East Africa is chaotic, yet, as numerous international and pan-African financial institutions frequently note, the region continues to weave its economic magic.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has consistently predicted that East Africa will be the continent’s fastest-growing economic bloc.

The most recent and detailed forecast for 2025 appears in the African Development Bank Group’s African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2024, published on 30 May 2024 during the Bank’s Annual Meetings in Nairobi. It states:

“East Africa, the continent’s fastest-growing region, will see real GDP growth rise from an estimated 1.5 per cent in 2023 to 4.9 per cent in 2024 and 5.7 per cent in 2025.”

The surprise is that East Africa—particularly the East African Community (EAC)—isn’t performing twice as well, given its vast potential. To truly shine, it must shed its destructive habits, starting with fostering greater peace.

In recent years, six of the 18 sub-Saharan African states with active armed conflicts were EAC members, accounting for roughly 33 per cent of such conflicts in the region.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, and South Sudan have endured high-intensity armed conflicts, while Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda have grappled with low-intensity, subnational skirmishes.

Beyond this, rampant corruption, governance failures, and political repression plague several EAC states. Yet the region boasts immense strengths it could leverage to rake in busloads of moolah.

For one, it has a decent share of arable land to revolutionise agriculture. Though Somalia, and to a lesser extent Kenya, drag it down, the EAC holds between 18 and 26 per cent of Africa’s arable land. The data here is shaky, and some generous estimates push this figure even higher.

The EAC is home to Lake Nalubaale/Nyanza (Victoria), Africa’s largest lake and the world’s second-largest freshwater lake by surface area, after Lake Superior in Canada and the US. Despite a handful of ships and mostly artisanal fishing, the lake sees little economic activity.

Yet, with its 1,000 islands, it could become the global capital of resort partying, tourism, and water sports. (Fun fact: Lake Bunyonyi in southwestern Uganda is 1,500 times smaller than Nalubaale but has 29 islands, giving it a far greater per capita wealth in islands.)

In these climate change-ravaged times, water is gold. Africa’s total renewable internal freshwater resources (internal river flows and groundwater from rainfall) are estimated at around 3,931 billion cubic metres. The EAC countries collectively hold 1,096.76 billion cubic metres—about 27.9 per cent of the continent’s inland freshwater.

Forests, too, have soared in value. Africa’s total forest area spans approximately 6.7 million square kilometres. The EAC’s combined forest area is roughly 2.46 million square kilometres—about 36.7 per cent of Africa’s forested land.

We owe much of this to the DRC joining the EAC; it alone accounts for around 27.1 per cent of the continent’s forest area, meaning the rest of the EAC is largely riding its coattails.

The EAC could also be a tourism titan. Consider the Pyramids of Giza (Egypt), Serengeti National Park (Tanzania), Mount Kilimanjaro (Tanzania), Victoria Falls (Zambia/Zimbabwe), Maasai Mara National Reserve (Kenya)—linked to the Serengeti’s migration—Table Mountain (South Africa), Kruger National Park (South Africa), Ngorongoro Crater (Tanzania), Zanzibar Archipelago (Tanzania), Sahara Desert, Okavango Delta (Botswana), Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (Uganda), Namib Desert (Namibia), Marrakech Medina (Morocco), and Virunga National Park (DRC).

Within the EAC, Bwindi and Virunga mean mountain gorillas—an arena where East Africa dominates entirely. Bwindi, Virunga, and Rwanda’s Volcanoes National Park host 100 per cent of the world’s mountain gorilla population.

The EAC also claims Africa’s five highest mountain peaks, though their icy summits are vanishing fast due to climate change. Mount Kilimanjaro (Tanzania) stands tallest at 5,895 metres, followed by Mount Kenya at 5,199 metres.

The Rwenzori Mountains (Uganda/DRC) house Mount Stanley, the third-highest at 5,109 metres, followed by Vittorio Emanuele Peak and Edward Peak, both in the same range.

Lower down, the Virunga Mountains (Rwanda/DRC/Uganda) feature a chain of volcanoes, including Mount Karisimbi (4,507 metres), while Mount Elgon (Kenya/Uganda), an extinct shield volcano, reaches 4,321 metres. Like the gorillas, this is another East African monopoly.

On renewable energy, roughly 27 per cent of Africa’s untapped non-solar renewable potential—hydropower, wind, geothermal, and biomass—lies within the EAC, based on an estimated 135 GW out of Africa’s 504 gigawatts.

This could range from 25–30 per cent depending on biomass estimates and project developments, driven by the DRC’s hydropower and Kenya’s geothermal, though tempered by weaker wind and biomass contributions.

The region is also a creative hub and a magnet for venture capital, largely thanks to Kenya’s star power. In 2023, Kenyan startups attracted £800 million in venture capital—28 per cent of all funds raised continent-wide.

EAC countries collectively secured 20 per cent of Africa’s $5.805 billion in tech funding that year, with Uganda securing $141.9 million, Rwanda $64.5 million, and Tanzania $25.8 million, all trailing behind Kenya.

For those, like Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, who champions growing populations, the EAC excels. Four of Africa’s 10 fastest-growing populations—Uganda, Burundi, DRC, and Tanzania—are EAC members.

East Africa might soon dominate Africa’s airways, too. Three of the top 10 African airlines—Kenya Airways, RwandAir, and Fastjet (Zimbabwe/Tanzania)—are EAC-based. If Ethiopia joins the EAC, Ethiopian Airlines, the continent’s leader, could shake things up. And if Air Tanzania and Uganda Airlines get their act together, it could be game over.

It’s becoming increasingly difficult for East Africa to excuse its failure to become an economic powerhouse.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. Twitter: @cobbo3

It was almost the perfect year for the Women’s Run to take place in Dar es Salaam. IWD2025 fell on a Saturday, which would have allowed for us to convene at dawn in the rich neighbourhood’s open green space and enjoy some exercise together.

It didn’t happen, the holy month of Ramadan had begun and there is an unspoken understanding that we reduce our physical exertions then. Respectable reason to delay the event.

However, when the event organisers mentioned that this year the Women’s Run will also carry the theme of Clean Cooking, I had an adverse reaction.

Spent the whole day feeling bent out of shape over it — how dare they chain this event to our stoves, can we just have one (expletive deleted) day when we’re not being strangled by the focus on domesticity? The intensity of my fury shook me a little, so I had to call myself in for a chat about it.

I made myself take a beat and a cup of tea and asked my Self why I was having such big feelings this year? What was really going on?

And my Self honoured the request, drank the tea, had a nap and eventually told me: Because the corporations are doing their thing again and co-opting a deeply necessary political response to injustice for their own purposes.

Because it is not okay to reduce a women’s run to “cook clean” even if the intention is a good one: This particular intersection re-enforces the “mwanamke jiko!” problem in my stubbornly patriarchal society.

Because it took us this long to be able to exercise in public in Dar es Salaam without being pummelled to death by unsolicited comments from the sexists: these public walks are where people cheer athleticism in women!

So many “becauses” but the main one was the co-optation.

My Self told me that the anger had been brewing for a while. She has seen what happens to movements that get co-opted: it is just death, usually by Capitalism.

I asked my Self: Baby Girl, you have spent a lifetime studying the ways of Power as a social force, surely you can do better than throwing a tantrum at having your Special Day taken over by a couple of “well-intended” thugs?

My Self refused to speak to me any further as She had plans for the weekend that revolved around rejuvenation. She told me that “self-care is an act of Love, and Love is radical in 2025!” My dramatic Self has a habit of capitalising certain words for emphasis.

In due time, my Self grabbed a tampon to soak up the tears so that She could re-engage. If corporations, politicians and other actors are able to co-opt Women’s Day for their own profane uses, it is because nobody calls them out about it regularly, she said.

You used to relish being considered dangerous because you are a Feminist, she said. Maybe writing about it can start a conversation, she said. So here we are.

I am no longer split in two with agitation over Women’s Month 2025, I will be enjoying it in peace as I plot on how to co-opt or otherwise corrupt cynical and profiteering attempts to pink-wash products and services.

Besides, my Self and I are laughing in relief that at least we were not “gifted” a kanga with the President’s face on it for Women’s Day 2025. Can you imagine? Tcha!

Although I was born and raised near our capital city of Kampala and even nearer to the international airport of Entebbe, I had no need to wear pants fulltime until I went to school aged four.

