As the World Bank and International Monetary Fund host the Spring Meetings in Washington this week, Africa’s development priorities hang in the balance.

With no high-level discussions on climate or gender — issues that are central to the continent’s growth and resilience — the agenda seems increasingly disconnected from the systemic challenges facing African nations. Instead, the focus remains on "Jobs and Macroeconomics," a framing that recalls the failed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 90s.

Under the guise of growth and stability, these policies imposed austerity, deregulation and fiscal cuts that decimated public services, deepened inequality and burdened Africa with unsustainable debt. The current direction threatens to repeat this damaging legacy, while the institutions responsible for financing fossil fuel expansion and undermining climate resilience evade accountability.

In this context, Mission 300, launched at the Africa Energy Summit in Dar es Salaam in January, stands as a critical initiative. Led by the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union, and the government of Tanzania, Mission 300 aims to provide electricity to 300 million people across Africa by 2030.

But ambition without justice is not progress. And promises without integrity are not solutions. The truth is, Mission 300 risks becoming just another top-down, donor-driven project that fails to answer the fundamental question: whose development, on whose terms, and at what cost?

In line with this year’s Spring Meetings’ theme "Jobs and Macroeconomics,” we must critically assess whether Mission 300 will create clean, sustainable jobs that benefit communities across Africa. Will it empower young people in rural Kenya or women in informal settlements in Ghana — or will they be concentrated in urban industrial corridors and foreign contractor payrolls?

According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (Irena), Africa accounts for only 3 percent of global renewable energy jobs, despite its vast potential and growing population. If Mission 300 is to reverse this trend, it must move beyond megaprojects and pipelines, and instead prioritise community-led, decentralised energy systems that generate not just electricity but equitable, decent work rooted in local contexts.

Yet, early indications are troubling. The inclusion of fossil gas as a transitional energy source — backed by the World Bank and reflected in Senegal’s National Energy Compact — is a signal that the same polluting industries responsible for destabilising our climate are being rebranded as part of the solution.

Natural gas may offer short-term job spikes during construction, but these are neither green nor future-proof jobs. Moreover, the International Energy Agency has made it clear that no new oil and gas fields are compatible with net-zero by 2050.

The financing model raises equally serious concerns. Much of the funding promised under Mission 300 comes in the form of concessional loans. Even at a one percent interest rate over 40 years, this is debt — and for a continent where 40 countries face rising debt levels, and at least 19 are at high risk of debt distress, adding more liabilities to public balance sheets to fund fossil-dependent infrastructure is not development — it is exploitation.

African nations sink deeper into debt crisis. Their external debt has reached a staggering $11.4 trillion in 2023. According to a report by Christian Aid, across Africa, 32 countries now spend more on debt than healthcare, with $85 billion paid to external creditors in 2023, projected to increase to $104 billion in 2024.

As debt burdens grow heavier across the continent, the wave of billion-dollar pledges and commitments deserves careful attention.

The Africa Energy Summit generated headlines with pledges of over $5 billion from donors like the Rockefeller Foundation, AIIB, and Islamic Development Bank, but bigger numbers don’t always mean better outcomes.

With over $50 billion now committed to Mission 300, including $48 billion from the AfDB and World Bank by 2030, there is still no public guarantee of how these funds will be deployed.

This lack of transparency and the sidelining of critical climate concerns only amplifies the deeper contradictions within the World Bank/IMF policies and deeply alarms African civil society and vulnerable communities in Africa.

The World Bank committed at the 2023 Annual Meetings in Marrakech to a new mission: A liveable planet, in addition to poverty eradication. This new vision is now marginalised possibly due to fears of withdrawal by the Trump administration, revealing a major contradiction.

Regarding climate finance, Bretton Woods institutions must strengthen their climate financing capacities, particularly in ways that don’t create additional barriers for developing countries. The September 2024 report on MDB’s Joint Report on climate finance shows that MDBs contributed a record $125 billion in 2023.

But these funds often come in the form of debt and non-concessional finance, which limits the fiscal space of developing countries already struggling with climate impacts and high debt levels. There is an urgent need to significantly increase grant-based and highly concessional finance within their portfolios.

Gender has also been sidelined in World Bank discussions for far too long. Despite the Bank’s ambitious Gender Strategy for 2024-30, which promises to prioritise gender equality in global development, the reality remains far removed from these claims. Women’s needs, particularly in vital sectors like energy access, continue to be neglected.

Nearly 900 million people in Africa still rely on harmful biomass for cooking, and the burden falls disproportionately on women. This is not merely a climate or environmental issue— it’s a health crisis, a significant economic vulnerability, and an unaddressed inequality. Reliance on polluting fuels costs $791.4 billion annually, with health-related impacts accounting for $526.3 billion.

The Spring Meetings must be seized as a turning point. While the hopes may be tempered by the complexities and challenges ahead, giving up is worse. Expectations are low, given the history of unfulfilled promises and empty rhetoric. Yet, this moment presents a critical opportunity for African leaders to reject outdated models of debt-driven growth, fossil-fuelled development, and gender-blind planning.

Dr Wafa Misrar is the Campaign and Policy Officer at CAN Africa, and Said Skounti is a researcher at IMAL Initiative.

