The European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) has patrolled Somali waters since 2008, supposedly to combat piracy and secure trade routes. While piracy was a real threat in the late 2000s, the mission has long exceeded its original purpose. Instead of strengthening Somalia’s maritime security, EUNAVFOR has purposely pursued its desired objectives of reinforced external control over Somalia’s territorial waters.

EUNAVFOR’s presence is partly backed by the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC), supported by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and major international shipping companies. It gave foreign navies, particularly the European Union, a pretext to assert control over Somali waters.

On paper, the EU mission was aimed at empowering Somalia and its neighbours to secure their waters with international support. However, in reality, it legitimised a surge of foreign naval forces, granting them broad operational freedom under UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.

These UNSC resolutions pressured Somalia to relinquish control of its waters under the pretext of international security.

From the start of 2013, piracy off Somalia’s coast had virtually disappeared after peaking in the early 2010s. Yet, foreign naval forces still patrolled its territorial waters under UNSC resolutions, leaving Somalia without full sovereignty over its seas. Since 2008, the UNSC had repeatedly renewed mandates allowing these forces to operate.

Read:  Why UN Security Council extended sanctions on Shabaab

Despite the sharp decline in Somali piracy after 2012, the EU remained intent on maintaining its naval presence. In December 2024, the EU Council preemptively extended Operation Atalanta (Operation Aspides) through to early 2027—just ahead of a key UN review on piracy measures.

Claiming a renewed piracy in 2023–24, the EU extended EUNAVFOR’s mission. With an expanded mandate covering weapons and drug interdiction, EUNAVFOR now serves a broader, long-term security agenda beyond piracy.

Somali officials claimed the EU pressured the government to extend counter-piracy measures, using security aid as leverage.

European diplomats allegedly warned that rejecting the UNSC mandate could put EU funding for the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia at risk.

As the primary backer of AU peacekeeping, the EU wielded significant influence, reportedly hinting at funding cuts if Somalia refused. Caught between accepting foreign naval patrols or jeopardising critical counter-insurgency support, Somalia held its ground, ultimately ending the UNSC piracy resolution despite mounting pressure.

After years of resistance, Somalia regained control of its waters in early 2022. Under President Mohamed Farmaajo, the government declared UN anti-piracy measures fulfilled and refused further extensions.

The UNSC’s counter-piracy resolution expired on March 3, 2022, for the first time since 2008, ending internationally sanctioned operations and restoring Somalia’s maritime sovereignty after 14 years.

Foreign naval patrols off Somalia have hurt coastal communities. Years of anti-piracy efforts have disrupted fishing, especially in Puntland and Galmudug, as fishermen fear harassment or misidentification. Frequent warship inspections deter many from going to fish.

For many, fishing is a vital livelihood, and this climate of fear has hurt incomes and food security. Ironically, an operation meant to secure maritime safety ended up pushing local fishermen out of their trade in their own country.

With little communication or accountability, EU navies seldom addressed the economic impact on coastal communities, leaving behind bitterness among those who felt abandoned in the pursuit of an international security agenda that ignored their rights and livelihoods.

Read: Conflicts in Africa take toll on EU donors

Young teens were detained as suspected pirates and sent abroad with little legal oversight. EU and allied forces captured hundreds, some misidentified. Unable to prosecute in Europe, navies sent them to African and Asian courts, often without Somali consular support.

Many Somalis were jailed abroad; their families were unaware. Rights groups flagged opaque trials, mistreatment, and foreign naval impunity. The result: deep resentment over unchecked operations in Somali waters.

Critics say EUNAVFOR ignored illegal fishing and toxic dumping, focusing only on piracy. Foreign trawlers devastated Somali waters livelihoods, yet EU forces did nothing, seen as hypocrisy.

Foreign entities polluted Somali coasts for decades, yet EUNAVFOR, despite sophisticated surveillance, took no action.

Many Somalis argue true security means tackling resource theft and pollution, not just piracy.

Global conferences prioritised shipping security over Somalia’s needs. Funds protected vessels and prosecuted pirates, while Somalia’s coast guard and judiciary stayed weak.

In his 2019 book, Piracy in Somalia: Violence and Development in the Horn of Africa, Awet Tewelde Weldemichael explains the intricate socio-economic dynamics that have shaped the rise of piracy along the Somali coast and how the international community has focused on militarised anti-piracy operations while ignoring the real problems including the plight of coastal communities, illegal fishing and dumping of waste into their waters by foreigners.

While EUNAVFOR may have tackled piracy, initially, it should be clear that foreign military presence in Somali waters should not outlast its necessity. Prolonged deployments risk dependency, creating local resentment, and great-power ambitions disguised as security efforts.

On March 3, 2025, UNSC Resolution 2776 extended foreign naval authority over Somali-linked vessels while renewing Al-Shabaab sanctions. Despite reclaiming maritime sovereignty, Somalia’s government backed it, raising doubts about its independence.

The EU, a top donor to Somalia, has also harmed Somali livelihoods through naval operations. Security efforts pushed fishing communities into poverty while ignoring illegal fishing, toxic dumping, and maritime governance—factors fueling piracy.

This policy incongruity reinforced grievances that groups like Al Shabaab exploit. The AS group has used EUNAVFOR’s continued presence and the impact on coastal communities as propaganda to delegitimise the Somali government and African Union forces, portraying them as complicit in foreign control over Somalia’s resources.

By failing to account for the consequences of its naval mission, the EU has inadvertently provided extremists with narratives to further destabilise Somalia.

Mr Abdisaid M Ali is the Chairperson of Lomé Peace and Security Forum (LPSF), a space for open dialogue on the political, security and development challenges of the African continent.

X: @4rukun.

East Africa is chaotic, yet, as numerous international and pan-African financial institutions frequently note, the region continues to weave its economic magic.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has consistently predicted that East Africa will be the continent’s fastest-growing economic bloc.

The most recent and detailed forecast for 2025 appears in the African Development Bank Group’s African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2024, published on 30 May 2024 during the Bank’s Annual Meetings in Nairobi. It states:

“East Africa, the continent’s fastest-growing region, will see real GDP growth rise from an estimated 1.5 per cent in 2023 to 4.9 per cent in 2024 and 5.7 per cent in 2025.”

The surprise is that East Africa—particularly the East African Community (EAC)—isn’t performing twice as well, given its vast potential. To truly shine, it must shed its destructive habits, starting with fostering greater peace.

In recent years, six of the 18 sub-Saharan African states with active armed conflicts were EAC members, accounting for roughly 33 per cent of such conflicts in the region.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, and South Sudan have endured high-intensity armed conflicts, while Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda have grappled with low-intensity, subnational skirmishes.

Beyond this, rampant corruption, governance failures, and political repression plague several EAC states. Yet the region boasts immense strengths it could leverage to rake in busloads of moolah.

For one, it has a decent share of arable land to revolutionise agriculture. Though Somalia, and to a lesser extent Kenya, drag it down, the EAC holds between 18 and 26 per cent of Africa’s arable land. The data here is shaky, and some generous estimates push this figure even higher.