Kindergarten was a later 1970s introduction. Such was newly independent African life, that many little boys also enjoyed independence from clothes in our warm weather.

Growing older, we realised the reason we weren’t stopped from running around the neighbourhood without clothes was that we had nothing worth covering then.

Watching the Ukrainian president last week as he stood his ground before a White House disciplinary committee (or lynch mob, depending on which angle you view the re-alignment of global politics from), it felt like seeing a group of Igbo brothers nodding in the background saying that Comrade Zelensky indeed deserves wearing trousers. Soon Africans will know which of their leaders qualifies to wear trousers.

At no other time after Independence did Africa need real men and women to guide it through the unjust jungle of global affairs.

The other day in Munich we saw European tears rolling when Vice President Vance indicated that US may no longer view Russia and China through Euro lenses. At least Zelensky neither wept nor caved in while being roasted in Washington.

How long will it take for a critical number of African leaders to identify and define what stakes the continent has in the oncoming storm?

Africa today is like a woman approaching middle age and running out of time to determine how to lead the rest of her life and raise sensible children.

She has been (mis)used by men who are now fighting themselves, and if she isn’t blind, sees her chance to determine her own destiny before they finish fighting and return to her, with a new formula for abusing her.

Read:  Africa presidents, look in the mirror to confirm it isn’t Trump you’ll see

And how apt that this is happening during the anniversary of the Berlin Conference when outsiders agreed on how to rob Africa without a single African at the table where the sharing was taking place!

There could be six or more options for Africa, four of them monogamous. Three possibilities would be to enter an exclusive relationship with America, or with China, or Russia.

Fourth would be to go monogamous with EU, but given the fast advancing years towards her menopause, Africa might find European indecision a big turnoff.

A fifth option would be a deal with Ukraine. Yes, many may not be aware that at the Soviet breakup 33 years ago, Ukraine was/is the second most powerful unit after Russia, of those that comprised the mighty Union in technology, military, economy and human resource development.

That Ukraine has remained standing and fighting since Russia attacked (some Americans now say Ukraine caused the war) is testimony to this. Let’s also add a footnote that the largest aircraft ever was built by Ukraine.

The Antonov An-225 Mriya, a real wonder of aviation engineering, was destroyed during the Russian invasion. Since Ukraine dreams of rebuilding the mass air transporter (its name means ‘dream’ in Ukrainian), Africa which lacks roads and railways could offer a partnership here to realise its African Continental Free Trade Area dream.

A sixth option would be opting for permanent celibacy (claiming independence or non-alignment). But given Africa’s limited technology and military capacity, this could be risky and she could end up like a village widow whose door can be kicked in by any villain.

Then to safeguard herself against such midnight attacks moreover abetted by some of her domestic staff (corrupt public officials), she may end up accepting protection from a not-so-honest guy, and the secrecy of the relationship would lead to lack of accountability on his part.

So a deal with a young man who is hard as nails and can build big airplanes for her can be a more viable option. But it takes people who have something worth covering in their clothes to make such tough decisions at a critical time for the continent.

Buwembo is a Kampala-based journalist. E-mail: [email protected]

Auditor-General Nancy Gathungu has revealed in Senate that the system running the Social Health Insurance Fund (Shif) under the Social Health Authority (SHA) was unprocedurally acquired and is unconstitutionally operated. Its acquisition was single-sourced, shrouded in secrecy, and flouted public procurement laws.

The system cost a staggering Ksh104 billion (more than $950 million). That’s not all.

A percentage of contributions Kenyans make to the fund goes to shadowy providers and operators of the system. The Auditor-General cast doubt on the scheme’s lawfulness and effectiveness. 

These damning revelations come on the heels of public uproar over unavailability of services under the scheme. A patient who stormed the Health Ministry to protest that SHA was not working, and who was later abducted from a hospital for her derring-do, represents the frustration of Kenyans over the scheme.

Where was parliament when this scheme was being concocted ? Why didn’t relevant parliamentary watchdog committees launch their own investigation immediately the public began to complain? Why did parliament appropriate such a staggering amount for the SHA software ?

The answer is also the reason why parliament overwhelmingly passed Finance Bill, 2024, and cheered wildly when it was later withdrawn due to countrywide protests.

The reason is also why MPs supported the Adani airport deal and again cheered hysterically when it was withdraw after a US court indicted the corporation for illicit behaviour.

It is also the reason why parliament has not conducted an investigation into who murdered youth protesting plunder and misrule last year, and is continuing to abduct, torture, murder and “disappear” youthful critics of the regime.

Read:  Kenya slouching towards a police state

The answer in a nutshell is parliament long abdicated its constitutional mandate of safeguarding the public from excesses of the executive. It is no longer the people’s House. It is now the president’s House.

In a span of two years, we have witnessed abduction and murder of critics, thievery on an unprecedented scale, failure of or disquiet over flagship projects like Hustler Fund and Affordable Housing, high cost of living, Adani misadventure, fake fertiliser scam, continuation of deadly banditry in certain regions, the growth of a “culture of lies”, crises in health and education, foreign policy debacles, and now the SHA controversy.

In the spirit of King Midas, everything the regime touches turns to rust.

To adapt Winston Churchill, never in recent history has so much damage been caused to so many by so few in such a short period of time. 

Despite all the failures, many people have always assumed that the regime, at its heart, means well. They persuaded themselves that the regime would see the error of its ways and do better. No one wants to doubt that their government means well.

Even harsh critics want government to succeed. But the Auditor-General’s report mustnow force us to ask a painful question – has the regime ever meant well? Is it still logical or patriotic to assume the regime means well? Isn’t doing so living in a fool’s paradise? 

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political and social commentator.

Give it to Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta , one-time president of Kenya, just give it to him. He has the knack of sometimes making a serious point with such easygoing bonhomie you might even think he is only jesting, when he is actually in earnest.

This last one about Donald Trump cutting aid to our countries and people whining is one of them.

Uhuru puts it across with such simplicity: you do not pay taxes in America; it’s not your money, period; stop whining and instead ask yourselves what you are going to do to cover the deficit created by the end of the handouts that Trump has decreed, closing a another chapter of free lunches so beloved of our free-loading rulers.

It is concerning how much the people running our governments are prepared to go on bended knee to beg for the most rudimentary things, even when we really do not need them or we could have provided them from our own resources.

I have seen cases of very simple and cheap health campaigns carrying very loud and conspicuous billboards, just to remind us that our minds are enslaved and tied to that mental and psychological lethargy that does not allow us to see how we could have done whatever it is with our own resources, saving us the embarrassment of beggary.

Trump is back and for him that means America is back. Forget the megalomania for a moment, but remember America was not founded as an altruistic, do-gooder nation; rather it was established on the blood-soaked burial mounds of Native Americans, who were summarily exterminated and erased, and the Africans who were kidnapped and taken there as slaves.

Read:  However fantastical, world could be reinvented in Trump’s clamour

So, any attempt to see America as our benefactor must proceed from a serious misapprehension. Simply put, you are on your own, you have no rich uncle, and now you may want to remember what you were taught in primary school: cut your coat according to your cloth.
Stop living like you are rich, because you simply aren’t.

Those cars you are driven in, those luxurious foreign trips you take, the huge fraudulent deals you make on your countries’ resources… all these are not yours, but rather they are expenses you push onto your poor people who continue to suffer under you simply because they have failed to throw you off their backs.

It reminds me that Uhuru as his country’s minister of finance (before becoming president) abolished government cars and created a scheme under which senior officials got loans to buy and drive their own cars (Rwanda did pretty much the same thing) .

This was resisted in Tanzania, because it is more profitable for our officials to be driven in huge gas-guzzling government cars, which they can use to carry, say, firewood or charcoal without wear-and-tear concerns.

But then, strangely, under President Benjamin Mkapa and his infrastructure minister John Magufuli, the same bureaucrats thought up a scheme to give away (literally give away) government quarters to their occupiers because, it was said, they were too expensive to maintain!

In a couple of strokes of the pen, whole estates of state property on prime land across the country were given away for a song, and they have now become eyesores in our major cities as the new owners turned them into illicit beer shacks and auto-spare-parts shops.

Evidence abounds, too, that some of the recipients of this extraordinary government largesse were in fact not the recognised occupants of the said houses but the mistresses of those who made these bizarre decisions.