In Uganda, there is a similarity between this year’s Easter week and that of 1979 – unstable power supply. In 1979, the blackouts were related to an external (military) force entering Uganda; today they are related to an external (business) force exiting Uganda.

The war that removed Uganda’s military government with the overrunning of Kampala on April 11 had started six months earlier in Kagera, the north-western region of Tanzania.

On the eve of Uganda’s Independence Day, October 8, 1978, the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces finally returned the fire to the plundering Uganda Army which had earlier invaded and annexed Kagera region, even provocatively naming a Ugandan district commissioner for it.

In February 1979 as the war advanced northwards on Ugandan soil, the country started experiencing power blackouts. Rumours attributed this to sabotage by Ugandan guerrillas working with Tanzanians to overthrow President Idi Amin.

By the time of the Catholic Centenary in Uganda on February 17, power cuts had become daily. Guests from all over the world including the main celebrant from the Vatican (it was a world Catholic event courtesy of the 22 Uganda Martyrs) had a taste of what celebrating amid wartime darkness is like.

As Amin fled eastwards after losing power on April 11, a new fear arose over the safety of Owen Falls Dam at Jinja and its vital bridge that connects Mombasa/Kenya to Kampala.

For in his last broadcasts over Radio Uganda, he had promised dire consequences should he lose power to invaders and their “unpatriotic collaborators”. However, Amin passed Jinja without blowing up the dam and exited Uganda to exile where he died peacefully 25 years later.

After Amin’s exit that 46 years ago threatened to reduce Uganda’s hydro electricity generation from 150MW to 0, the country’s generation continued deteriorating for two decades, until the Museveni government with partners like HH The Aga Khan got production capacity growing again and has now grown 15 times higher to over 2,000MW.

Partnering with the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Uganda expanded power distribution that had shrunk due to a deteriorating grid network, now 10 times up from 250,000 to now 2.5million connections.

Then this April, with the exit of the CDC-led distribution consortium called Umeme, the long-forgotten power outages returned, hopefully temporarily. But citizens aged 50 and above can relate this Easter season to the power cuts of April 1979 when Amin was exiting.

Read: Uganda scrambles to fund Umeme exit as deadline looms

The power cuts related to the Umeme exit of March 31 could have been due to two or more reasons. First, the expected physical stripping by junior technicians unsure of their jobs under new management could have ‘disappeared’ a few kilometres of wire from the grid and a few thousand litres of transformer oils and other consumables.

Second is the stalled investment in grid maintenance (which should be constant) that must have arisen during the lengthy uncertain transition when the distributor was on the way out.

The replacement —the state agency for whose mandate Umeme had been executing —the Uganda Electricity Distribution and Corporation Ltd (UEDCL) — is subject to government procurement procedures that are lengthy and bureaucratic.

But grid maintenance and expansion are all about procuring transformers, wires, poles and securing passage across thousands of kilometres, period.

Last week UEDCL was engaging the government procurement agency to waive bureaucratic delays, otherwise the vultures that influence public tenders can reverse the gains of grid expansion and consistent power supply backwards by three decades in a short time, aggravating inconsistent lighting this Easter to widespread blackouts by Christmas and total darkness by the time of the general election time next year. We don’t want that, do we?

Buwembo is a Kampala-based journalist. Email: [email protected]

In 1977, Kenya police banned the performance of Ngaahika Ndeenda by Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii. The actors were small-scale farmers and workers in and around Kamirithu Village.

The play, directed by Kimani Gecau, was performed in an open-air makeshift theatre in the middle of the village. Before its stoppage, thousands of people had travelled from afar to watch the play.

The play showed how the church allied with the political class to keep the poor in subjugation. It narrated the story of how ordinary people rose up against British colonialism. It disputed the depiction of African culture as savage.

The play showed that the anti-colonial ideals were the true basis for a more progressive and democratic country. The play utilised the dramatic resources of art to tell its multi-themed story.

The banning of the play was the less harsh response by Jomo Kenyatta’ s regime. Ngugi wa Thiong’o was abducted at night and detained without trial at Kamiti Maximum Security Prison.

Kimani and Mirii evaded a police dragnet and escaped into exile. Later, the police descended on the theatre in Kamirithu and in avenging fury razed it to the ground.

In 2022, Ngaahika Ndeenda was performed at the Kenya National Theatre. I took my Gen-Z daughter and nephew to watch the performance. I listened carefully to their assessment. They remarked on the dramatic and comedic elements.

Neither of them said they were inspired to commandeer a tank to storm government buildings. We emerged from the theatre to find throngs of mostly young people excitedly debating the merits and demerits of the performance.

The play was an artistic experience, not a call to arms. If there was any revolutionary seed planted, it was in their understanding of history, and the hypocrisy of individuals and society.

History has repeated itself. A few days ago, armed Kenya police raided the venue of a secondary schools' drama festival to stop the rehearsal and performance of a play.

Echoes of War by Cleophas Malala was to be performed by Butere Girls School. Police threw tear gas to disperse the girls and reporters.

Echoes of War talks about the cultural and political divide between the older and younger generations. The characters decry bad governance.