The EAC is home to Lake Nalubaale/Nyanza (Victoria), Africa’s largest lake and the world’s second-largest freshwater lake by surface area, after Lake Superior in Canada and the US. Despite a handful of ships and mostly artisanal fishing, the lake sees little economic activity.

Yet, with its 1,000 islands, it could become the global capital of resort partying, tourism, and water sports. (Fun fact: Lake Bunyonyi in southwestern Uganda is 1,500 times smaller than Nalubaale but has 29 islands, giving it a far greater per capita wealth in islands.)

In these climate change-ravaged times, water is gold. Africa’s total renewable internal freshwater resources (internal river flows and groundwater from rainfall) are estimated at around 3,931 billion cubic metres. The EAC countries collectively hold 1,096.76 billion cubic metres—about 27.9 per cent of the continent’s inland freshwater.

Forests, too, have soared in value. Africa’s total forest area spans approximately 6.7 million square kilometres. The EAC’s combined forest area is roughly 2.46 million square kilometres—about 36.7 per cent of Africa’s forested land.

We owe much of this to the DRC joining the EAC; it alone accounts for around 27.1 per cent of the continent’s forest area, meaning the rest of the EAC is largely riding its coattails.

The EAC could also be a tourism titan. Consider the Pyramids of Giza (Egypt), Serengeti National Park (Tanzania), Mount Kilimanjaro (Tanzania), Victoria Falls (Zambia/Zimbabwe), Maasai Mara National Reserve (Kenya)—linked to the Serengeti’s migration—Table Mountain (South Africa), Kruger National Park (South Africa), Ngorongoro Crater (Tanzania), Zanzibar Archipelago (Tanzania), Sahara Desert, Okavango Delta (Botswana), Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Uganda), Namib Desert (Namibia), Marrakech Medina (Morocco), and Virunga National Park (DRC).

Within the EAC, Bwindi and Virunga mean mountain gorillas—an arena where East Africa dominates entirely. Bwindi, Virunga, and Rwanda’s Volcanoes National Park host 100 per cent of the world’s mountain gorilla population.

The EAC also claims Africa’s five highest mountain peaks, though their icy summits are vanishing fast due to climate change. Mount Kilimanjaro (Tanzania) stands tallest at 5,895 metres, followed by Mount Kenya at 5,199 metres.

The Rwenzori Mountains (Uganda/DRC) house Mount Stanley, the third-highest at 5,109 metres, followed by Vittorio Emanuele Peak and Edward Peak, both in the same range.

Lower down, the Virunga Mountains (Rwanda/DRC/Uganda) feature a chain of volcanoes, including Mount Karisimbi (4,507 metres), while Mount Elgon (Kenya/Uganda), an extinct shield volcano, reaches 4,321 metres. Like the gorillas, this is another East African monopoly.

On renewable energy, roughly 27 per cent of Africa’s untapped non-solar renewable potential—hydropower, wind, geothermal, and biomass—lies within the EAC, based on an estimated 135 GW out of Africa’s 504 gigawatts.

This could range from 25–30 per cent depending on biomass estimates and project developments, driven by the DRC’s hydropower and Kenya’s geothermal, though tempered by weaker wind and biomass contributions.

The region is also a creative hub and a magnet for venture capital, largely thanks to Kenya’s star power. In 2023, Kenyan startups attracted £800 million in venture capital—28 per cent of all funds raised continent-wide.

EAC countries collectively secured 20 per cent of Africa’s $5.805 billion in tech funding that year, with Uganda securing $141.9 million, Rwanda $64.5 million, and Tanzania $25.8 million, all trailing behind Kenya.

For those, like Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, who champions growing populations, the EAC excels. Four of Africa’s 10 fastest-growing populations—Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and Tanzania—are EAC members.

East Africa might soon dominate Africa’s airways, too. Three of the top 10 African airlines—Kenya Airways, RwandAir, and Fastjet (Zimbabwe/Tanzania)—are EAC-based. If Ethiopia joins the EAC, Ethiopian Airlines, the continent’s leader, could shake things up. And if Air Tanzania and Uganda Airlines get their act together, it could be game over.

It’s becoming increasingly difficult for East Africa to excuse its failure to become an economic powerhouse.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. Twitter: @cobbo3

It was almost the perfect year for the Women’s Run to take place in Dar es Salaam. IWD2025 fell on a Saturday, which would have allowed for us to convene at dawn in the rich neighbourhood’s open green space and enjoy some exercise together.

It didn’t happen, the holy month of Ramadan had begun and there is an unspoken understanding that we reduce our physical exertions then. Respectable reason to delay the event.

However, when the event organisers mentioned that this year the Women’s Run will also carry the theme of Clean Cooking, I had an adverse reaction.

Spent the whole day feeling bent out of shape over it — how dare they chain this event to our stoves, can we just have one (expletive deleted) day when we’re not being strangled by the focus on domesticity? The intensity of my fury shook me a little, so I had to call myself in for a chat about it.

I made myself take a beat and a cup of tea and asked my Self why I was having such big feelings this year? What was really going on?

And my Self honoured the request, drank the tea, had a nap and eventually told me: Because the corporations are doing their thing again and co-opting a deeply necessary political response to injustice for their own purposes.

Because it is not okay to reduce a women’s run to “cook clean” even if the intention is a good one: This particular intersection re-enforces the “mwanamke jiko!” problem in my stubbornly patriarchal society.

Because it took us this long to be able to exercise in public in Dar es Salaam without being pummelled to death by unsolicited comments from the sexists: these public walks are where people cheer athleticism in women!

So many “becauses” but the main one was the co-optation.

My Self told me that the anger had been brewing for a while. She has seen what happens to movements that get co-opted: it is just death, usually by Capitalism.

I asked my Self: Baby Girl, you have spent a lifetime studying the ways of Power as a social force, surely you can do better than throwing a tantrum at having your Special Day taken over by a couple of “well-intended” thugs?

My Self refused to speak to me any further as She had plans for the weekend that revolved around rejuvenation. She told me that “self-care is an act of Love, and Love is radical in 2025!” My dramatic Self has a habit of capitalising certain words for emphasis.

In due time, my Self grabbed a tampon to soak up the tears so that She could re-engage. If corporations, politicians and other actors are able to co-opt Women’s Day for their own profane uses, it is because nobody calls them out about it regularly, she said.

You used to relish being considered dangerous because you are a Feminist, she said. Maybe writing about it can start a conversation, she said. So here we are.

I am no longer split in two with agitation over Women’s Month 2025, I will be enjoying it in peace as I plot on how to co-opt or otherwise corrupt cynical and profiteering attempts to pink-wash products and services.

Besides, my Self and I are laughing in relief that at least we were not “gifted” a kanga with the President’s face on it for Women’s Day 2025. Can you imagine? Tcha!

Although I was born and raised near our capital city of Kampala and even nearer to the international airport of Entebbe, I had no need to wear pants fulltime until I went to school aged four.

Kindergarten was a later 1970s introduction. Such was newly independent African life, that many little boys also enjoyed independence from clothes in our warm weather.

Growing older, we realised the reason we weren’t stopped from running around the neighbourhood without clothes was that we had nothing worth covering then.