Maybe we should leave such matters to the future historians, who will be poring over records to determine who has been the most corrupt in our endless parade of brigands and blood suckers, but for the time being we are enjoined to find ways of plugging the holes in our budgets by Trump’s decision to plug the holes in his own exchequer.

It is his right to do so, absolutely, as it is our duty to stop the leaks (nay, gushes) from our own coffers. That is why I draw a lot of inspiration from what Uhuru has been telling us: Hey, people, it is his money he is withholding. It is not your money, and you have no right to whine.

So, if you have this heavy burden of keeping thousands of sick people who need life-saving drugs to keep on keeping on, do the done thing and put your money where your mouth is, Get rid of all those SUVs whose purchase price--- before it is even on the road --- is an appreciable percentage of a small ARV factory that could save a few of your people’s lives.

Do away with all those foreign travels in first class/business class and the fat allowances that go with them, and the Rolexes and the blings…. and you will find there is enough money for your schoolchildren’s desks, books and chalk.

In other words, be logical, make sense, behave like you mean what you say, that you care for your people. Simply put, jump off that long gravy train and you will find that Trump does make sense, at least on this one.

For the rest, tackle Trump where you can tackle him, like Gaza; or kick him on South Africa’s land issues, and you will make sense.

Jenerali Ulimwengu is chairman of the board of the Raia Mwema newspaper and an advocate of the High Court in Dar es Salaam.

This year I will score a self-designed gourmande hat-trick that I want to dub the Dar Special.

To kick things off, I celebrated Fat Tuesday with pancakes and mild debauchery in the form of cheesecake. This will be followed by wangling an invite to a Holi party, then the grand finale of Eid ul Fitr.

What a month, hey? And what a city to spend it in. While I was eating my Fat Tuesday pancakes, a colleague teased me about improving the quality and price of the meals that I buy because it is the month of Ramadan, and he can no longer demand his share.

A pretty mundane interaction, right? Except it isn’t.

When I was a kid, I jumped into a public swimming pool with a handful of other kids only to watch everyone else we had found there exit the pool hurriedly. It was somewhere in South Africa before 1994. Lacking the direct experience of my parents who lived through the last of colonialism, I wasn’t prepared.

I thought everywhere was a bit like Dar: A mixed chopped salad, if not a melting pot.

Travel is a great teacher and over time I learned that oases of competent cultural co-existence are not all that common. Dar es Salaam comes with a bit of a story, like all good cities do. “Founded” by Majid Bin Said — if you are comfortable erasing the Africans who already lived there as was the fashion at the time— it has been used as an administrative centre by successive regimes.

I think the arc goes: Locals minding their business, Sultan of Zanzibar, German, British, Tanganyika, finally Tanzania... and maybe one day, the Southern State of the East African Federation and onwards to the United States of Afrika.

Read: Life in Dar es Salaam during Christmas holiday

Up until now, countless people and dozens of cultures have made their way here bringing religious and cultural diversity. This is not a clean and friendly history written by Disney, but somehow over a century and some change we have figured out how to make it work with a bit of grace given to us by Utu.

Considering what it took us to get here — tolerance is a form of sacrifice, of love — it would be unpatriotic of me not to revel in this kaleidoscope of languages and cuisine, music. Hedonism has such an unnecessarily bad rap, you know? In Kiswahili, one of the expressions for actively enjoying life translates into “eating life” — yes, thank you.

Perhaps this is why Professor Doctor Honourable Minister Palamagamba Kabudi told us at excessive length using excessively formal Kiswahili that Singeli music was going to be officially recognised and promoted as a unique Tanzanian cultural product.

It is a brilliant move to recognise and celebrate an art form that is homebrewed out of youth unemployment, world-class drumbeats, disruptive resistance humour, lasciviousness and illegal alcohol.

Definitely not a transparent grab for young urban votes during an election year via the co-optation of a popular genre of music, nope.

In Singeli I hear the offspring of mdundiko and other endangered native genres that have always contrasted with and inspired more “polished” forms like taarab.

After my last sinia of holy day pilau has been devoured, the coloured powder has been washed from my hair and the smell of Catholic incense clears the air in April, it will be my patriotic duty to find a dive bar and lose myself all hot and sweaty in fast songs with louche lyrics. Least I can do for the joie de vivre in the port of peace. See you there?

Elsie Eyakuze is an independent consultant and blogger for The Mikocheni Report; E-mail: [email protected]

South Sudanese soldiers encircled Vice President Riek Machar’s home in the capital, Juba, on Wednesday, and several of his allies were arrested after an armed group loyal to him overran an army base in the country’s north.

Machar, whose political rivalry with President Salva Kiir has previously erupted into full-blown war, warned last month that the dismissal of several of his allies from government positions jeopardised the 2018 peace deal that ended South Sudan’s five-year civil conflict. That war claimed more than 400,000 lives.

While Machar’s struggles have a distinctly South Sudanese post-independence flavour, his predicament is also part of a broader African tradition—where presidents and their deputies often endure relationships defined by suspicion, power struggles, and outright betrayal.

Take Kenya, for instance. Last October, Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua was impeached, marking the first such removal of a deputy president in the country’s history. His alliance with President William Ruto had disintegrated within months, culminating in his ouster just two years after he took on Kenya’s second-most powerful role.

Ironically, Ruto himself endured a famously toxic relationship with his predecessor, former president Uhuru Kenyatta, in the four years before the 2022 elections that propelled him into power.

Sometimes, these rivalries turn deadly. Burkina Faso’s charismatic revolutionary leader, Thomas Sankara, once trusted Blaise Compaoré as his right-hand man.

They had seized power together in a 1983 coup. But Compaoré’s ambitions poisoned their relationship. On October 15, 1987, he orchestrated Sankara’s assassination and took control for himself.

This remains one of Africa’s most infamous cases of a deputy turning against their president.

Read: South Sudan defends detention of Riek Machar allies

Zimbabwe’s case is equally illustrative. Former president Robert Mugabe, Africa’s longest-serving leader, appointed Joice Mujuru—a respected liberation war veteran—as vice president in 2004, seemingly grooming her as his successor.

But as First Lady Grace Mugabe entered the political arena, she sought to sideline Mujuru. In 2014, Grace accused Mujuru of plotting to assassinate Mugabe. The ensuing smear campaign saw Mujuru unceremoniously ejected from the party and her vice presidency.

Then there is Somalia, where former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, who lost re-election in May 2022, maintained a notoriously acrimonious relationship with his deputy, Mahdi Mohamed Guled.

In August 2020, a video surfaced purporting to show the two attempting to strangle each other during a heated press conference.

The story spread like wildfire, and given their well-known enmity, many found it plausible. It later emerged that the video had been doctored—an old political scuffle repackaged for dramatic effect.

For all the dramatic falling-outs, Africa has also had vice presidents who perfected the art of staying out of trouble. Few mastered it as well as Uganda’s Edward Ssekandi, who served as President Yoweri Museveni’s deputy for a decade. If Ssekandi ever disagreed with Museveni, he ensured the public never caught wind of it.

Museveni, who has been known to publicly berate his ministers and prime ministers, never turned his wrath on Ssekandi. Months would pass without Ssekandi making a public appearance, save for the occasional grainy photo on social media of him dancing alone in a dimly lit pub. When his tenure ended, there was no fanfare, no angry statements from his supporters, and no tearful television interviews.

Ssekandi reportedly walked away with a smile—and remains a much-loved figure.

His approach reinforced a crucial African political lesson: to survive as a vice president, one must either master the art of invisibility or wholeheartedly embrace the role of presidential cheerleader, bag-carrier, and flatterer-in-chief.

Of course, sometimes fate intervenes. Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan became president not because of any strategic manoeuvre but because his boss, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, fell gravely ill and died in office in 2010. The lesson? If you’re a VP, luck can be more useful than loyalty.

Then there’s the “sexually transmitted successor” strategy—Kenyan slang for those who ascend by family ties. Equatorial Guinea’s Vice President, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, enjoys a seemingly smooth relationship with his boss—who also happens to be his father, President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.

Read:  South Sudan on edge as cracks emerge in ruling coalition

But beyond individual ambitions and betrayals, structural factors also shape these tensions. At independence, many African states adopted highly centralised systems where presidents wielded near-absolute power. Those who tasted such power grew paranoid about potential rivals. The vice presidency, by design, became a precarious position.