Like their real-life Gen-Z counterparts, the characters use social media to criticise bad governance and corruption. In the end, the dictator in the play agrees to listen to his youthful critics, and they all resolve to work together for the good of the country.

Echoes of War, like Ngaahika Ndeenda, does not call for violent rebellion. The play is a simple dramatisation of normal political discourse we have daily on TV and radio. Only fully fledged or fledgling dictatorships can be so thin-skinned.

The violent overreaction even embarrassed the ODM side of the regime. Had the regime allowed the play, we might never have heard of it, and Ruto’s regime would not have dug itself even deeper in the hole of ignominy.

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political and social commentator.

The East African Community (EAC) Council of Ministers is meeting in Arusha this week to discuss issues affecting the region, including the deteriorating security situation in eastern Congo and budgetary constraints hampering the operations of the Secretariat.

The ministers are expected to review the interventions of the joint EAC-SADC (Southern African Development Community) initiatives to restore peace, security and stability in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

A paper from the Secretariat notes that since the start of the year, more than 700,000 people have been displaced in the Congolese provinces of North and South Kivu due to the resurgence of the M23 armed group.

“The resurgence has also worsened the humanitarian situation in the two provinces,” the EAC says.

The ministers will also review the bloc’s financial situation, which has affected the implementation of its mandate and the payment of statutory obligations, including staff salaries.

Read: EAC on the brink: Cash crunch bites as defaults mount

Somalis movement

Meanwhile, Somalia has complained to the Secretariat about the challenges its citizens face when travelling within EAC member states.

Mogadishu says Somali officials, including those holding diplomatic and service passports, face obstacles in obtaining visas in advance, hence hindering their ability to travel and participate fully in regional initiatives.

“In this respect, member states are reminded of their commitment to observe and implement the provisions of the [Common Market] Protocol and to provide reciprocal treatment to citizens of partner states in matters enshrined in the Protocol,” the Secretariat says.

South Sudan's army said it had recaptured a key town in Upper Nile state that it lost to an ethnic Nuer militia in March in clashes which led to the arrest of First Vice President Riek Machar and a spiralling political crisis.

President Salva Kiir has served in an uneasy power-sharing government with Machar since a 2018 peace deal ended a civil war between fighters loyal to the two men which killed hundreds of thousands of people.

Machar's detention under house arrest, for trying to stir up a rebellion through his supposed support for the White Army militia in Upper Nile, has ignited international fears of renewed conflict along ethnic lines.

Spokespeople for the military and White Army, which Machar's party denies backing, said Nasir town was re-captured on Sunday without a fight.

"We were just taking a tactical withdrawal," said Honson Chuol James, White Army spokesperson, adding that 17 people were killed during heavy bombardment of the nearby village of Thuluc.

Army spokesperson Lul Ruai Koang said the military were able to avoid an ambush in Thuluc thanks to close air support.

"They were spotted when they were grouping, and they were fired on, and then they dispersed," Koang said.

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni visited Kiir earlier this month after deploying his army to help secure South Sudan's capital Juba amid the heightened political tensions.

Uganda's military chief Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who is also Museveni's son, claims his troops have since killed 1,500 fighters from the White Army, which fought alongside Machar's forces in the civil war.

Earlier this month Machar's SPLM-IO party appeared to be starting to splinter. One faction declared it had temporarily replaced Machar as party chairman, while the armed wing said it remained loyal to their detained leader.

Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé has many friends in the Great Lakes region. They include Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Congolese counterpart Felix Tshisekedi and Angola’s João Lourenço.

Now it seems these contacts could come in handy, or the friendship will be tested.

This week, he formally took up the position of African Union-backed mediator in the Congolese crisis, where Kinshasa and Kigali have traded barbs over the years.

He made a whirlwind visit to Kinshasa, where he had a face-to-face meeting with President Tshisekedi. Earlier on Wednesday, President Gnassingbé was in Luanda, where he met President Lourenço, the former mediator in the crisis between the DRC and Rwanda.

Gnassingbé is thus taking over from the Angolan Head of State, who is now the AU chairman. Until last week, the Togolese leader hadn’t been a top name on mediation matters. Now, he has come to take the pulse of the Great Lakes conflict and understand the contours of the Luanda Process as led by Angola, which has since been merged with the Nairobi Process led by former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta

“This choice, far from being symbolic, confirms a leadership recognised for its discretion, consistency and effectiveness in the peaceful resolution of conflicts,” the Togolese Presidency said on April 16.

The work will not be easy in this region where diplomatic initiatives are multiplying without ever extinguishing a crisis that has been shaking the region for 31 years now.

First, he has to overcome the rivalries between the parties involved and win the trust of Rwanda, the DRC, the rebels (M23/AFC and other armed groups).

Read: New track for Congo talks? AU proposes Togo leader as new mediator

On his latest visit to the region, he avoided Kigali.

Nicaise Kibel Bel, an expert on military issues in the Great Lakes region, said this should not pose any problem to his mission.

“Everyone knows that the Togolese Head of State has great respect for President Paul Kagame,” he said.

