wartime mystique with the sharp edge of realpolitik.

And it is not romanticism. Africa’s fascination with men in uniform stems from structural dysfunction. In fragile states, the barracks often outlast parliaments. Soldiers are perceived—by some—as decisive, efficient, and even incorruptible. They may rule with iron fists, but they seldom dither.

The reality therefore is more complex than stereotypes suggest. Some of these leaders do not simply seize power; many possess an instinctive understanding of their nations’ pulse.

In a region where colonial legacies left fragile institutions and “independence” often became an elite monopoly, the commander, not the consensus-builder, frequently prevailed.

Even in countries with elections, the uniform retains its allure. Sometimes, ballots ratify coups already staged. Other times, the soldier transforms into a suit-clad statesman, long after the rifles fall silent. The electorate, caught between disillusionment and pragmatism, often acquiesces.

There are risks, of course. Abiy Ahmed swept into office on reformist zeal, only to be tested by war and criticism. El-Sisi has solidified power with unrelenting machinery. Sudan’s descent into civil war in 2023 and South Sudan’s earlier conflict from 2013 are stark reminders of the fallout when former comrades clash.

This entrenchment of khaki politics has also distorted the democratic script in some countries. Elections occur, yes—but the ballot often becomes theatre, not transformation.

Thus, the soldier-statesman persists, not because Africa adores coups or rebellions, but because it has not yet weaned itself from commanders. As long as democracy’s dysfunction breeds fatigue, there will be space for uniforms to be rebranded, not retired.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. X@cobbo3

President William Ruto is dangling a series of incentives for Chinese investors, including tax holidays, ease of repatriating profits, skilled workforce and easier immigration rules.

At a meeting with the Chinese business community in Beijing on Tuesday, the President said Kenya’s membership in African regional economic blocs, trade agreements such as the African Growth Opportunity Act (Agoa) with the US, and the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union could help Chinese exporters reach these markets with privileges similar to Kenyans.

“Kenya is open for business,” President Ruto said.

“We have every reason for you to invest in our country and I welcome you to come so that we can build, we can grow and witness the making of Africa’s next great success story, and we will do this together.

“Kenya has also built a big footprint of markets around not [only] just our region, but also globally...You may also wish to know that, under the Agoa arrangement, we have duty-free, quota-free access to the American market, and all this market access infrastructure is available to you in Kenya.”

Agoa has helped Kenyan producers of textiles and foreign investors who produce apparael locally to export to the US under certain privileges.

But the deal is now facing a bleak future after US President Donald Trump imposed a flat tare tariff of 10 percent on a number of countries that profited from Agoa, including Kenya. Agoa is set to expire in September this year, unless Washington extends it, or replaces it.

Read: China’s delight as Uncle Sam’s once-favourite Ruto comes calling

Meanwhile, Kenya is waving the Agoa privileges to pitch for investors.

At the investor roundtable, President Ruto also sold Kenya’s regional positioning, touting Nairobi as a gateway to neighbouring markets.

“Because of the network of market access that we have built, you can access the East African Community market and the Comesa market, a community that has 26 countries and a population of 730 million people,” he said.

Seven Chinese firms signed letters of intent with the Kenya Investment Authority to invest in various sectors of the economy if certain conditions are met.

The companies could pump in $500 million if they sign investment agreements. And a lot will depend on what Kenya does to convince them.

Nairobi says it will target the Chinese market more, promising incentives on taxes, immigration and secure financial transactions.

Starting June, Kenya will conduct a five-province marketing campaign in China, seeking to sell itself as a better investment destination.

The actual regions of China are to be announced later, but one of the cities is Changsha in Hunan Province, where Kenya intends to learn and attract investors in running city transportation systems and related smart technology.

In early 2026, Kenya will invite Chinese investors to Nairobi “to showcase the opportunities here, and you can see for yourselves first-hand what these investment opportunities look like,” President Ruto said.

President Ruto is also using the visit to seek new funding for his pet projects such as housing, ICT and universal healthcare.

A court in Cote d’Ivoire ruled on Tuesday that opposition leader and former Credit Suisse Chief Executive Tidjane Thiam should be removed from the electoral roll because he was a French national when he registered, his lawyer said.

The decision, which cannot be appealed, could end the Ivorian-born Thiam’s ambition to run in the world’s top cocoa-producing nation’s presidential election, expected in October.

“Given his French nationality and in accordance with Article 48 of the Ivorian Nationality Code, he was no longer Ivorian at the time he registered on the electoral roll,” Thiam’s lawyer told Reuters.

Thiam said in a statement following the decision that he is now calling on political leaders on all sides to engage in talks to break the deadlock.

“Ivorians expect the judicial system to guarantee peaceful, transparent and credible elections, not to serve as an instrument for a regime seeking to hoard power and silence its critics,” he said.

“The ruling party has used the courts to eliminate its most serious rival, while maintaining the illusion of due process. ... Make no mistake about it, this decision is an act of democratic vandalism, which will disenfranchise millions of voters,” he said.

In 2023, Thiam was elected leader of PDCI, one of the country’s main opposition parties, making him a likely candidate for the presidential election.

He renounced his French citizenship in February in order to meet eligibility conditions for the election and announced that he would be a candidate. Cote d’Ivoire law states that candidates must be Ivorian citizens and cannot hold another nationality.

Last month, a decision published in France’s official journal showed that Thiam had been relieved of his French citizenship.

Ghana’s President John Dramani Mahama suspended Chief Justice Gertrude Torkornoo with immediate effect and initiated an investigation in response to three petitions filed against her, a statement said.