Additionally, many VPs are appointed not out of trust but to appease ethnic, regional, or political constituencies. If a vice president has ambitions of their own, they naturally seek to consolidate power, making them a threat to the boss.

Weak institutions also fuel instability. In some countries, the first lady, first son or daughter, or even the head of state’s personal witch doctor wield more influence than a vice president – and sometimes are the de facto presidents.

When power is informal and succession rules are unclear, chaos follows. This is often exacerbated by the lack of presidential term limits.

This instability has led to dismissals, coups, assassinations, and full-scale wars—none more devastating than South Sudan’s December 2013 conflict, triggered when Kiir first sacked Machar as vice president.

For Machar, history appears to be repeating itself. And if Africa’s past is anything to go by, his latest standoff with Kiir will not be the last chapter in the continent’s long, blood-stained book of presidential-vice presidential rivalries.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. Twitter: @cobbo3

South Sudan’s peace agreement of 2018 may be a victim of failing monitoring mechanisms, a growing consensus among stakeholders shows.

And as regional and international stakeholders scramble to prevent a resurgence of large-scale conflict in South Sudan, the biggest concern now is how to prevent the entire agreement from collapsing.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) this week admitted that the instruments of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), have not worked, especially the security arrangements.

Igad Executive Secretary, Dr Workneh Gebeyehu, observed during the 43rd Extraordinary Summit on Wednesday, that the mechanisms established to oversee security arrangements, such as the Joint Defence Board, have fallen into disuse, and confidence within the Presidency as established by the agreement has been gravely undermined.

"Moreover, progress on critical reforms, including drafting of a new constitution and preparations for elections, remain stalled, casting doubt on the practicality and chances of successfully realising the objectives of the transitional roadmap within the stipulated timelines," said Dr Workneh during the summit held virtually.

South Sudan was unrepresented in the meeting although an official explained that their scheduling requests had clashed with a busy calendar for other leaders in the bloc.

Kenyan President William Ruto and Ugandan counterpart Yoweri Museveni as well as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed were also unable to attend, sending representatives instead. Sudan had earlier suspended cooperation with Igad and had been expected to skip the summit.

The meeting was attended by Djibouti President, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who is the current chair of Igad Heads of State, Somalia president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Ethiopia, Foreign Minister, Dr Gideon Timothewos, Kenya’s National Security Adviser, Dr Monica Juma, Uganda’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs (International Affairs), Henry Oryem Okello.

Read: Igad attempts to cool tensions in South Sudan

Others included; Moussa Faki, the outgoing chairperson of the African Union Commission; Mohamed Abdi Ware, Igad Deputy Executive Secretary, the Igad Special Envoy for South Sudan, Ismail Wais, Joram Biswaro, Special Representative of the chairperson of the African Union Commission in South Sudan and Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in South Sudan.

The summit is being held virtually and will attempt to address concerns that emerged last when a militia clashed with South Sudanese forces in Upper Nile, the eastern state in South Sudan.

That group was linked to First Vice President Riek Machar and his party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO). It saw a number of his allies detained in what authorities said was a “conflict with the law.” Machar himself remains under house arrest.

Kiir, Machar and several other representative of armed groups formed a coalition government known as the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) after Igad mediated a peace deal they signed in 2018. The agreement was known as the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

However, cracks have often emerged among the ranks of the coalition. The TGoNU has been extended three times, the result of failed deadlines set by South Sudan to transition to a formally elected government.

The leaders at the Igad meeting admitted to the growing lack of trust among the Parties to the R-ARCSS, further eroded by recent incidents, and formed a Ministerial Sub-Committee to immediately travel to Juba to assess the situation and initiate an inclusive dialogue among parties.

On Monday, South Sudan President Salva Kiir dismissed three more ministers in the latest Cabinet reshuffle likely to escalate the situation.

In a presidential decree broadcast on TV, Kiir removed Ruben Madol Arol as minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and replaced him with Wek Mamer Kuol, a former deputy Cabinet minister.

Awut Deng Acuil was relieved of her duties as minister of General Education and Instruction, with educationist Kuyok Abol Kuyok set to assume the role.

Joseph Mum Majak was dismissed as minister of Trade and Industry. Both Deng and Madol have held ministerial positions since 2020, while Majak was appointed Trade minister in July 2024.

Read: South Sudan army surrounds Riek Machar’s house, detains allies

The President did not provide reasons for their dismissals. The latest Cabinet purge came in the wake of armed confrontations in Nasir, including an attack on a United Nations aircraft, which resulted in the deaths of UN personnel and dozens of soldiers on March 7.

The continued conflict in Nasir, Upper Nile State between the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) and the White Army militias has the potential of spreading to other areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposing (SPLM-IO).

Dr Workneh said the developments in Nasir serve as a critical indicator of the nation’s vulnerability to violence, despite the capital Juba maintaining an outward semblance of calm.

“The latest outbreak of violence, compounded by the detention of prominent opposition figures and a widening political divide in the capital Juba, has provoked grave concern across the region,” he said.

The SPLM-IO military and political figures arrested last week included Gabriel Duop Lam, Co-Chair of the Joint Defence Board and Deputy Chief of the SSPDF, as well as senior government officials Puot Kang, Minister of Petroleum, and Stephen Par Kuol, Minister of Peacebuilding (who has since been released).

As things stand, Igad’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) has been unable to enforce the ceasefire. There has been fighting in SPLM-IO controlled areas such as Upper Nile, Abyei, Twic, Western Equatoria and Jonglei.

While eight people out of the 21 people who were arrested together with the Minister of Petroleum, Puot Kang Chol have since been released, the SPLM-IO cadres within the SSPDF remain restless over fear of arrest.

SSPDF spokesperson Major General Lul Ruai Koang announced midweek that several SPLM-IO military personnel that had been integrated into the SSPDF have deserted and gone into hiding. Appeals by the army leadership for their return to work have not been obeyed.

Rajab Mohandis, a civil rights activist and member of the People’s Coalition for Civil Action, said that the appeal is likely to be ignored because the detentions, coupled with the heavy security deployment around Dr Riek Machar’s residence, signal a deliberate targeting of SPLM-IO figures. That, he argued, erodes any semblance of trust in the government’s security apparatus.

Read: Uganda says special forces deploy in Juba amid tensions

“It is naïve to expect officers who have seen their superiors detained under murky circumstances to simply return to work under the assurances of the same institution that facilitated those arrests.

‘The precedent suggests that compliance may not guarantee safety; instead, it may expose them to the same fate as their detained colleagues,” said Mr Mohandis.

South Sudan’s security sector remains deeply fractured along political and ethnic lines, with trust in state institutions low. The National Security Service (NSS) confirmed plans for further arrests, reinforcing the perception that political and military purges are underway.

The biggest challenge is the inability to unify the armed groups in line with the R-ARCSS provisions. The agreement had provided that 83,000 Necessary Unified Forces had to be completed by May 2019, eight months after the signing. Six years down the line, only 53,000 forces have been graduated, but most lack basic arms.

Mr Mohandis says that instead of being unified, the forces continue to fight among themselves, while those from the opposition continue to face arrests and detention, “showing that unification is a lost cause, symbolic and cosmetic”.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called for the urgent unification of South Sudanese Security Forces as the fundamental pillar in the 2018 peace agreement.

“The delays in implementing this aspect of the agreement have contributed to uncertainty and insecurity,” Mohamud said during the summit of Igad, adding that continued engagement between President Salava Kiir and Dr Machar is vital for national unity and the full implementation of the peace process.

“Peace South Sudan stands at a crossroads. It can either continue down a path of division, conflict, and suffering, or it can choose peace, reconciliation, and national unity,” he said.

The Igad Secretariat recommended six measures to be taken immediately in order to restore peace in South Sudan, top of which was to release detained leaders.

Sudan says it will block entry of all Kenyan goods in the latest protest against Nairobi’s dalliance with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group that has been fighting the army since April 2023.

The decision was rendered in a decree issued by Omar Ahmed Mohamed Ali, the acting minister for Trade and Finance of Sudan, halting all imports from Kenya through all ports, border crossings, airports and entry points.

It came after the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, for the first time, pronounced itself against the idea of forming a parallel government as declared by the RSF recently.

Sudan said the decision was made to safeguard Sudan’s “supreme interests and strengthen national security” citing Kenya’s alleged hosting of militia leaders and their allies, as well as its support for their meetings and activities—an apparent reference to armed groups opposing the Sudanese government.