On January 19 this year, Gnassingbé paid a working visit to Kigali, where he signed cooperation agreements with Kagame on agriculture, trade, green financing and energy.

The Togolese president has inherited a task that Mr Kenyatta and Mr Lourenço failed in, not because they did not try, but because they came up against a multifaceted conflict. The first complexity lies in the geographical position of the DRC.

The country belongs to both the SADC and East African Community, as well as to the Community of Central African States and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, organisations with sometimes divergent views and agendas on Congo.

The Congo seems to be opening up more favourably to the SADC, whose armed mission (SAMIDRC) is still on Congolese soil in spite of being ordered to pull out by the bloc’s Summit.

The EAC is seen by Kinshasa as an axis dominated by countries with evil designs against Congo. Rwanda is accused of supporting the M23/AFC with arms and troops.

Speaker of National Assembly Vital Kamerhe and others have also accused Uganda of participating in the aggression against Congo.

This mistrust extends to Kenya, whose president William Ruto is accused of partiality towards the Rwandan president in the conflict with the DRC.

RedRead: Ruto chairs Congo peace facilitators

As chairman of the EAC, Ruto will certainly be one of Gnassingbé’s interlocutors on the Congolese question. The Togolese leader will also have to talk with the SADC. What will he do to remove himself from the influence of the two blocs to conduct effective mediation?

The AU is attempting to regain control of a conflict in which diplomatic initiatives and the names of mediators seem to collide.

On the one hand is the Emir of Qatar, whose diplomacy has been silent, but who in a very short time seems to have moved the peace process forward, managing to bring together Kagame and Tshisekedi on March 18, to everyone’s surprise.

Türkiye had offered mediation but its proposal was rejected by the DRC, which argued “African solutions to African problems.” The EAC and SADC initially proposed mediation led by Kenyatta, former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and former Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn.

But a five-party mediation was chosen instead. It comprises former presidents Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia), Kgalema Motlanthe (South Africa), Catherine Samba-Panza (Central African Republic), Obasanjo and Kenyatta.

All this, added to the Security Council’s initiative, with Resolution 2773, which calls for peace.

The United States of America is not to be outdone. The Joe Biden administration was very active in pushing ceasefire. And the Donald Trump administration recently sent an envoy to the region. Despite all these initiatives, dozens of ceasefires have been violated.

Even today, “the situation has not changed, the fighting continues, and the humanitarian situation is as dramatic as ever in North and South Kivu,” Congolese Foreign minister Thérèse Kayikwamba told the UN Security Council on Wednesday.

Gnassingbé is certainly aware of Rwanda’s concerns about the FDLR rebels in the DRC, and DRC’s accusations about Kigali’s support for the M23/AFC.

DRC now says it is open to talking peace directly with the M23/AFC. But the rebels have spelt out conditions, among them that Tshisekedi makes a solemn declaration expressing the political will of his regime to conduct direct negotiations, the cancellation of all death sentences, prosecutions, arrest warrants and the offer of a reward to anyone who helps the Kinshasa regime to arrest the leaders and cadres of the AFC/M23.

They also want him to "put an end to and criminalise all hate speech, which is often followed by acts of oppression... to put an end to all acts of discrimination and denial of nationality against the above-mentioned communities; the immediate release of all civilians or military personnel arrested and/or accused of collusion with the AFC/M3 on account of their race or ethnicity, or their professional, friendly or commercial relations with members of the AFC/M23; the repeal of all other restrictive measures taken by the Kinshasa regime against the AFC/M23.”

Brigadier General Brice Oligui Nguema, Gabon’s interim leader, has emerged from last weekend’s election with a resounding mandate, securing 90.35 percent of the vote. His closest rival, former Prime Minister Alain Claude Bilie By Nze, garnered a mere 3.02 percent. Voter turnout reached 70.4 percent, a significant increase from the 56.65 percent recorded during the disputed August 2023 polls.

Nguema seized power on 30 August 2023, in a swift military coup staged moments after Gabon’s electoral commission declared Ali Bongo Ondimba the victor. That election, now annulled, was over before the ink had dried. The coup dismantled state institutions and abruptly ended the Bongo dynasty’s 56-year grip on power.

Ali Bongo ruled for 14 years, succeeding his father, Omar Bongo, who held sway for 41 years. Nguema, notably, is Ali Bongo’s cousin—a twist suggesting the family’s political DNA still flows through Gabon’s veins, albeit cloaked in new attire.

Yet, Nguema’s approach diverges from the playbook of Africa’s other coup leaders. He was the last of the continent’s new junta class to seize power and has become the first to organise elections.

Whether this was a genuine act of democracy or a strategic recalibration, it marks a departure. In a region where juntas often chant pan-Africanist slogans and rail against imperialist powers while postponing electoral timelines, Nguema’s approach stands apart.

Contrast this with the so-called “coup belt.” In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goïta, after orchestrating coups in August 2020 and May 2021, remains averse to elections. Guinea’s Mamady Doumbouya, who ousted Alpha Condé in September 2021, keeps deferring the vote.

Sudan’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who seized power in October 2021, is embroiled in a brutal war with his former deputy, Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo.

Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traoré, in charge since September 2022, shows no inclination to give it a democratic varnish at the polls. Niger’s Abdourahamane Tchiani, who toppled President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023, has scarcely mentioned elections.

Nguema, however, eschewed exhibitionist fiery rhetoric. Instead, he projected calm, spoke of reform, put on some deadly dance moves on stage and —crucially—delivered a vote.

Whether motivated by a quest for legitimacy, international approval, or a firmer grip on power, the result is here: another coup leader now dons a presidential sash.

This spectacle, though, is a subplot in a broader African drama unfolding for decades: the rise and reign of the soldier-statesman. The focus on this “new wave” of coups obscures a larger truth. Soldiers and guerrilla commanders have long been the architects of African power.

Africa comprises 54 internationally recognised states (55 if you include the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, an AU member but denied statehood by many due to Morocco’s occupation).

Among them, the most formidable bloc is neither a regional alliance nor an ideological faction. It is the men in uniform. Twenty-three African heads of state are current or former soldiers or guerrilla commanders.

Consider the roster: João Lourenço (Angola, guerrilla commander), Ibrahim Traoré (Burkina Faso, military), Évariste Ndayishimiye (Burundi, guerrilla commander), Mahamat Idriss Déby (Chad, military), Azali Assoumani (Comoros, military), Denis Sassou Nguesso (Congo Republic, military), Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Egypt, military), Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (Equatorial Guinea, military), Isaias Afwerki (Eritrea, guerrilla chief), Abiy Ahmed (Ethiopia, guerrilla and military), Brice Oligui Nguema (Gabon, military), Mamady Doumbouya (Guinea, military), Umaro Sissoco Embaló (Guinea-Bissau, military), Assimi Goïta (Mali, military), Mohamed Ould Ghazouani (Mauritania, military), Abdourahamane Tchiani (Niger, military), Paul Kagame (Rwanda, guerrilla chief), Julius Maada Bio (Sierra Leone, military), Salva Kiir Mayardit (South Sudan, guerrilla commander), Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Sudan, military), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda, guerrilla chief), Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zimbabwe, guerrilla commander), and Brahim Ghali (SADR/Western Sahara, guerrilla chief).

Read: Gabon coup leader Nguema elected president with landslide victory

These are not merely coup-makers or victorious rebels; a few have turned out to be state-builders and narrative-shapers. Some govern with technocratic finesse, others blend wartime mystique with the sharp edge of realpolitik.

And it is not romanticism. Africa’s fascination with men in uniform stems from structural dysfunction. In fragile states, the barracks often outlast parliaments. Soldiers are perceived—by some—as decisive, efficient, and even incorruptible. They may rule with iron fists, but they seldom dither.

The reality therefore is more complex than stereotypes suggest. Some of these leaders do not simply seize power; many possess an instinctive understanding of their nations’ pulse.

In a region where colonial legacies left fragile institutions and “independence” often became an elite monopoly, the commander, not the consensus-builder, frequently prevailed.

Even in countries with elections, the uniform retains its allure. Sometimes, ballots ratify coups already staged. Other times, the soldier transforms into a suit-clad statesman, long after the rifles fall silent. The electorate, caught between disillusionment and pragmatism, often acquiesces.

There are risks, of course. Abiy Ahmed swept into office on reformist zeal, only to be tested by war and criticism. El-Sisi has solidified power with unrelenting machinery. Sudan’s descent into civil war in 2023 and South Sudan’s earlier conflict from 2013 are stark reminders of the fallout when former comrades clash.

This entrenchment of khaki politics has also distorted the democratic script in some countries. Elections occur, yes—but the ballot often becomes theatre, not transformation.

Thus, the soldier-statesman persists, not because Africa adores coups or rebellions, but because it has not yet weaned itself from commanders. As long as democracy’s dysfunction breeds fatigue, there will be space for uniforms to be rebranded, not retired.

Charles Onyango-Obbo is a journalist, writer, and curator of the “Wall of Great Africans”. X@cobbo3

Kenya's triple Olympic and world 1,500 metres champion Faith Kipyegon is to attempt the first women's, unofficial sub-four minute mile in a Nike "Breaking 4" project following the success of Eliud Kipchoge's sub-two hour marathon.

Nike said on Wednesday that Kipyegon, 31, is to attempt the feat on June 26 at Stade Charlety, Paris, where she beat her own 1,500 metres world record last year.

Full details are yet to be revealed but, as with her compatriot's 1:59:40.2 marathon in Vienna in 2019, she is likely to be aided by "in and out" pacers, new high-tech shoes and kit and other technological, physiological and psychological help that will mean any record would not be officially recognised.

Kipyegon set the current official mile world record of 4:07.64 for the now-rarely run distance in 2023, taking almost five seconds off Sifan Hassan's 2019 mark, so would need a huge leap forward to achieve the landmark time.

"I’m a three-time Olympic champion. I’ve achieved World Championship titles. I thought, What else, why not dream outside the box?" Kipyegon said. "I want this attempt to say to women, 'You can dream and make your dreams valid'."

Kipyegon won the Olympic 1,500m title at the 2016, 2020 and 2024 Games and the world title in 2017, 2022 and 2023, when she also took 5,000m gold.