Watching the Ukrainian president last week as he stood his ground before a White House disciplinary committee (or lynch mob, depending on which angle you view the re-alignment of global politics from), it felt like seeing a group of Igbo brothers nodding in the background saying that Comrade Zelensky indeed deserves wearing trousers. Soon Africans will know which of their leaders qualifies to wear trousers.

At no other time after Independence did Africa need real men and women to guide it through the unjust jungle of global affairs.

The other day in Munich we saw European tears rolling when Vice President Vance indicated that US may no longer view Russia and China through Euro lenses. At least Zelensky neither wept nor caved in while being roasted in Washington.

How long will it take for a critical number of African leaders to identify and define what stakes the continent has in the oncoming storm?

Africa today is like a woman approaching middle age and running out of time to determine how to lead the rest of her life and raise sensible children.

She has been (mis)used by men who are now fighting themselves, and if she isn’t blind, sees her chance to determine her own destiny before they finish fighting and return to her, with a new formula for abusing her.

Read:  Africa presidents, look in the mirror to confirm it isn’t Trump you’ll see

And how apt that this is happening during the anniversary of the Berlin Conference when outsiders agreed on how to rob Africa without a single African at the table where the sharing was taking place!

There could be six or more options for Africa, four of them monogamous. Three possibilities would be to enter an exclusive relationship with America, or with China, or Russia.

Fourth would be to go monogamous with EU, but given the fast advancing years towards her menopause, Africa might find European indecision a big turnoff.

A fifth option would be a deal with Ukraine. Yes, many may not be aware that at the Soviet breakup 33 years ago, Ukraine was/is the second most powerful unit after Russia, of those that comprised the mighty Union in technology, military, economy and human resource development.

That Ukraine has remained standing and fighting since Russia attacked (some Americans now say Ukraine caused the war) is testimony to this. Let’s also add a footnote that the largest aircraft ever was built by Ukraine.

The Antonov An-225 Mriya, a real wonder of aviation engineering, was destroyed during the Russian invasion. Since Ukraine dreams of rebuilding the mass air transporter (its name means ‘dream’ in Ukrainian), Africa which lacks roads and railways could offer a partnership here to realise its African Continental Free Trade Area dream.

A sixth option would be opting for permanent celibacy (claiming independence or non-alignment). But given Africa’s limited technology and military capacity, this could be risky and she could end up like a village widow whose door can be kicked in by any villain.

Then to safeguard herself against such midnight attacks moreover abetted by some of her domestic staff (corrupt public officials), she may end up accepting protection from a not-so-honest guy, and the secrecy of the relationship would lead to lack of accountability on his part.

So a deal with a young man who is hard as nails and can build big airplanes for her can be a more viable option. But it takes people who have something worth covering in their clothes to make such tough decisions at a critical time for the continent.

Buwembo is a Kampala-based journalist. E-mail: [email protected]

Auditor-General Nancy Gathungu has revealed in Senate that the system running the Social Health Insurance Fund (Shif) under the Social Health Authority (SHA) was unprocedurally acquired and is unconstitutionally operated. Its acquisition was single-sourced, shrouded in secrecy, and flouted public procurement laws.

The system cost a staggering Ksh104 billion (more than $950 million). That’s not all.

A percentage of contributions Kenyans make to the fund goes to shadowy providers and operators of the system. The Auditor-General cast doubt on the scheme’s lawfulness and effectiveness. 

These damning revelations come on the heels of public uproar over unavailability of services under the scheme. A patient who stormed the Health Ministry to protest that SHA was not working, and who was later abducted from a hospital for her derring-do, represents the frustration of Kenyans over the scheme.

Where was parliament when this scheme was being concocted ? Why didn’t relevant parliamentary watchdog committees launch their own investigation immediately the public began to complain? Why did parliament appropriate such a staggering amount for the SHA software ?

The answer is also the reason why parliament overwhelmingly passed Finance Bill, 2024, and cheered wildly when it was later withdrawn due to countrywide protests.

The reason is also why MPs supported the Adani airport deal and again cheered hysterically when it was withdraw after a US court indicted the corporation for illicit behaviour.

It is also the reason why parliament has not conducted an investigation into who murdered youth protesting plunder and misrule last year, and is continuing to abduct, torture, murder and “disappear” youthful critics of the regime.

Read:  Kenya slouching towards a police state

The answer in a nutshell is parliament long abdicated its constitutional mandate of safeguarding the public from excesses of the executive. It is no longer the people’s House. It is now the president’s House.

In a span of two years, we have witnessed abduction and murder of critics, thievery on an unprecedented scale, failure of or disquiet over flagship projects like Hustler Fund and Affordable Housing, high cost of living, Adani misadventure, fake fertiliser scam, continuation of deadly banditry in certain regions, the growth of a “culture of lies”, crises in health and education, foreign policy debacles, and now the SHA controversy.

In the spirit of King Midas, everything the regime touches turns to rust.

To adapt Winston Churchill, never in recent history has so much damage been caused to so many by so few in such a short period of time. 

Despite all the failures, many people have always assumed that the regime, at its heart, means well. They persuaded themselves that the regime would see the error of its ways and do better. No one wants to doubt that their government means well.

Even harsh critics want government to succeed. But the Auditor-General’s report mustnow force us to ask a painful question – has the regime ever meant well? Is it still logical or patriotic to assume the regime means well? Isn’t doing so living in a fool’s paradise? 

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political and social commentator.

Give it to Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta , one-time president of Kenya, just give it to him. He has the knack of sometimes making a serious point with such easygoing bonhomie you might even think he is only jesting, when he is actually in earnest.

This last one about Donald Trump cutting aid to our countries and people whining is one of them.

Uhuru puts it across with such simplicity: you do not pay taxes in America; it’s not your money, period; stop whining and instead ask yourselves what you are going to do to cover the deficit created by the end of the handouts that Trump has decreed, closing a another chapter of free lunches so beloved of our free-loading rulers.

It is concerning how much the people running our governments are prepared to go on bended knee to beg for the most rudimentary things, even when we really do not need them or we could have provided them from our own resources.

I have seen cases of very simple and cheap health campaigns carrying very loud and conspicuous billboards, just to remind us that our minds are enslaved and tied to that mental and psychological lethargy that does not allow us to see how we could have done whatever it is with our own resources, saving us the embarrassment of beggary.

Trump is back and for him that means America is back. Forget the megalomania for a moment, but remember America was not founded as an altruistic, do-gooder nation; rather it was established on the blood-soaked burial mounds of Native Americans, who were summarily exterminated and erased, and the Africans who were kidnapped and taken there as slaves.

Read:  However fantastical, world could be reinvented in Trump’s clamour

So, any attempt to see America as our benefactor must proceed from a serious misapprehension. Simply put, you are on your own, you have no rich uncle, and now you may want to remember what you were taught in primary school: cut your coat according to your cloth.
Stop living like you are rich, because you simply aren’t.

Those cars you are driven in, those luxurious foreign trips you take, the huge fraudulent deals you make on your countries’ resources… all these are not yours, but rather they are expenses you push onto your poor people who continue to suffer under you simply because they have failed to throw you off their backs.

It reminds me that Uhuru as his country’s minister of finance (before becoming president) abolished government cars and created a scheme under which senior officials got loans to buy and drive their own cars (Rwanda did pretty much the same thing) .