The Sudanese market depends on Kenyan products such as tea, coffee, food items, and some industrial goods. In good times, Sudan bought about $37 million of Kenyan tea although that figure dropped in wartime to $18 million in 2024. The move could lead to price increases for certain goods in Sudan, even as Kenyan direct exports to Sudan may be affected.

Read: Kenya urges Sudanese rivals to join RSF coalition

However, Sudan could yet use Kenyan tea via Egypt or Gulf countries, two regions that also buy most of the Kenyan tea via the Mombasa Tea Auction, before blending and reselling. Sudan’s porous borders may also mean the goods barred from entry may yet find a way into Sudan.

However, Sudan was using trade only as the latest tool in the box, having lobbied the international community to help condemn RSF moves.

This week, the 15-member African Union Peace and Security Council, which had taken weeks to comment on the issue, finally agreed on a statement on March 11, warning that any attempts to back a parallel administration could break up Sudan.

The Council issued a press statement in which it rejected and condemned the recent announcement of parallel government by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its affiliated political and social forces in Nairobi.

The RSF has been fighting the Sudanese military government since April 2023, resulting in more than 30,000 deaths and 12 million displaced people.

Sudan itself is suspended from the AU activities, but the AU top organ in charge of peace and security decisions said it still wants to treat Khartoum using the norms of the AU.

“The Council does not recognise the purported parallel government or entity in the Republic of Sudan,” said the press release after the Council’s 1264th meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Rebel movement

The Council called on all AU member states and the international community not to recognise any parallel government or entity seeking to partition and govern any part of the territory of the Republic of Sudan or its institutions.

Read: Kenya wobbles on Sudan peace plan after criticism

It called on all member states and the international community to refrain from recognising and/or providing support to any armed or political group toward the establishment of a parallel government or state entity in the Republic of Sudan.

The RSF and some 18 other allied movements, three weeks ago, signed a charter establishing a government of ‘Peace and Unity' in Nairobi, a development that has put the Kenyan government under international radar for allowing a rebel movement to establish a parallel government in its soil.

Initially, the Kenya government said that Kenya's actions were in line with its broader role in peace negotiations and its commitment to supporting Sudan in finding a resolution to its ongoing political crisis.

Kenyan Prime Cabinet Secretary, also the Foreign Affairs and Diaspora Cabinet Secretary, Musalia Mudavadi had maintained that it was following through its tradition of facilitating peace agreements in the region, including the 2004 Somalia peace process and the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi in 2005.

However, the Kenya government has since gone slow on its support for the parallel government, especially after President William Ruto faced a series of criticisms due to his closeness with the RSF leader Muhamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemedti.’.

The African Union said that it is committed to the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan, while pursuing peaceful resolution of the conflict that began in April 2023, and which has created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis causing the displacement of over 12 million Sudanese civilians.

Read: RSF struggles to build coalition unity as Sudan war raises humanitarian spectre

“[The] Council reaffirmed the AU unwavering commitment to continue to collaborate with all Sudanese stakeholders towards finding viable and durable solutions towards silencing the guns permanently in Sudan, based on the AU Roadmap for the Resolution of the Conflict in Sudan, which was adopted by the PSC at the Heads of State and Government level on 27th May 2023,” says the press released.

Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the council’s position, saying that it reflects the principles of Pan-Africanism and respects both the AU Constitutive Act and the UN Charter on the preservation of state sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and the rejection of interference in the internal affairs of states.

“Sudan renews its appreciation for these clear positions that are consistent with international law, which constitute strong support to the Sudanese people and their national institutions in defending their sovereignty, unity, dignity, and independence,” the ministry said in its consequent press release.

Kenya’s tea exports to Sudan have diminished further as conflict rages in the Horn of African country. And as it is, that war is reflecting heavily on Kenya’s sales at the Mombasa Tea Auction.

On Thursday, Sudan’s military government said it will no longer allow Kenyan tea, coffee and other products onto its territory, a protest against Nairobi’s hosting of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group that has been fighting the Sudanese army since 2023.

A dispatch from the Sudanese military government’s Ministry of Trade and Supplies said: “Sudan decides to halt all imports from Kenya via airports, seaports and land borders, effective immediately.”

Tea had been Kenya’s biggest export to Sudan, earning some $37 million in 2022 before the war. However, after violence that figure has been dropping every year. In 2023, the year of war, Kenya sold $29.6 million worth of tea. The figure dropped to $18 million in 2024.

Officials at the Mombasa Tea Auction said this week the Sudan war is a general reflection of lower sales, indicating how security affects businesses in the region.

Despite market challenges, Kenya recorded a total of $1.65 billion earnings from tea representing a nine percent increase from the marketed value of $1.39 billion recorded in 2023, overall.

However, the war in Sudan, economic restrictions in Iran, security issues in Iraq, economic turmoil in Pakistan and a political issue in Chad are continual threats for the sector this year.

In the Kenya Tea Industry Performance Report 2024 by Kenya Tea Board (KTB), shows sales to Sudan dropped the biggest among traditional big markets, as a result of conflicts.

There are fears of more losses this year following diplomatic issues with Kenya. Sudanese authorities did not say for how long the ban would remain in place.

However, diplomatic sources had already told The EastAfrican Kenya no longer backs a parallel government in Sudan and would only encourage Sudanese entities to hold dialogue to achieve political solution.

Read: Kenya urges Sudanese rivals to join RSF coalition

In 2024, Kenya tea was shipped to 96 export destinations, compared to 92 in 2023. Pakistan maintained its position as the leading export destination for Kenya tea, having imported 206.27 million kilos, which accounted for 34.7 percent of the total export volume.

Early this month, Kenya’s tea exporters voiced concern about potential blowback from Sudan. The Sudanese government described Kenya’s hosting of RSF, the group which its forces have been fighting in a civil war since March 2023, as an act of hostility against the Sudanese people, vowing to take all necessary measures to redress the balance including banning Kenya tea.

Sudan is ranked among the top 10 markets for Kenyan tea and the standoff could mean a decline in exports to Sudan, impacting trade.

The report published this week noted Chad as an emerging market for direct imports from Kenya. Prior to the war, landlocked Chad would get its import supplies from Sudan.

“Due to the blockage of trade routes from Sudan, Chad has now shifted to Nigeria and Cameroon as alternative import transshipment routes,” read the report.

The European Union is expected to sanction nine individuals in connection with violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, two EU diplomats said on Friday.

They did not identify the people set to be listed, in keeping with the practice of not revealing such details before the sanctions are officially approved. EU foreign ministers are expected to approve the sanctions in Brussels next Monday.

Rebels of the M23 group have seized east Congo’s two biggest cities since January in an escalation of a long-running conflict rooted in the spillover into Congo of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and the struggle for control of Congo’s vast mineral resources.

Congo is currently considering whether to send representatives to peace talks with the M23 group that Angola plans to host next week, government sources said on Thursday.

Rwanda is accused of backing the Tutsi-led M23 rebels, a charge it denies.

Read: UN peacekeepers deployed in DRC to counter new wave of violence

The EU summoned the ambassador of Rwanda last month, calling on the country to “immediately withdraw” troops from Congolese territory and to “stop supporting the M23 and any other armed group”.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has also said that the 27-nation bloc will review its agreement with Rwanda over critical raw materials due to the country’s links with the M23 rebels. Rwanda denies providing arms and troops to M23 rebels.

Congo’s government has said at least 7,000 people have died in the fighting since January. At least 600,000 people have been displaced by the fighting since November, according to the UN humanitarian affairs office.

Tanzania’s efforts to lure investors to its upstream oil and gas prospects have received lukewarm reception over the past four years, raising concerns even as peers in the region auction more blocks.

And as the country prepares to auction 26 offshore blocks in May, some energy experts are blaming snail pace progress on the $42 billion Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project for hindering new exploration ventures.

The Tanzanian project is to be developed by multinationals Shell PLC and Norway’s Equinor ASA as lead partners and participating interest from the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), the result of an MoU signed in January 2021.

The industry welcomed this development as a bold move by the then new Samia Suluhu Hassan presidency, aiming to kick start the stalled project and open up the country’s upstream sector for new investments.

At a recent investor briefing in India, Energy minister Doto Mashaka Biteko said parties to the LNG project are hammering out final tax incentives due June this year. However, the project’s implementation and host government agreements, are still pending.