As well as the mile record, she also holds the 1,500m world record of 3:49.04 and barely seemed to take a breath after taking time away from the track to have a baby.

"Becoming a mother has changed my entire mental attitude," she said. "You have to engage yourself, you have to show your child the way."

Nike will be applying the lessons learned from Kipchoge's attempts, where he narrowly failed and then subsequently succeeded in getting under two hours.

Read: Eliud Kipchoge’s marathon record excites scientists

Along with carbon-plated "super shoes", one key aspect was the use of pacers in a v-formation, with a turnover of athletes to ensure fresh legs. Innovative apparel technology and laser pacing lights also played a part, and are likely to do so again for Kipyegon's attempt.

Nike said full details of the attempt, including information on pacers, supporters in the stadium and kit, will be revealed in the coming weeks.

Kipyegon has known Kipchoge for more than 10 years and they share the same coach in Patrick Sang. "Faith can absorb any goal, she is a big dreamer," Kipchoge said.

"She is the woman to take on this challenge because she is open to trying."

'Audacious goal'

To improve her record mile by at least 7.65 seconds, Kipyegon will need to run each of her four and a bit laps an average of nearly two seconds faster than her previous best.

"Faith is a once-in-a-generation talent, and her audacious goal is exactly what Nike stands for,” said Elliott Hill, Nike President & CEO.

"Breaking4 is the kind of bold dream we will do everything in our power to make real — helping both elite and everyday athletes to believe anything is possible.

"Alongside Faith, our innovators are breaking barriers by combining cutting-edge sport science with revolutionary footwear and apparel innovation to help her achieve a truly historic goal."

Britain's Roger Bannister was the first man to go under four minutes in May 1954, with compatriot Diane Leather the first woman to break five minutes later the same month. The current men's record is the 3:43.13 set by Hicham El Guerrouj in 1999.

Hassan's 4:12.33 run in 2019 just edged the record of Russian Svetlana Masterkova that had lasted 23 years.

Kenya’s President William Ruto on Wednesday criticised the unilateral US tariffs on global trade, choosing the Chinese as the perfect audience to attack what he called a broken post-Cold War economic system.

The President spoke at Peking University in Beijing, one of the oldest and most respected public universities in the world founded in 1898, on the second day of his four-day state visit to China.

He said the world may be moving forward with globalisation and technology and all that, yet the world leaders are stuck in the old wartime.

“We gather at a time of profound and accelerated global change. From regional conflicts, economic shocks and climate disruption, to cyber insecurity and demographic shifts, the challenges we face today are complex, interconnected, and urgent. But within these challenges are opportunities; opportunities for renewed partnership, bold thinking, and a reimagined global architecture,” he told an audience that included senior Chinese government officials.

Turning to the trade tariffs that President Donald Trump imposed on almost every country in the world in March, ostensibly to protect American products, he warned that the escalating tariff war could deal a death blow to the global multilateral system.

“The post-war multilateral system is broken, dysfunctional and no longer fit for purpose… The ongoing trade tariff wars could signal the end of the old world order as it has existed since the end of World War II. The financial and security architecture that arose out of the ashes of that conflict has largely benefited the Global North at the expense of the Global South, with exclusion of everyone else,” he said.

China has been the most engaged in this tariff war with the US, where the tax war on goods between the two has reached as high as 225 percent for the US and 145 percent for China.

Read: Why China might have a winning hand in trade war with US

The US also imposed a flat rate 10 percent tariff on other countries like Kenya, which could equally hurt exports to America that enjoy duty-free and quota-free access under the African Growth Opportunity Act (Agoa).

Currying favour

Tariffs is a subject the Chinese may have wanted to hear, and Ruto’s public lecture in Peking may have offered a perfect opportunity for him to endear himself to his hosts. He had been to Beijing twice in the past two years, but those visits were just official visits; this is his first state visit to China.

Read: China’s delight as Uncle Sam’s once-favourite Ruto comes calling

But it came a year after he made a similar trip to the US under Joe Biden. In Washington DC, last year, he said he was building a relationship that would benefit Kenyans and Africans.

And in Beijing, he said China had got the back of many African countries, including Kenya, who could otherwise never afford to advance their economies or technology, by offering cheaper options.

“Without China, many of these technologies would remain unaffordable for much of the developing world,” he said, referring to solar and other technologies used in daily life in Kenya.

‘Cold War warriors’

There were more attacks against the West. Ruto did not name other countries, but said the world’s adoption of globalisation had been dragged down by systems that the West built to sustain their dominance.

“The Security Council, once a beacon of peace and diplomacy, now has one permanent member invading one country, while another member takes sides in conflict in contradiction to the council’s own resolutions. Yet, today, the permanent members live in denial and resist reform, even as the Security Council becomes less and less legitimate and its relevance being put to question,” he said, referring to the council’s permanent five members -- Russia, the US, France, the United Kingdom and China.

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, while the US has blocked Africa’s bid to gain veto power on the council. Of the 15-member council, which is supposed to oversee global peace and security, only the five permanent members have veto power because they had won the World War II, had the largest population at the end of the war or had biggest economy at the time.