This was resisted in Tanzania, because it is more profitable for our officials to be driven in huge gas-guzzling government cars, which they can use to carry, say, firewood or charcoal without wear-and-tear concerns.

But then, strangely, under President Benjamin Mkapa and his infrastructure minister John Magufuli, the same bureaucrats thought up a scheme to give away (literally give away) government quarters to their occupiers because, it was said, they were too expensive to maintain!

In a couple of strokes of the pen, whole estates of state property on prime land across the country were given away for a song, and they have now become eyesores in our major cities as the new owners turned them into illicit beer shacks and auto-spare-parts shops.

Evidence abounds, too, that some of the recipients of this extraordinary government largesse were in fact not the recognised occupants of the said houses but the mistresses of those who made these bizarre decisions.

Maybe we should leave such matters to the future historians, who will be poring over records to determine who has been the most corrupt in our endless parade of brigands and blood suckers, but for the time being we are enjoined to find ways of plugging the holes in our budgets by Trump’s decision to plug the holes in his own exchequer.

It is his right to do so, absolutely, as it is our duty to stop the leaks (nay, gushes) from our own coffers. That is why I draw a lot of inspiration from what Uhuru has been telling us: Hey, people, it is his money he is withholding. It is not your money, and you have no right to whine.

So, if you have this heavy burden of keeping thousands of sick people who need life-saving drugs to keep on keeping on, do the done thing and put your money where your mouth is, Get rid of all those SUVs whose purchase price--- before it is even on the road --- is an appreciable percentage of a small ARV factory that could save a few of your people’s lives.

Do away with all those foreign travels in first class/business class and the fat allowances that go with them, and the Rolexes and the blings…. and you will find there is enough money for your schoolchildren’s desks, books and chalk.

In other words, be logical, make sense, behave like you mean what you say, that you care for your people. Simply put, jump off that long gravy train and you will find that Trump does make sense, at least on this one.

For the rest, tackle Trump where you can tackle him, like Gaza; or kick him on South Africa’s land issues, and you will make sense.

Jenerali Ulimwengu is chairman of the board of the Raia Mwema newspaper and an advocate of the High Court in Dar es Salaam.

This year I will score a self-designed gourmande hat-trick that I want to dub the Dar Special.

To kick things off, I celebrated Fat Tuesday with pancakes and mild debauchery in the form of cheesecake. This will be followed by wangling an invite to a Holi party, then the grand finale of Eid ul Fitr.

What a month, hey? And what a city to spend it in. While I was eating my Fat Tuesday pancakes, a colleague teased me about improving the quality and price of the meals that I buy because it is the month of Ramadan, and he can no longer demand his share.

A pretty mundane interaction, right? Except it isn’t.

When I was a kid, I jumped into a public swimming pool with a handful of other kids only to watch everyone else we had found there exit the pool hurriedly. It was somewhere in South Africa before 1994. Lacking the direct experience of my parents who lived through the last of colonialism, I wasn’t prepared.

I thought everywhere was a bit like Dar: A mixed chopped salad, if not a melting pot.

Travel is a great teacher and over time I learned that oases of competent cultural co-existence are not all that common. Dar es Salaam comes with a bit of a story, like all good cities do. “Founded” by Majid Bin Said — if you are comfortable erasing the Africans who already lived there as was the fashion at the time— it has been used as an administrative centre by successive regimes.

I think the arc goes: Locals minding their business, Sultan of Zanzibar, German, British, Tanganyika, finally Tanzania... and maybe one day, the Southern State of the East African Federation and onwards to the United States of Afrika.

Read: Life in Dar es Salaam during Christmas holiday

Up until now, countless people and dozens of cultures have made their way here bringing religious and cultural diversity. This is not a clean and friendly history written by Disney, but somehow over a century and some change we have figured out how to make it work with a bit of grace given to us by Utu.

Considering what it took us to get here — tolerance is a form of sacrifice, of love — it would be unpatriotic of me not to revel in this kaleidoscope of languages and cuisine, music. Hedonism has such an unnecessarily bad rap, you know? In Kiswahili, one of the expressions for actively enjoying life translates into “eating life” — yes, thank you.

Perhaps this is why Professor Doctor Honourable Minister Palamagamba Kabudi told us at excessive length using excessively formal Kiswahili that Singeli music was going to be officially recognised and promoted as a unique Tanzanian cultural product.

It is a brilliant move to recognise and celebrate an art form that is homebrewed out of youth unemployment, world-class drumbeats, disruptive resistance humour, lasciviousness and illegal alcohol.

Definitely not a transparent grab for young urban votes during an election year via the co-optation of a popular genre of music, nope.

In Singeli I hear the offspring of mdundiko and other endangered native genres that have always contrasted with and inspired more “polished” forms like taarab.

After my last sinia of holy day pilau has been devoured, the coloured powder has been washed from my hair and the smell of Catholic incense clears the air in April, it will be my patriotic duty to find a dive bar and lose myself all hot and sweaty in fast songs with louche lyrics. Least I can do for the joie de vivre in the port of peace. See you there?

Elsie Eyakuze is an independent consultant and blogger for The Mikocheni Report; E-mail: [email protected]

South Sudanese soldiers encircled Vice President Riek Machar’s home in the capital, Juba, on Wednesday, and several of his allies were arrested after an armed group loyal to him overran an army base in the country’s north.

Machar, whose political rivalry with President Salva Kiir has previously erupted into full-blown war, warned last month that the dismissal of several of his allies from government positions jeopardised the 2018 peace deal that ended South Sudan’s five-year civil conflict. That war claimed more than 400,000 lives.

While Machar’s struggles have a distinctly South Sudanese post-independence flavour, his predicament is also part of a broader African tradition—where presidents and their deputies often endure relationships defined by suspicion, power struggles, and outright betrayal.

Take Kenya, for instance. Last October, Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua was impeached, marking the first such removal of a deputy president in the country’s history. His alliance with President William Ruto had disintegrated within months, culminating in his ouster just two years after he took on Kenya’s second-most powerful role.

Ironically, Ruto himself endured a famously toxic relationship with his predecessor, former president Uhuru Kenyatta, in the four years before the 2022 elections that propelled him into power.

Sometimes, these rivalries turn deadly. Burkina Faso’s charismatic revolutionary leader, Thomas Sankara, once trusted Blaise Compaoré as his right-hand man.

They had seized power together in a 1983 coup. But Compaoré’s ambitions poisoned their relationship. On October 15, 1987, he orchestrated Sankara’s assassination and took control for himself.

This remains one of Africa’s most infamous cases of a deputy turning against their president.

Read: South Sudan defends detention of Riek Machar allies

Zimbabwe’s case is equally illustrative. Former president Robert Mugabe, Africa’s longest-serving leader, appointed Joice Mujuru—a respected liberation war veteran—as vice president in 2004, seemingly grooming her as his successor.

But as First Lady Grace Mugabe entered the political arena, she sought to sideline Mujuru. In 2014, Grace accused Mujuru of plotting to assassinate Mugabe. The ensuing smear campaign saw Mujuru unceremoniously ejected from the party and her vice presidency.