Read: The hassle of keeping Dar moving on clean energy

Last week, during the 11th East African Petroleum Conference and Exhibition (EAPCE) in Dar es Salaam, Dr Biteko said the project is moving forward and all milestones will be achieved once ongoing negotiations are completed, leading to the final investment decision.

Government officials speaking on condition of anonymity say the previously set FID date of 2025 is now out of reach, and the timelines have been moved to 2028, which pushes LNG production start to 2032, at the earliest – and this has had a ripple effect on future oil and gas exploration efforts.

At recent international conferences, Tanzania had been promoting its offshore oil and gas blocks in the Indian Ocean and Lake Tanganyika as holding high prospects. But investors have not responded to bid for the advertised exploration areas.

One reason, officials admit is rising pressure against fossil fuels.

Dr Hussein Ali Mwinyi, the President of Zanzibar, told an audience in Dar es Salaam that the primary bottleneck for development of the petroleum and industry in the east African region was funding while global activists intensify opposition to fossil fuel projects as credit agencies increasingly hesitant to support such initiatives.

“The traditional financiers that Africa has relied on for decades are withdrawing their support particularly in Africa, citing climate change concerns as the primary reason,” said Mwinyi at the conference last week.

“On the utilisation part, the need for implementing more cross-border oil and gas infrastructure cannot be overstated. Through this infrastructure, the region can efficiently harness the petroleum resources for the greater good of the Partner States.”

During the 10th EAPCE in Kampala in May 2023, Tanzania’s Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Energy Felchesmi Mramba pitched the same exploration areas, stating that they would be auctioned before the end of that year. That did not happen.

Read: Tanzania, investors begin talks on gas production

According to Nj Ayuk, the executive chairman of the African Energy Chamber (AEC) – a vocal and agile lobby for the industry – Tanzania’s struggles to auction the new acreage are a result of the country’s fiscal terms which are heavily steeped against investors.

“And the bureaucrats are slow,” he said.

“I saw the agenda of a Tanzanian energy conference held a couple of months ago, and the blocks being pitched were exactly the same as in 2022,” said Marc Howard, a London-based energy consultant who advises multinationals seeking investments in eastern and southern Africa.

“It is a shame because the nearshore gas plays have done really well but I feel that the Tanzania LNG project needs to move to encourage other investors,” he added, explaining that firms drilling offshore in Mauritania, as well, have seen prospects come to nothing from blocks thought highly prospective.

“But sometimes out of nowhere you get these incredibly fast developments that start producing swiftly,” Mr Howard said.

In January 2022, Tanzania’s national oil company TPDC hired UK law firm Baker Botts as transaction adviser for the government negotiation team in the LNG Project.

In June 2022, TPDC signed a framework agreement with Equinor and Shell to pave the way for the construction of the LNG export terminal.

This was done to reverse the effect on the industry that Tanzania’s fifth President John Pombe Magufuli created when he set out to introduce laws and renegotiate the fiscal terms with foreign companies operating in Tanzania’s extractives resources space.

The Magufuli changes were aimed at resource nationalisation as it saw taxes hiked and forced investors to commit to a degree of local ownership by listing on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange. The regime also set out to review production sharing agreements and host government agreements with gas investors.

Dr Mwinyi admitted that these projects can be bureaucratic, lengthy and cumbersome, deterring potential investors who may lack the patience or resources for protracted negotiations and approvals.

“We should do more licensing rounds and participate in roadshows and conferences to aggressively promote investment in the petroleum upstream operations. Through more exploration, we will enhance oil and gas discoveries in the region to be one of the contributing players on the global stage,” said President Mwinyi.

In fact, Tanzania is not unique to these problems. East African countries have generally found it difficult to attract investors in the oil and gas sector due to the labour-intensive nature, poor funding as well as lack of political good will that such projects need.

Financing for energy ventures is often in hard currency, while energy services are paid for in local currencies, creating a currency mismatch in forex fluctuations, experts say.

Tanzania, Uganda and South Sudan and, lately, Kenya having all discovered large deposits of oil and gas, investment in these sectors is slow.

Kenya has been marketing 10 blocks in Lamu and Anza basins at the Coast. Tanzania and Uganda have also planned the East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) from Hoima in Lake Albert region, Uganda to the Tanzanian port city of Tanga as a landmark cross-border infrastructure project. 

Read: Uganda’s funding headache for Eacop, SGR projects

It has struggled to ward off opposition from environmental activists who have gone on to lobby oil majors and financiers to turn their eyes away from the project.

“There are several factors why energy projects do not attract many investors. We don’t have robust energy policies. We lack policies that encourage investment,” said Dr Geoffrey Aori Mabea, executive officer of the Regional Association of Energy Regulators for Eastern and Southern Africa (RAE-RESA).

“Energy investment is quite expensive. It is costly and time consuming. And so if the energy projects do not align with the initiatives of the energy transition, then we do not have development partners ready to support those initiatives.”

Continentally, Africa attracts only three percent of global energy investment funds, far below what is needed to reach sustainable development targets and universal energy access by 2030.

Dr Mabea cited the political risks, and unfavourable assessment reports from the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) as factors denying investment in the sector.

“Getting these development partners, the lead time is very long. Because of underlying risks such as political risks and also what we are going through in Kenya, the borrowing capacity of a country is very low,” said Dr Mabea.

Tanzania’s reserves of 57.54 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that can be used for households, electricity generation, heating for industries and powering of vehicles, could be a boon for the country and region.

In May 2021, Kenya and Tanzania inked a $1.1 billion deal for a gas pipeline project between the coastal town of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, around the same time Uganda and Tanzania agreed to undertake a feasibility study to develop a gas pipeline between the two countries.

Both Kenya and Uganda are off takers of Tanzania’s gas, but the slow progress of the LNG development could see the countries turn to other sources.

Ugandan power utility Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL) has started converting its heavy fuel oil plants to gas-fired power plants to make electricity cheaper and also push the country’s energy transition to clean sources.

George Mutitweka, the UEGCL chief operations officer says the firm is looking at different options, including Uganda’s own upstream oil projects Tilenga and Kingfisher, the country’s planed refinery, Rwanda gas from Lake Kivu and Tanzania’s LNG as well as producers in the Gulf the potential sources.

“LNG has a lower carbon footprint than HFO (Heavy Fuel Oil), but it will all come down to the least cost and available option to us,” he said.

Tanzania made the first onshore natural gas discovery at Songo Songo Island in 1974 followed by Mnazi Bay in 1982, Mkuranga in 2008, Ruvu in 2017, and Ruvuma in 2018, amounting to 10.41 trillion cubic feet of gas in place.

The country has since developed Songo Songo and Mnazi Bay gas fields, which are producing gas for power generation, industries, households and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) for vehicles, since 2004 and 2006 respectively.

Read: Tanzania’s gas boom that never was – when local hopes are dashed by global realities

With significant deep sea gas discoveries amounting to 47.13 trillion cubic feet of gas between 2010 and 2014, Tanzania stood out as the region’s leader, boasting the largest natural gas reserves.

Currently, the government and international oil companies Shell and Equinor – as the lead investors while Ophir, Pavilion, and ExxonMobil are minor partners – are finalising negotiating the host government agreement for developing the discovered natural gas for domestic use and export.

In September last year, Omani energy conglomerate ARA Petroleum was awarded a 25-year license for the development of Tanzania’s 3.5 trillion cubic feet Ntorya gas field, the largest onshore project in the southern highlands of Tanzania.

Investments in renewable energy are capital-intensive and require specialised skills to manage. It is estimated that Africa needs between US$ 1 and US$2 trillion to meet the clean energy transition targets by 2030,” said Tanzanian Vice President, Dr Philip Mpango, at the conference.

“In response, Tanzania has implemented policies and programmes to encourage investment in renewable energy, as manifested by the current status where renewable sources take the lead in the energy mix.”

South Sudan’s peace agreement of 2018 may be a victim of failing monitoring mechanisms, a growing consensus among stakeholders shows.

And as regional and international stakeholders scramble to prevent a resurgence of large-scale conflict in South Sudan, the biggest concern now is how to prevent the entire agreement from collapsing.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad) this week admitted that the instruments of the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), have not worked, especially the security arrangements.