After consultations with the Council of State, the President “determined that a prima facie case has been established,” and a committee has been set up to look at the petitions, according to the statement from his office.

The statement did not give details of the accusations in each petition. Ghana’s presidential office could not be immediately reached for further comments.

Chief Justice Torkornoo, Ghana’s third female justice, was nominated by former president Nana Akufo-Addo and has held the position since June 2023.

Justice Torkornoo survived a removal request earlier this year when President Akufo-Addo said a petition to have her removed from the bench had “several deficiencies”.

As the World Bank and International Monetary Fund host the Spring Meetings in Washington this week, Africa’s development priorities hang in the balance.

With no high-level discussions on climate or gender — issues that are central to the continent’s growth and resilience — the agenda seems increasingly disconnected from the systemic challenges facing African nations. Instead, the focus remains on "Jobs and Macroeconomics," a framing that recalls the failed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 90s.

Under the guise of growth and stability, these policies imposed austerity, deregulation and fiscal cuts that decimated public services, deepened inequality and burdened Africa with unsustainable debt. The current direction threatens to repeat this damaging legacy, while the institutions responsible for financing fossil fuel expansion and undermining climate resilience evade accountability.

In this context, Mission 300, launched at the Africa Energy Summit in Dar es Salaam in January, stands as a critical initiative. Led by the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union, and the government of Tanzania, Mission 300 aims to provide electricity to 300 million people across Africa by 2030.

But ambition without justice is not progress. And promises without integrity are not solutions. The truth is, Mission 300 risks becoming just another top-down, donor-driven project that fails to answer the fundamental question: whose development, on whose terms, and at what cost?

In line with this year’s Spring Meetings’ theme "Jobs and Macroeconomics,” we must critically assess whether Mission 300 will create clean, sustainable jobs that benefit communities across Africa. Will it empower young people in rural Kenya or women in informal settlements in Ghana — or will they be concentrated in urban industrial corridors and foreign contractor payrolls?

According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (Irena), Africa accounts for only 3 percent of global renewable energy jobs, despite its vast potential and growing population. If Mission 300 is to reverse this trend, it must move beyond megaprojects and pipelines, and instead prioritise community-led, decentralised energy systems that generate not just electricity but equitable, decent work rooted in local contexts.

Yet, early indications are troubling. The inclusion of fossil gas as a transitional energy source — backed by the World Bank and reflected in Senegal’s National Energy Compact — is a signal that the same polluting industries responsible for destabilising our climate are being rebranded as part of the solution.

Natural gas may offer short-term job spikes during construction, but these are neither green nor future-proof jobs. Moreover, the International Energy Agency has made it clear that no new oil and gas fields are compatible with net-zero by 2050.

The financing model raises equally serious concerns. Much of the funding promised under Mission 300 comes in the form of concessional loans. Even at a one percent interest rate over 40 years, this is debt — and for a continent where 40 countries face rising debt levels, and at least 19 are at high risk of debt distress, adding more liabilities to public balance sheets to fund fossil-dependent infrastructure is not development — it is exploitation.

African nations sink deeper into debt crisis. Their external debt has reached a staggering $11.4 trillion in 2023. According to a report by Christian Aid, across Africa, 32 countries now spend more on debt than healthcare, with $85 billion paid to external creditors in 2023, projected to increase to $104 billion in 2024.

As debt burdens grow heavier across the continent, the wave of billion-dollar pledges and commitments deserves careful attention.

The Africa Energy Summit generated headlines with pledges of over $5 billion from donors like the Rockefeller Foundation, AIIB, and Islamic Development Bank, but bigger numbers don’t always mean better outcomes.

With over $50 billion now committed to Mission 300, including $48 billion from the AfDB and World Bank by 2030, there is still no public guarantee of how these funds will be deployed.

This lack of transparency and the sidelining of critical climate concerns only amplifies the deeper contradictions within the World Bank/IMF policies and deeply alarms African civil society and vulnerable communities in Africa.

The World Bank committed at the 2023 Annual Meetings in Marrakech to a new mission: A liveable planet, in addition to poverty eradication. This new vision is now marginalised possibly due to fears of withdrawal by the Trump administration, revealing a major contradiction.

Regarding climate finance, Bretton Woods institutions must strengthen their climate financing capacities, particularly in ways that don’t create additional barriers for developing countries. The September 2024 report on MDB’s Joint Report on climate finance shows that MDBs contributed a record $125 billion in 2023.

But these funds often come in the form of debt and non-concessional finance, which limits the fiscal space of developing countries already struggling with climate impacts and high debt levels. There is an urgent need to significantly increase grant-based and highly concessional finance within their portfolios.

Gender has also been sidelined in World Bank discussions for far too long. Despite the Bank’s ambitious Gender Strategy for 2024-30, which promises to prioritise gender equality in global development, the reality remains far removed from these claims. Women’s needs, particularly in vital sectors like energy access, continue to be neglected.

Nearly 900 million people in Africa still rely on harmful biomass for cooking, and the burden falls disproportionately on women. This is not merely a climate or environmental issue— it’s a health crisis, a significant economic vulnerability, and an unaddressed inequality. Reliance on polluting fuels costs $791.4 billion annually, with health-related impacts accounting for $526.3 billion.

The Spring Meetings must be seized as a turning point. While the hopes may be tempered by the complexities and challenges ahead, giving up is worse. Expectations are low, given the history of unfulfilled promises and empty rhetoric. Yet, this moment presents a critical opportunity for African leaders to reject outdated models of debt-driven growth, fossil-fuelled development, and gender-blind planning.

Dr Wafa Misrar is the Campaign and Policy Officer at CAN Africa, and Said Skounti is a researcher at IMAL Initiative.