Then there is Somalia, where former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, who lost re-election in May 2022, maintained a notoriously acrimonious relationship with his deputy, Mahdi Mohamed Guled.

In August 2020, a video surfaced purporting to show the two attempting to strangle each other during a heated press conference.

The story spread like wildfire, and given their well-known enmity, many found it plausible. It later emerged that the video had been doctored—an old political scuffle repackaged for dramatic effect.

For all the dramatic falling-outs, Africa has also had vice presidents who perfected the art of staying out of trouble. Few mastered it as well as Uganda’s Edward Ssekandi, who served as President Yoweri Museveni’s deputy for a decade. If Ssekandi ever disagreed with Museveni, he ensured the public never caught wind of it.

Museveni, who has been known to publicly berate his ministers and prime ministers, never turned his wrath on Ssekandi. Months would pass without Ssekandi making a public appearance, save for the occasional grainy photo on social media of him dancing alone in a dimly lit pub. When his tenure ended, there was no fanfare, no angry statements from his supporters, and no tearful television interviews.

Ssekandi reportedly walked away with a smile—and remains a much-loved figure.

His approach reinforced a crucial African political lesson: to survive as a vice president, one must either master the art of invisibility or wholeheartedly embrace the role of presidential cheerleader, bag-carrier, and flatterer-in-chief.

Of course, sometimes fate intervenes. Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan became president not because of any strategic manoeuvre but because his boss, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, fell gravely ill and died in office in 2010. The lesson? If you’re a VP, luck can be more useful than loyalty.

Then there’s the “sexually transmitted successor” strategy—Kenyan slang for those who ascend by family ties. Equatorial Guinea’s Vice President, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, enjoys a seemingly smooth relationship with his boss—who also happens to be his father, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.

Read:  South Sudan on edge as cracks emerge in ruling coalition

But beyond individual ambitions and betrayals, structural factors also shape these tensions. At independence, many African states adopted highly centralised systems where presidents wielded near-absolute power. Those who tasted such power grew paranoid about potential rivals. The vice presidency, by design, became a precarious position.

Additionally, many VPs are appointed not out of trust but to appease ethnic, regional, or political constituencies. If a vice president has ambitions of their own, they naturally seek to consolidate power, making them a threat to the boss.

Weak institutions also fuel instability. In some countries, the first lady, first son or daughter, or even the head of state’s personal witch doctor wield more influence than a vice president – and sometimes are the de facto presidents.

When power is informal and succession rules are unclear, chaos follows. This is often exacerbated by the lack of presidential term limits.

This instability has led to dismissals, coups, assassinations, and full-scale wars—none more devastating than South Sudan’s December 2013 conflict, triggered when Kiir first sacked Machar as vice president.

For Machar, history appears to be repeating itself. And if Africa’s past is anything to go by, his latest standoff with Kiir will not be the last chapter in the continent’s long, blood-stained book of presidential-vice presidential rivalries.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. Twitter: @cobbo3

At least 21 people were killed in an air strike on a village in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, South Sudan on Sunday night.

Nasir County Commissioner Gatluak Lew told the media that the midnight air strike had also claimed the life of the local paramount chief Paul Bol.

“Last night, 17 people died on the spot after the bombing and five were injured. However, now only one injured person is alive as the rest have succumbed to their injuries. I can confirm that 21 people died in the air strike,” he said.

The aerial bombing comes less than two weeks after government forces withdrew from the area following intense fighting with an ethnic militia, the White Army.

A South Sudanese general was among around 27 soldiers killed on March 7 when a UN helicopter trying to evacuate them from Nasir came under attack.

Witnesses accused the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) of carrying out the attack, alleging it targeted residential areas and destroyed homes.

The details came after the Ugandan troops warned the local militia in Nasir to surrender or be targeted.

“Our mission in South Sudan has just begun. I want to offer the White Army an opportunity to surrender to the UPDF force before it’s too late. We seek brotherhood and unity. But if [they] dare to fight us, you will all die,” warned Uganda's Chief of Defence Forces Muhoozi Kainerugaba.

Last week Uganda said it had deployed special forces in Juba to "secure it". The South Sudanese government at the time denied the presence of Ugandan troops in the country.

However, on Monday, government spokesman Michael Makuei confirmed the presence of UPDF forces in the country "to back up and support the (national army) according to their needs". He told journalists at a news conference the airforce bombed Nasir on Monday morning.

The clashes in Nasir, near the Ethiopian border, between national forces and the White Army, a loosely organised group mostly comprising armed ethnic Nuer youths, has threatened to reignite the 2013-2018 civil war in which hundreds of thousands of people died.

The government accuses the party of First Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, of collaborating with the White Army, which fought alongside Machar's forces during the civil war against the predominantly ethnic Dinka troops loyal to President Salva Kiir. Machar's party has denied involvement.

Additional reporting by Reuters

As tensions rise in South Sudan over the conflict in Nasir in Upper Nile, in the east of the country, First Vice President Dr Riek Machar may also be considering how this could affect his political relevance. 

The authorities in Juba have carried out a series of arrests of senior military and cabinet members of Dr Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), accusing them of being in “conflict with the law.”

The government in Juba has defended the arrests, saying the individuals were fuelling violence by the White Army militia in Nasir against South Sudanese troops.

Dr Machar himself remains outside of the dragnet, but his movement has been restricted, technically placing him under house arrest in Juba. Officials say the White Army are troops from the SPLA-IO, the armed wing of Machar’s party.

The bigger question, however, is whether Dr Machar and his party will last in the coalition government known as the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU).

TGoNU is the result of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), brokered by regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Government (Igad).

Read: South Sudan on edge as cracks emerge in ruling coalition

As it stands, the agreement gives Dr Machar immunity from dismissal. It also technically gives him a say in the sacking of any minister from his party. However, this has already been violated after President Salva Kiir sacked several ministers last year, despite protests from the SPLM-IO.

Now Dr Machar is in danger of losing his clout as one of the country's leading political figures after President Kiir also targeted members of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF,) who are allied to Dr Machar.

Charles Onyango-Obbo: Riek Machar and the African VP curse: Here’s the secret to breaking the spell

Fragile ceasefire

Fighting between the South Sudanese military and the White Army in Upper Nile has put Dr Machar in the spotlight. But it is not the only cause for concern. Intermittent skirmishes in other SPLM-IO dominated regions such as Abyei, Twic, Western Equatoria and Jonglei have also signalled a fragile ceasefire under the R-ARCSS.

For the first time since 2018, the SSPDF carried out an airstrike in Nasir on the night of March 16, causing civilian casualties and fires.

Since the initial peace agreement in 2015, Dr Machar has been deserted by several of his key political and military allies. The first was his former chief negotiator, Taban Deng Gai, who defected in 2016 and was rewarded with the post of vice president.

South Sudan President Salva Kiir (right) with his new vice president Taban Deng Gai at State House, in Juba on July 26, 2016.

Others include Johnson Olony, the former leader of the Agwelek militias that used to control the Malakal region, and more recently General Simon Gatwech, who broke away from the SPLM-IO in 2022 with a significant number of fighters to form the SPLM-Kitwang. Gen Gatwech was in February appointed the deputy commander-in-chief of the SSPDF.