Igad Executive Secretary, Dr Workneh Gebeyehu, observed during the 43rd Extraordinary Summit on Wednesday, that the mechanisms established to oversee security arrangements, such as the Joint Defence Board, have fallen into disuse, and confidence within the Presidency as established by the agreement has been gravely undermined.

"Moreover, progress on critical reforms, including drafting of a new constitution and preparations for elections, remain stalled, casting doubt on the practicality and chances of successfully realising the objectives of the transitional roadmap within the stipulated timelines," said Dr Workneh during the summit held virtually.

South Sudan was unrepresented in the meeting although an official explained that their scheduling requests had clashed with a busy calendar for other leaders in the bloc.

Kenyan President William Ruto and Ugandan counterpart Yoweri Museveni as well as Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed were also unable to attend, sending representatives instead. Sudan had earlier suspended cooperation with Igad and had been expected to skip the summit.

The meeting was attended by Djibouti President, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who is the current chair of Igad Heads of State, Somalia president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Ethiopia, Foreign Minister, Dr Gideon Timothewos, Kenya’s National Security Adviser, Dr Monica Juma, Uganda’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs (International Affairs), Henry Oryem Okello.

Read: Igad attempts to cool tensions in South Sudan

Others included; Moussa Faki, the outgoing chairperson of the African Union Commission; Mohamed Abdi Ware, Igad Deputy Executive Secretary, the Igad Special Envoy for South Sudan, Ismail Wais, Joram Biswaro, Special Representative of the chairperson of the African Union Commission in South Sudan and Nicholas Haysom, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in South Sudan.

The summit is being held virtually and will attempt to address concerns that emerged last when a militia clashed with South Sudanese forces in Upper Nile, the eastern state in South Sudan.

That group was linked to First Vice President Riek Machar and his party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO). It saw a number of his allies detained in what authorities said was a “conflict with the law.” Machar himself remains under house arrest.

Kiir, Machar and several other representative of armed groups formed a coalition government known as the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) after Igad mediated a peace deal they signed in 2018. The agreement was known as the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS).

However, cracks have often emerged among the ranks of the coalition. The TGoNU has been extended three times, the result of failed deadlines set by South Sudan to transition to a formally elected government.

The leaders at the Igad meeting admitted to the growing lack of trust among the Parties to the R-ARCSS, further eroded by recent incidents, and formed a Ministerial Sub-Committee to immediately travel to Juba to assess the situation and initiate an inclusive dialogue among parties.

On Monday, South Sudan President Salva Kiir dismissed three more ministers in the latest Cabinet reshuffle likely to escalate the situation.

In a presidential decree broadcast on TV, Kiir removed Ruben Madol Arol as minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs and replaced him with Wek Mamer Kuol, a former deputy Cabinet minister.

Awut Deng Acuil was relieved of her duties as minister of General Education and Instruction, with educationist Kuyok Abol Kuyok set to assume the role.

Joseph Mum Majak was dismissed as minister of Trade and Industry. Both Deng and Madol have held ministerial positions since 2020, while Majak was appointed Trade minister in July 2024.

Read: South Sudan army surrounds Riek Machar’s house, detains allies

The President did not provide reasons for their dismissals. The latest Cabinet purge came in the wake of armed confrontations in Nasir, including an attack on a United Nations aircraft, which resulted in the deaths of UN personnel and dozens of soldiers on March 7.

The continued conflict in Nasir, Upper Nile State between the South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) and the White Army militias has the potential of spreading to other areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposing (SPLM-IO).

Dr Workneh said the developments in Nasir serve as a critical indicator of the nation’s vulnerability to violence, despite the capital Juba maintaining an outward semblance of calm.

“The latest outbreak of violence, compounded by the detention of prominent opposition figures and a widening political divide in the capital Juba, has provoked grave concern across the region,” he said.

The SPLM-IO military and political figures arrested last week included Gabriel Duop Lam, Co-Chair of the Joint Defence Board and Deputy Chief of the SSPDF, as well as senior government officials Puot Kang, Minister of Petroleum, and Stephen Par Kuol, Minister of Peacebuilding (who has since been released).

As things stand, Igad’s Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) has been unable to enforce the ceasefire. There has been fighting in SPLM-IO controlled areas such as Upper Nile, Abyei, Twic, Western Equatoria and Jonglei.

While eight people out of the 21 people who were arrested together with the Minister of Petroleum, Puot Kang Chol have since been released, the SPLM-IO cadres within the SSPDF remain restless over fear of arrest.

SSPDF spokesperson Major General Lul Ruai Koang announced midweek that several SPLM-IO military personnel that had been integrated into the SSPDF have deserted and gone into hiding. Appeals by the army leadership for their return to work have not been obeyed.

Rajab Mohandis, a civil rights activist and member of the People’s Coalition for Civil Action, said that the appeal is likely to be ignored because the detentions, coupled with the heavy security deployment around Dr Riek Machar’s residence, signal a deliberate targeting of SPLM-IO figures. That, he argued, erodes any semblance of trust in the government’s security apparatus.

Read: Uganda says special forces deploy in Juba amid tensions

“It is naïve to expect officers who have seen their superiors detained under murky circumstances to simply return to work under the assurances of the same institution that facilitated those arrests.

‘The precedent suggests that compliance may not guarantee safety; instead, it may expose them to the same fate as their detained colleagues,” said Mr Mohandis.

South Sudan’s security sector remains deeply fractured along political and ethnic lines, with trust in state institutions low. The National Security Service (NSS) confirmed plans for further arrests, reinforcing the perception that political and military purges are underway.

The biggest challenge is the inability to unify the armed groups in line with the R-ARCSS provisions. The agreement had provided that 83,000 Necessary Unified Forces had to be completed by May 2019, eight months after the signing. Six years down the line, only 53,000 forces have been graduated, but most lack basic arms.

Mr Mohandis says that instead of being unified, the forces continue to fight among themselves, while those from the opposition continue to face arrests and detention, “showing that unification is a lost cause, symbolic and cosmetic”.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called for the urgent unification of South Sudanese Security Forces as the fundamental pillar in the 2018 peace agreement.

“The delays in implementing this aspect of the agreement have contributed to uncertainty and insecurity,” Mohamud said during the summit of Igad, adding that continued engagement between President Salava Kiir and Dr Machar is vital for national unity and the full implementation of the peace process.

“Peace South Sudan stands at a crossroads. It can either continue down a path of division, conflict, and suffering, or it can choose peace, reconciliation, and national unity,” he said.

The Igad Secretariat recommended six measures to be taken immediately in order to restore peace in South Sudan, top of which was to release detained leaders.

Kenya Airways (KQ) has been forced to review the status of its 41.23 percent shareholding in Precision Air Services Plc as the Tanzanian subsidiary faced mounting financial troubles.

With total liabilities exceeding total assets, the resulting negative shareholder equity signals a bad state of financial health for Precision Air, reducing the possibility of the Kenyan national carrier recovering the money invested in it.

Kenya Airways chief executive Allan Kilavuka said they are reviewing their investment in Precision Air in line with the overall turnaround plan for KQ.

“Our investment in Precision Air is not merely about short-term financial results but about ensuring long-term connectivity, job creation and economic opportunity for the regions it serves,” Mr Kilavuka told The EastAfrican in an emailed response to our query. “As the national airline, we have a clear turnaround strategy that is already yielding positive results, and we are applying the same disciplined approach to assessing the best path forward for Precision Air.”

A decision will mostly come after consultations with KQs’ own stakeholders, regulators and experts. But Kilavuka argued financial prudence will be the key guide, besides the desire to support easier air connectivity in the region.

It is a decision Kenya Airways has been forced into after facing the possibility of losing its entire investment in the Tanzanian subsidiary valued at around Tsh1.32 billion ($498,383).

Years of accumulated losses and mounting debts have eroded the subsidiary’s shareholders’ equity, pushing it into a state of technical insolvency. Precision Air’s hopes of survival now hinge largely on successful debt restructuring negotiations with bankers and creditors.

And KQ, which is also weighed down by depleted working capital and shareholder equity balances, risks losing its entire investment in Precision Air should the troubled subsidiary be liquidated. KQ is itself trying to reclaim its financial footing following years of its own accumulated losses and debts.