“Seemingly, there appears to be Cold War warriors that are unable to see a world that is not ideologically polarised and are determined to reinvent a polarised world by other means,” the Kenyan leader said.

This was a trip the Chinese had labelled “a walk down memory lane,” reflecting the historical ties between Kenya and China. But, like any bilateral engagements, the context of geopolitical tensions was written all over it.

Yet President Ruto could still bite and lick his wounds.

In an earlier event, he had told the Chinese businesspeople that Agoa, the US law gives Kenya privileged access to American markets, could suit them if they set up shop in Kenya.

Read: Ruto dangles tax breaks, Agoa to Chinese investors

“Kenya is open for business. We have every reason for you to invest in our country, and I welcome you to come so that we can build, we can grow and witness the making of Africa’s next great success story, and we will do this together,” he told an audience in Beijing.

Agoa has helped Kenyan producers of textile and foreign investors who produce apparel locally to export to the US under certain privileges. But that is now facing a bleak future after President Trump imposed a flat rate tariff of 10 percent on a number of countries that benefit from Agoa, including Kenya.

It is 9pm in downtown Nairobi. Inside a small, buzzing nail salon, a group of young men—mostly in baggy jeans and faded t-shirts—huddle around clients’ hands with focused intensity. Rwandan music hums from a corner speaker as greetings fly in Kinyarwanda. For a moment, it feels like Kigali, not Nairobi.

Most of them are nail technicians; a few are second-hand clothes and shoe vendors who have stopped by to say hello. A young woman walks in carrying a bucket of food. She serves the men swiftly—some pay, others say something in Kinyarwanda that makes her giggle before she slips out.

For the two hours I sat at this nail parlour—getting my nails done because the service is not only top-tier but half the price of upmarket salons—I counted 17 young men and one woman. All are Rwandan, Congolese or Burundian.

If they are not inside the salon, they are standing outside similar parlours along the street, calling out to passersby: “Sister, sister—nails?”

Their accents—heavy with Kinyarwanda and French inflections—give them away.

Over the past several months, a growing number of young migrants from Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo and Burundi have been flocking to Nairobi. They work as nail technicians, hawkers, mitumba sellers, barbers and masseurs—menial jobs.

Evans, a Congolese man, is a jewellery hawker. He prefers we use only his first name for fear of deportation. With a heavy Congolese accent, he says he has had to learn Kiswahili to bridge the language gap with his Kenyan customers.

"Hizi ni coated (these are coated)… you see, very strong, haitafifia (they won't fade)," he says, pausing to gauge if the customer has understood. He gestures with his hands, mimicking that the coating in earrings makes them worth the price.

“Back home, opportunities like these are rare. Kenya is our greener pasture. The beauty industry here is big and growing,” he explains.

“Here, no one judges you. You can earn a living while learning Kiswahili. I’m not doing this because I want to—I do it because I must. My family depends on me.”

Evans came to Kenya in 2010.

"I’ve been selling jewellery ever since. Business is good now because I have loyal clients,” he says.

Michael, a Rwandan nail technician, says to many East Africans, Nairobi is not just a tourist or shopping destination but it has provided him a lifeline.

“I came here when I was just 20. A friend who had come here earlier told me about Nairobi. When I came, I found he was earning a living from making nails and I joined him. He taught me, and I had to learn quickly—because in Nairobi, survival depends on how fast you learn a skill. If you don’t adapt, you starve. It’s that simple,” he tells The EastAfrican.

Now 28 years old, Michael has spent the last eight years perfecting his craft of nail-making and he gets more than 20 customers every day.

His tools? A steady grip, an eye for detail, and the hunger to make something of himself.

“In Rwanda, this job is seen as a woman’s job. But here, it puts food on the table. The pay is better here than back home. Even though things are tougher now, I can still send something to my mother and siblings," he says.

Jackson, another Rwandan nail technician, has been in Nairobi for 10 years now and is still hustling.

“Inflation has hit us hard. I do more clients, but the money doesn’t stretch. Rent, food, transport, everything has gone up. Yet clients don’t want to pay more,” he says.

But he still believes Nairobi offers better prospects than Kigali.

“Women here love getting their nails done—even four times a month. That means more money. In Rwanda, there’s barely any demand for this,” he says.

In the 10 years, he has gone back home only once because he is still dreaming of a rich return.

"I went back and saw the hardship that my peers were facing. I decided I would only go back when I'm rich. For now, my family still relies on me, so I'll keep working in Nairobi," he says.

Nairobi’s promise of work and access to basic services makes it an attractive destination for East African migrants. But many work without legal documents, exposing them to daily risks, including exploitation and harassment by the police.

“City Council askaris nab us and throw us in jail. You must bribe them—Sh1,000—or you 'sleep inside' (spend the night in cells),” Jackson reveals.

Toby, also Rwandan, has lived in Kenya for 10 years and even has a Kenyan identity card.

“Ten years ago, a friend invited me. Then I brought another friend. It’s all about the hustle—no room for play,” he says.

Despite a sense of belonging, he admits something still feels out of reach. “I’ve been here my whole adult life. It feels like home, but I’m still chasing something.”