According to Dr Remember Miamingi, a South Sudanese governance expert and human rights advocate, Dr Machar’s power hinged on two key pillars: unwavering ethnic Nuer support, which fuelled his military and political clout, and international legitimacy as a central signatory to successive peace deals.

But the SPLM-IO accuses Mr Kiir of systematically eroding foundations of the 2018 peace agreement. They say SPLM-IO troops are largely confined to squalid cantonment sites, fuelling disgruntlement and intercommunal strife, which in turn has fragmented SPLM-IO support base.

“This combination of poor troop conditions, divide-and-rule tactics, and government-aligned narratives portraying him as a weak leader indifferent to community suffering has rapidly drained his influence and unity of command. International frustration over persistent violence and perceived agreement violations have likewise chipped away at Dr Machar’s standing,” said Dr Miamingi.

He said that Dr Machar, however, remains marginally relevant thanks to his formal role in the peace process and the reluctance of external actors to sideline him altogether.

Ultimately, Dr Machar’s political and military fortunes depend on his ability to break free from Juba’s constraints, to re-engage with his fractured networks in Upper Nile, and rekindle external backing for a more balanced deal.

According to political commentator Akol Miyen Kuol any change or replacement of Dr Machar can only happen internally if enough members of SPLM-IO feel that his leadership is wanting.

“So, President Kiir doesn't have a right to change or replace Dr Machar as long as the revitalised deal has not come to an end,” he said.

Dr Machar has been confined to Juba since arriving in the capital in early 2020. He is not allowed to leave Juba, even for medical treatment.

In addition to engineered defections, ministries assigned to his party have been swapped and his party officials sacked, including from state governors, without his consent. In the latest wave of crisis, forces affiliated with him came under attack in all three states being administered by his party governors.

Dr Miamingi says Dr Machar may be losing relevance because he is not delivering any of the changes he talked about before arriving in Juba, such as his claims to be fighting for democratic, economic and security transformation of South Sudan.

“Anytime he releases a public statement, it is only about violations of the agreement that directly affect his party members and forces,” he said. 

Lam Jok, a former official of SPLM-IO, says Dr Machar is still crucial to the peace process and his forces remain strong, but accuses Kiir's camp of trying to abrogate the R-ARCSS by antagonising some signatories. 

Congolese rebels M23 say they will send a delegation to Luanda, Angola for talks with the government of President Felix Tshisekedi, even though they warned they could pull a plug if Kinshasa does not clarify its attendance.

The Congo River Alliance (to which the M23 belongs) said it had sent a five-member delegation to Luanda on Monday to take part in the talks with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government slated for Tuesday.

“The Congo River Alliance (AFC/M23) informs the public that it is sending a five-person delegation to Luanda, the capital of Angola this Monday, March 17, 2025, to participate in direct dialogue at the request of Angolan authorities.

“AFC/M23 reiterates its deepest gratitude to His Excellency Joao Lourenco, the President of the Republic of Angola, for his tireless efforts towards a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict in DRC,” the statement read.

The Luanda talks are expected to usher in peace and end a war that has claimed thousands and displaced millions of people since the start of the year. Both sides have now indicated they will attend.

Read:  For Congo and M23, accepting talks was first step. Agenda is next

The DRC presidency said on Sunday it was ready to participate, but did not say whether the delegation would include President Tshisekedi.

Tina Salama, a spokesperson for the presidency, said the head of the delegation had not yet been decided, but confirmed that Kinshasa would be represented.

The M23 said it could withdraw from talks if the Congolese government remained vague about direct talks.

“In this context, AFC/M23 considers it essential for the Angolan mediation team to get clear answers to the following concerns: Mr Tshisekedi to publicly and unequivocally express his commitment to direct negotiations with our organisation.”

The group also wants Luanda to provide a clear set of terms of reference as well as commitment to implement decisions of a joint summit of East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which among other things had named a tripartite team of facilitators to replace President Lourenco as mediator.

Kinshasa had previously labelled M23 as terrorist movement and refused to engage directly. However, it has suffered a series of military losses.

Read:  Tshisekedi under pressure after rebels seize Goma, begin southward march

Ahead of the talks, President Lourenco called for a ceasefire from midnight on Sunday.

This will mark the first meeting between M23 rebels and the DRC government in three years.

Previous rounds of Angola-brokered peace talks have failed to end fighting between the Congolese army and the M23, largely because the M23 were not part of the negotiations.

The European Union (EU) on Monday sanctioned nine individuals in connection with violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a publication in the Official Journal of the EU showed.

Among those on the list are commanders of the Rwanda Defence Force, the leader of the M23 rebel group, Bertrand Bisimwa, and the governor of North Kivu.

The sanctions also targeted the chief executive of Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board and Gasabo Gold Refinery in Kigali, which the EU accused of illicitly exporting natural resources from Congo.

Amid a flurry of diplomatic activity, a rebel alliance that includes M23 rebels confirmed it would send a five-member delegation to Tuesday's talks in Luanda, which could mark M23's first direct negotiations with the Congolese government.

DRC President Felix Tshisekedi's office on Sunday said that Kinshasa would send representatives to Luanda, reversing the government's long-standing vow not to negotiate with the group, which it has dismissed as a mere front for the Rwandan government.

Pressure has been growing on Tshisekedi to negotiate with M23 rebels after a series of battlefield setbacks since January. The rebels have seized eastern DR Congo's two biggest cities and a host of smaller localities.

The fighting has killed at least 7,000 people this year, according to the DRC government, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced.

The conflict is rooted in the spillover into DR Congo of Rwanda's 1994 genocide and the struggle for control of the country's vast mineral resources, many of which are used in batteries used for electric vehicles and other electronic products.

The United Nations and international powers accuse Rwanda of providing arms and sending soldiers to fight with the ethnic Tutsi-led M23 rebels. Rwanda says its forces are acting in self-defence against DR Congo's army and militias hostile to Kigali.

Read: EU to sanction nine people over Congo violence, diplomats say

A Rwandan government spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the EU sanctions.

Rwanda expels Belgian diplomats

Western countries have taken measures against Rwanda over the conflict, including the withholding of development aid by Britain and Germany, but Kigali has been defiant.

On Monday, it announced it was severing diplomatic relations with Belgium, the former colonial power in Rwanda and DRC, and giving Belgian diplomats 48 hours to leave.

Rwanda's Foreign Affairs Ministry accused Belgium, which has called for strong EU action against Kigali, of "using lies and manipulation to secure an unjustified hostile opinion of Rwanda."

Belgium's Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Prevot said Brussels would reciprocate by declaring Rwandan diplomats persona non grata, calling Kigali's move "disproportionate".

Previous rounds of EU sanctions have targeted M23 commanders and Rwandan army officers.

Read:  Congo conflict: EU toughens stance as Rwanda fights 'selective' narrative

Zobel Behalal, a senior expert at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, said the latest sanctions were notable in going after Rwanda Mines, Petroleum and Gas Board and the Gasabo Gold Refinery.

"The EU sanctions ... are a recognition that profits from natural resources are one of the main motivations for Rwanda's involvement in this conflict," Behalal told Reuters.