“A negative shareholder equity points to either a history of accumulated losses, high level of debt and significant asset depreciation. In the case of Precision Air, the airline has been suffering from swelling accumulated losses. As such, the airline has faced cash flow issues as well as legal issues related to debt, thereby affecting operations,” said Melodie Gatuguta, a research associate for banking at Standard Investment Bank.

“With regard to the airline as an investment to KQ, if the firm were to liquidate, KQ may receive little to no return on its investments. In addition, if KQ is interested in exiting its position, it may find it difficult to lock in prospective buyers with regards to valuation,” she added.

Shareholder equity refers to how much money a company has after subtracting all its expenses and debts. A negative shareholder equity arises when a company owes more money to investors than its assets can cover.

A negative shareholder equity is often a bad sign since it means the company has not only been losing money, but has lost more money than its owners have put into the company in the first place.

“Precision Air can turn around its operations and return to profitability, there may still be opportunities for recovery and growth,” said Ms Gatuguta.

“In the event of liquidation of Precision Air, equity holders will be paid last. They will pay banks and suppliers before shareholders,” said Ken Gichinga, a Chief Economist at Mentoria Economics.

Read: Kenya Airways, Precision Air seek waiver extension of competition rules

Precision Air fell into a net loss of Tsh57.38 billion ($21.66 million) in 2023 from a net profit of Tsh5.91 billion ($2.23 million) in 2022. Its negative working capital deteriorated to Tsh537.5 billion from Tsh485.9 billion in the same period.

Its total liabilities exceeded total assets resulting in a shareholders’ deficit position of Tsh491.2 billion ($185.45 million) a worse off position compared to a shareholders’ deficit position of Tsh433.8 billion ($163.78 million) in 2022.

Precision Air was financed by loans totalling to Tsh435.3 billion ($164.35 million) in 2023 up from Tsh398 billion ($150.27 million) in 2022, and these loans have been classified as current due to breach of agreements.

“The group and company also defaulted on their debt obligations as stipulated in the debt agreements resulting in debts amounting to Tsh435.3 billion ($164.35 million) being due on demand,” Precision Air said in its annual report (2023).

“Because of this default, the inability of the group and company to generate cash that would be sufficient to settle arrears and instalment payments as per the debt agreements and the on-going discussions with the lenders on possible rescheduling of the borrowings, there is no reliable basis for developing a reliable liquidity risk profile for borrowings,” it added.

Kenya Airways acquired a minority 49 percent shareholding in Precision Air in 2003. Precision Air would be listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange in December 2011, with a total of 7,056 investors participating in the initial public offering (IP0). The IPO sold 16 percent stake in Precision Air to the public diluting KQ’s shareholding to 41 percent.

Currently, KQ’s investments in Precision Air is valued at around Tsh1.32 billion ($498,383) for a 41.23 percent stake according to Precision Air’s annual report.

KQ is the second largest shareholder in Precision Air after the estate of the late Tanzanian Michael Shirima, which owns the majority 42.91 percent shareholding. The public holds the remaining 15.86 percent of the shares.

“Both airlines (KQ and Precision Air) are grappling with negative equity due to prolonged losses, heavy debt burdens and pandemic-related disruptions. Despite a rebound in passenger demand, accumulated deficits still outweigh assets, reflecting the financial strain,” said Ngugi Waweru, a research analyst at Faida Investment Bank. “For investors, negative shareholder equity raises concerns. For instance, with a negative equity position, it is unlikely for the airlines to pay dividends as profits (if any), which must go towards rebuilding equity and servicing debt.”

Precision Air said it will continue focusing on improving profitability and liquidity to ensure it remains competitive in the market with a key focus on pursuing restructuring of the aircraft loan facility and entire balance sheet and continuous engagement of creditors to agree on payment plans based on the paying ability of the company and in line with projected cash flows.

Precision Air has invested in two subsidiaries—Precision Handling Ltd and Precise Systems Ltd—both of which are dormant, with their investments impaired to the tune of Tsh1 billion ($377,563) and Tsh10 million ($3,775.63), respectively.

Kenya’s Cabinet has approved a proposal by saccos to integrate into the national payment system (NPS) in a move aimed at reducing over-reliance on bank loans and taking over financial products and services currently offered by banks such as cheque books, foreign currency trading, Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) and Electronic Funds Transfers (EFTs).

“In a bid to enhance the stability, efficiency and competitiveness of Kenya’s Savings and Credit Co-operatives (Saccos), the Cabinet has approved amendments to the Sacco Societies Act, 2008. The proposed reforms, outlined in the Sacco Societies (Amendment) Bill, 2023—now before parliament —aim to modernise financial and technological operations, particularly benefitting smaller saccos,” the Cabinet said in memo dated March 11.

“Key reforms include a Sacco Shared Services Framework, allowing the financial institutions to pool resources, adopt fintech solutions, and enhance cooperation, while maintaining operational independence. A Central Liquidity Facility will facilitate inter-sacco transactions, short-term lending, and participation in the National Payment System, while a centralised data repository will improve regulatory oversight and efficiency.”

The approval provides a big boost to the on-going amendments to the Sacco Societies Act, 2008 that will see the Saccos integrated in the National Payment System and eventual leading to the implementation of a Central Liquidity Facility (CLF)—an equivalent of the interbank money market— where saccos will be able to lend to each to offset their liquidity positions.

The amendments to the Sacco Act has created provisions for effecting of the CLF where saccos can lend and borrow money from one another thereby severing ties with commercial banks whose loans are considered ‘expensive.’

Read: Kenyan saccos join National Payment System to lower cost of credit

Under the new plan saccos will run their own inter-Sacco market where they can lend and borrow from each other at reasonable rates to offset their financial positions.

The inability for saccos to directly integrate with the National payments System (NPS) has caused these societies to rely on banks and third parties (fintechs) for integration to the larger financial eco-system through arrangements that are unfavourable and expensive to saccos members.

They also lack State-backed mechanisms for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) and are left to individually make contingency plans with commercial lenders which is very expensive.

The Sacco Society Regulatory Authority (SASRA) has been pushing for the formation of a Sacco Societies Shared Services Platform, with the capability of enabling saccos to provide Technology and Central Liquidity Facility services as well as enabling Saccos to participate in the National and International Payment System.

In 2019 the sacco regulator in consultation with the National Treasury and with the financial support from development partners, commissioned a study to determine the feasibility and viability of establishing and operationalising a sacco shared services model in Kenya.

The study also included a technical review of the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework to guide the establishment of any shared services by saccoss.

The study recommended formation of a Sacco Shared Service organisation (SASO), similar to the Credit Union Shared Organisation (CUSO) — commonly in Northern America, US and Canada— in order to undertake the various common or shared services for member saccos.

The SASO or Sacco Central seeks to promote financial stability and competitiveness of member saccos by providing a CLF, a shared technology platform, and appropriate payment solutions.

The Sacco Central was registered as a Secondary Co-operative in June 2022 and was inaugurated on April 15, 2023 with initial membership of 55 saccos.

Sources from the sacco sector say the integration of the societies into the national payments system would be a game changer and would improve their competitiveness in the financial sector elevating them to the league of commercial banks.

“Currently we are also members of the Sacco Central. Sacco Central is a body that has been formed to bring together the sacco sector because one of the key weaknesses around the sacco model is that we do not have access to the national payments system and that is why some saccos had attempted to go and buy banks,” said source.

“What we are looking at Sacco Central is to give us direct access to the national payments system and we think that is going to be a game changer. Look at the size of these institutions we are indeed larger than most banks in Kenya.”

Read: Blow to Kenyan banks as Saccos close in on own money market

According to the source there are currently discussions on-going on whether Saccos will access the national payments system through the regulator or through a market driven approach. For instance, banks access the national payments system through their industry lobby the Kenya Bankers Association.

“The discussion in the industry is where to best place it (NPS). Is it to be run through the regulator or to be run through a market driven approach. The banks access the national payments system through KBA so the discussions we are having currently is which model are we going to adopt (regulator or market driven model),” said source

“I think there are still some discussions internally, there is house cleaning to be done so that we can agree on that then probably we can be able to move on but in terms of legislation remember the Sacco Societies (Amendment) Bill, 2023 currently in parliament already takes care of that and takes recognition of the fact there will be a Sacco Central.”

The reforms are expected to position Saccos as key players in Kenya’s financial inclusion and economic empowerment agenda.

Failure to access the national payments system and the clearing house has seen Saccos form partnership with banks to enable them to offer these services at a cost.