Asked why it is mostly men coming to Kenya to do this kind of work, he smiles and says: “Our women wouldn’t do this. They prefer staying in the house. In many cases, cultural norms dictate that women stay at home while men are the breadwinners, even if it means venturing into unconventional jobs."

Aspiring musician

When Frank Kayiranga aka Frankay first arrived in Kenya in 2020, he was not sure what to expect. He had been invited by a childhood friend who had already carved out a living as a nail technician in Nairobi.

But what was meant to be a short visit turned into something more—a realisation that Kenya held more opportunities than he had imagined.

“My friend invited me because back home there are no jobs. I visited then went back to Rwanda. But I kept thinking about the life I had seen in Nairobi. The hustle, the possibilities, the energy. So, I made up my mind—I had to come back,” he says.

In January 2025, he returned, this time with a clear goal: to sing his way into Kenyans hearts.

A singer of romantic ballads, eyeing weddings and intimate gatherings, he says breaking into the music industry has not been easy.

Frank Kayiranga alias Frankay poses for a photo on March 5, 2025.

"But back home, singing gigs are scarce, and the music industry, though vibrant, is difficult to break into. In Kenya, I saw a different scene—more diversity, more places to perform, and a society that seems open to different talents. I sing about love—because love is universal," he says.

Language has been his biggest hurdle. While he speaks fluent Kinyarwanda and French, English and Kiswahili are still tough.

“I am learning Kiswahili,” he says, laughing. “Pole pole (slowly, slowly), as they say. But I want to learn as many languages as I can because music has no borders."

Frankay is optimistic.

“I came to be a successful musician. My friend who came to Nairobi in 2013 became a successful nail technician, even though back home that job is seen as demeaning. He’s making it. I want to be like him,” he says.

Local labour market

Kenya lacks accurate data on illegal immigrants from especially East Africa and as more come in, is it a concern to economists?

"This is a problem because it touches on the basic rules of the World Trade Organisation. Free trade does not mean the unrestricted movement of goods and services to the extent that foreigners can enter the domestic economy and take up jobs that can be done by locals. Such practices deny citizens employment opportunities. In some cases, decisions have been made to limit the movement of labour from neighbouring countries because it distorts wage structures and drives down salaries, which is disadvantageous to locals," says Prof Samuel Nyandemo, an economist.

He says the rule should be that foreigners can only access jobs for which locals do not have the capacity or skills. This is similar to procurement rules, which dictate that foreign firms should only be awarded tenders for large-scale projects—those worth billions—that locals cannot handle.

"The Kenyan government should step in and implement protective measures for the local labour market. Additionally, due to money laundering and the lack of proper regulations, Kenya is increasingly becoming a hub for black market activities, leading to a shadow economy that is neither accountable nor sustainable," Prof Nyandemo says.

President William Ruto is dangling a series of incentives for Chinese investors, including tax holidays, ease of repatriating profits, skilled workforce and easier immigration rules.

At a meeting with the Chinese business community in Beijing on Tuesday, the President said Kenya’s membership in African regional economic blocs, trade agreements such as the African Growth Opportunity Act (Agoa) with the US, and the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union could help Chinese exporters reach these markets with privileges similar to Kenyans.

“Kenya is open for business,” President Ruto said.

“We have every reason for you to invest in our country and I welcome you to come so that we can build, we can grow and witness the making of Africa’s next great success story, and we will do this together.

“Kenya has also built a big footprint of markets around not [only] just our region, but also globally...You may also wish to know that, under the Agoa arrangement, we have duty-free, quota-free access to the American market, and all this market access infrastructure is available to you in Kenya.”

Agoa has helped Kenyan producers of textiles and foreign investors who produce apparael locally to export to the US under certain privileges.

But the deal is now facing a bleak future after US President Donald Trump imposed a flat tare tariff of 10 percent on a number of countries that profited from Agoa, including Kenya. Agoa is set to expire in September this year, unless Washington extends it, or replaces it.

Read: China’s delight as Uncle Sam’s once-favourite Ruto comes calling

Meanwhile, Kenya is waving the Agoa privileges to pitch for investors.

At the investor roundtable, President Ruto also sold Kenya’s regional positioning, touting Nairobi as a gateway to neighbouring markets.

“Because of the network of market access that we have built, you can access the East African Community market and the Comesa market, a community that has 26 countries and a population of 730 million people,” he said.

Seven Chinese firms signed letters of intent with the Kenya Investment Authority to invest in various sectors of the economy if certain conditions are met.

The companies could pump in $500 million if they sign investment agreements. And a lot will depend on what Kenya does to convince them.

Nairobi says it will target the Chinese market more, promising incentives on taxes, immigration and secure financial transactions.

Starting June, Kenya will conduct a five-province marketing campaign in China, seeking to sell itself as a better investment destination.

The actual regions of China are to be announced later, but one of the cities is Changsha in Hunan Province, where Kenya intends to learn and attract investors in running city transportation systems and related smart technology.

In early 2026, Kenya will invite Chinese investors to Nairobi “to showcase the opportunities here, and you can see for yourselves first-hand what these investment opportunities look like,” President Ruto said.

President Ruto is also using the visit to seek new funding for his pet projects such as housing, ICT and universal healthcare.