The mines board and the gold refinery did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The European Parliament called on the EU's executive last month to suspend a memorandum of understanding (MoU) from last year that aims to support Rwandan supplies of strategic minerals. The EU's foreign policy chief said the agreement was under review.

Congolese rebel group, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC/M23), on Monday pulled the plug on Luanda Talks slated for Tuesday 18, protesting a series of sanctions imposed on their members by the European Union.

The group that had taken control of two key cities in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had initially agreed to meet with representatives of the Congolese government, which was the first step in seeking long-term peace.

But as soon as the European Union fingered nine individuals, including Rwandan military chiefs, the rebels said the decision curtails their operations and sabotages the entire peace bid while allowing the Congolese authorities a free hand.

"The Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC/M23) deeply regrets that certain international institutions are deliberately undermining peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and obstructing the much-anticipated talks."

“Successive sanctions imposed on our members, including those enacted on the eve of the Luanda discussions, severely undermine direct dialogue and make any progress impossible” read a statement the rebel group sent on Monday evening.

“This incomprehensible and ambiguous stance only encourages (Congolese President ) Mr Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo to continue with his warmongering programme.” Later Corneille Nangaa, the leader of the AFC said the sanctions had come while the group was being attacked by the Congolese army, including targeting civilians.

Read: M23 issues demands ahead of direct talks with Congo

“Furthermore, AFC/M23 draws the attention of the International and National Community to the warmongering campaign of the coalition forces of Kinshasa regime through multiple ground attacks and indiscriminate bombardments of densely populated areas as well as our positions, using fighter jets and CH-4 combat drones," they said in a statement.

“Under these circumstances, the talks have become impracticable. Consequently, our organisation can no longer continue to participate in the discussions" reads the statement.

The decision marks a major setback to efforts meant to find a peaceful solution to the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The rebel group had earlier on Monday announced that it has sent a five-person delegation to Luanda to participate in the direct talks with Kinshasa, under the auspices of Angolan President, Joao Lourenco.

A possible return to fighting seems to be looming as the M23 rebels claim the Congolese forces have continued their attacks on civilian territories using Sukhoi fighter jets.

At least 21 people were killed in an air strike on a village in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, South Sudan on Sunday night.

Nasir County Commissioner Gatluak Lew told the media that the midnight air strike had also claimed the life of the local paramount chief Paul Bol.

“Last night, 17 people died on the spot after the bombing and five were injured. However, now only one injured person is alive as the rest have succumbed to their injuries. I can confirm that 21 people died in the air strike,” he said.

The aerial bombing comes less than two weeks after government forces withdrew from the area following intense fighting with an ethnic militia, the White Army.

A South Sudanese general was among around 27 soldiers killed on March 7 when a UN helicopter trying to evacuate them from Nasir came under attack.

Witnesses accused the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) of carrying out the attack, alleging it targeted residential areas and destroyed homes.

The details came after the Ugandan troops warned the local militia in Nasir to surrender or be targeted.

“Our mission in South Sudan has just begun. I want to offer the White Army an opportunity to surrender to the UPDF force before it’s too late. We seek brotherhood and unity. But if [they] dare to fight us, you will all die,” warned Uganda's Chief of Defence Forces Muhoozi Kainerugaba.

Last week Uganda said it had deployed special forces in Juba to "secure it". The South Sudanese government at the time denied the presence of Ugandan troops in the country.

However, on Monday, government spokesman Michael Makuei confirmed the presence of UPDF forces in the country "to back up and support the (national army) according to their needs". He told journalists at a news conference the airforce bombed Nasir on Monday morning.

The clashes in Nasir, near the Ethiopian border, between national forces and the White Army, a loosely organised group mostly comprising armed ethnic Nuer youths, has threatened to reignite the 2013-2018 civil war in which hundreds of thousands of people died.

The government accuses the party of First Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer, of collaborating with the White Army, which fought alongside Machar's forces during the civil war against the predominantly ethnic Dinka troops loyal to President Salva Kiir. Machar's party has denied involvement.

Additional reporting by Reuters

Kenya Airways (KQ) has been forced to review the status of its 41.23 percent shareholding in Precision Air Services Plc as the Tanzanian subsidiary faced mounting financial troubles.

With total liabilities exceeding total assets, the resulting negative shareholder equity signals a bad state of financial health for Precision Air, reducing the possibility of the Kenyan national carrier recovering the money invested in it.

Kenya Airways chief executive Allan Kilavuka said they are reviewing their investment in Precision Air in line with the overall turnaround plan for KQ.

“Our investment in Precision Air is not merely about short-term financial results but about ensuring long-term connectivity, job creation and economic opportunity for the regions it serves,” Mr Kilavuka told The EastAfrican in an emailed response to our query. “As the national airline, we have a clear turnaround strategy that is already yielding positive results, and we are applying the same disciplined approach to assessing the best path forward for Precision Air.”

A decision will mostly come after consultations with KQs’ own stakeholders, regulators and experts. But Kilavuka argued financial prudence will be the key guide, besides the desire to support easier air connectivity in the region.

It is a decision Kenya Airways has been forced into after facing the possibility of losing its entire investment in the Tanzanian subsidiary valued at around Tsh1.32 billion ($498,383).

Years of accumulated losses and mounting debts have eroded the subsidiary’s shareholders’ equity, pushing it into a state of technical insolvency. Precision Air’s hopes of survival now hinge largely on successful debt restructuring negotiations with bankers and creditors.

And KQ, which is also weighed down by depleted working capital and shareholder equity balances, risks losing its entire investment in Precision Air should the troubled subsidiary be liquidated. KQ is itself trying to reclaim its financial footing following years of its own accumulated losses and debts.

“A negative shareholder equity points to either a history of accumulated losses, high level of debt and significant asset depreciation. In the case of Precision Air, the airline has been suffering from swelling accumulated losses. As such, the airline has faced cash flow issues as well as legal issues related to debt, thereby affecting operations,” said Melodie Gatuguta, a research associate for banking at Standard Investment Bank.

“With regard to the airline as an investment to KQ, if the firm were to liquidate, KQ may receive little to no return on its investments. In addition, if KQ is interested in exiting its position, it may find it difficult to lock in prospective buyers with regards to valuation,” she added.

Shareholder equity refers to how much money a company has after subtracting all its expenses and debts. A negative shareholder equity arises when a company owes more money to investors than its assets can cover.

A negative shareholder equity is often a bad sign since it means the company has not only been losing money, but has lost more money than its owners have put into the company in the first place.

“Precision Air can turn around its operations and return to profitability, there may still be opportunities for recovery and growth,” said Ms Gatuguta.

“In the event of liquidation of Precision Air, equity holders will be paid last. They will pay banks and suppliers before shareholders,” said Ken Gichinga, a Chief Economist at Mentoria Economics.

Read: Kenya Airways, Precision Air seek waiver extension of competition rules

Precision Air fell into a net loss of Tsh57.38 billion ($21.66 million) in 2023 from a net profit of Tsh5.91 billion ($2.23 million) in 2022. Its negative working capital deteriorated to Tsh537.5 billion from Tsh485.9 billion in the same period.

Its total liabilities exceeded total assets resulting in a shareholders’ deficit position of Tsh491.2 billion ($185.45 million) a worse off position compared to a shareholders’ deficit position of Tsh433.8 billion ($163.78 million) in 2022.

Precision Air was financed by loans totalling to Tsh435.3 billion ($164.35 million) in 2023 up from Tsh398 billion ($150.27 million) in 2022, and these loans have been classified as current due to breach of agreements.

“The group and company also defaulted on their debt obligations as stipulated in the debt agreements resulting in debts amounting to Tsh435.3 billion ($164.35 million) being due on demand,” Precision Air said in its annual report (2023).

“Because of this default, the inability of the group and company to generate cash that would be sufficient to settle arrears and instalment payments as per the debt agreements and the on-going discussions with the lenders on possible rescheduling of the borrowings, there is no reliable basis for developing a reliable liquidity risk profile for borrowings,” it added.

Kenya Airways acquired a minority 49 percent shareholding in Precision Air in 2003. Precision Air would be listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange in December 2011, with a total of 7,056 investors participating in the initial public offering (IP0). The IPO sold 16 percent stake in Precision Air to the public diluting KQ’s shareholding to 41 percent.

Currently, KQ’s investments in Precision Air is valued at around Tsh1.32 billion ($498,383) for a 41.23 percent stake according to Precision Air’s annual report.

KQ is the second largest shareholder in Precision Air after the estate of the late Tanzanian Michael Shirima, which owns the majority 42.91 percent shareholding. The public holds the remaining 15.86 percent of the shares.

“Both airlines (KQ and Precision Air) are grappling with negative equity due to prolonged losses, heavy debt burdens and pandemic-related disruptions. Despite a rebound in passenger demand, accumulated deficits still outweigh assets, reflecting the financial strain,” said Ngugi Waweru, a research analyst at Faida Investment Bank. “For investors, negative shareholder equity raises concerns. For instance, with a negative equity position, it is unlikely for the airlines to pay dividends as profits (if any), which must go towards rebuilding equity and servicing debt.”

Precision Air said it will continue focusing on improving profitability and liquidity to ensure it remains competitive in the market with a key focus on pursuing restructuring of the aircraft loan facility and entire balance sheet and continuous engagement of creditors to agree on payment plans based on the paying ability of the company and in line with projected cash flows.

Precision Air has invested in two subsidiaries—Precision Handling Ltd and Precise Systems Ltd—both of which are dormant, with their investments impaired to the tune of Tsh1 billion ($377,563) and Tsh10 million ($3,775.63), respectively.

As tensions rise in South Sudan over the conflict in Nasir in Upper Nile, in the east of the country, First Vice President Dr Riek Machar may also be considering how this could affect his political relevance. 

The authorities in Juba have carried out a series of arrests of senior military and cabinet members of Dr Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), accusing them of being in “conflict with the law.”

The government in Juba has defended the arrests, saying the individuals were fuelling violence by the White Army militia in Nasir against South Sudanese troops.

Dr Machar himself remains outside of the dragnet, but his movement has been restricted, technically placing him under house arrest in Juba. Officials say the White Army are troops from the SPLA-IO, the armed wing of Machar’s party.

The bigger question, however, is whether Dr Machar and his party will last in the coalition government known as the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU).

TGoNU is the result of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), brokered by regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Government (Igad).

Read: South Sudan on edge as cracks emerge in ruling coalition

As it stands, the agreement gives Dr Machar immunity from dismissal. It also technically gives him a say in the sacking of any minister from his party. However, this has already been violated after President Salva Kiir sacked several ministers last year, despite protests from the SPLM-IO.

Now Dr Machar is in danger of losing his clout as one of the country's leading political figures after President Kiir also targeted members of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF,) who are allied to Dr Machar.

Charles Onyango-Obbo: Riek Machar and the African VP curse: Here’s the secret to breaking the spell

Fragile ceasefire

Fighting between the South Sudanese military and the White Army in Upper Nile has put Dr Machar in the spotlight. But it is not the only cause for concern. Intermittent skirmishes in other SPLM-IO dominated regions such as Abyei, Twic, Western Equatoria and Jonglei have also signalled a fragile ceasefire under the R-ARCSS.

For the first time since 2018, the SSPDF carried out an airstrike in Nasir on the night of March 16, causing civilian casualties and fires.

Since the initial peace agreement in 2015, Dr Machar has been deserted by several of his key political and military allies. The first was his former chief negotiator, Taban Deng Gai, who defected in 2016 and was rewarded with the post of vice president.

South Sudan President Salva Kiir (right) with his new vice president Taban Deng Gai at State House, in Juba on July 26, 2016.

Others include Johnson Olony, the former leader of the Agwelek militias that used to control the Malakal region, and more recently General Simon Gatwech, who broke away from the SPLM-IO in 2022 with a significant number of fighters to form the SPLM-Kitwang. Gen Gatwech was in February appointed the deputy commander-in-chief of the SSPDF.

According to Dr Remember Miamingi, a South Sudanese governance expert and human rights advocate, Dr Machar’s power hinged on two key pillars: unwavering ethnic Nuer support, which fuelled his military and political clout, and international legitimacy as a central signatory to successive peace deals.

But the SPLM-IO accuses Mr Kiir of systematically eroding foundations of the 2018 peace agreement. They say SPLM-IO troops are largely confined to squalid cantonment sites, fuelling disgruntlement and intercommunal strife, which in turn has fragmented SPLM-IO support base.

“This combination of poor troop conditions, divide-and-rule tactics, and government-aligned narratives portraying him as a weak leader indifferent to community suffering has rapidly drained his influence and unity of command. International frustration over persistent violence and perceived agreement violations have likewise chipped away at Dr Machar’s standing,” said Dr Miamingi.

He said that Dr Machar, however, remains marginally relevant thanks to his formal role in the peace process and the reluctance of external actors to sideline him altogether.

Ultimately, Dr Machar’s political and military fortunes depend on his ability to break free from Juba’s constraints, to re-engage with his fractured networks in Upper Nile, and rekindle external backing for a more balanced deal.

According to political commentator Akol Miyen Kuol any change or replacement of Dr Machar can only happen internally if enough members of SPLM-IO feel that his leadership is wanting.

“So, President Kiir doesn't have a right to change or replace Dr Machar as long as the revitalised deal has not come to an end,” he said.

Dr Machar has been confined to Juba since arriving in the capital in early 2020. He is not allowed to leave Juba, even for medical treatment.

In addition to engineered defections, ministries assigned to his party have been swapped and his party officials sacked, including from state governors, without his consent. In the latest wave of crisis, forces affiliated with him came under attack in all three states being administered by his party governors.

Dr Miamingi says Dr Machar may be losing relevance because he is not delivering any of the changes he talked about before arriving in Juba, such as his claims to be fighting for democratic, economic and security transformation of South Sudan.

“Anytime he releases a public statement, it is only about violations of the agreement that directly affect his party members and forces,” he said. 

Lam Jok, a former official of SPLM-IO, says Dr Machar is still crucial to the peace process and his forces remain strong, but accuses Kiir's camp of trying to abrogate the R-ARCSS by antagonising some signatories.