As the World Bank and International Monetary Fund host the Spring Meetings in Washington this week, Africa’s development priorities hang in the balance.

With no high-level discussions on climate or gender — issues that are central to the continent’s growth and resilience — the agenda seems increasingly disconnected from the systemic challenges facing African nations. Instead, the focus remains on "Jobs and Macroeconomics," a framing that recalls the failed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 90s.

Under the guise of growth and stability, these policies imposed austerity, deregulation and fiscal cuts that decimated public services, deepened inequality and burdened Africa with unsustainable debt. The current direction threatens to repeat this damaging legacy, while the institutions responsible for financing fossil fuel expansion and undermining climate resilience evade accountability.

In this context, Mission 300, launched at the Africa Energy Summit in Dar es Salaam in January, stands as a critical initiative. Led by the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union, and the government of Tanzania, Mission 300 aims to provide electricity to 300 million people across Africa by 2030.

But ambition without justice is not progress. And promises without integrity are not solutions. The truth is, Mission 300 risks becoming just another top-down, donor-driven project that fails to answer the fundamental question: whose development, on whose terms, and at what cost?

In line with this year’s Spring Meetings’ theme "Jobs and Macroeconomics,” we must critically assess whether Mission 300 will create clean, sustainable jobs that benefit communities across Africa. Will it empower young people in rural Kenya or women in informal settlements in Ghana — or will they be concentrated in urban industrial corridors and foreign contractor payrolls?

According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (Irena), Africa accounts for only 3 percent of global renewable energy jobs, despite its vast potential and growing population. If Mission 300 is to reverse this trend, it must move beyond megaprojects and pipelines, and instead prioritise community-led, decentralised energy systems that generate not just electricity but equitable, decent work rooted in local contexts.

Yet, early indications are troubling. The inclusion of fossil gas as a transitional energy source — backed by the World Bank and reflected in Senegal’s National Energy Compact — is a signal that the same polluting industries responsible for destabilising our climate are being rebranded as part of the solution.

Natural gas may offer short-term job spikes during construction, but these are neither green nor future-proof jobs. Moreover, the International Energy Agency has made it clear that no new oil and gas fields are compatible with net-zero by 2050.

The financing model raises equally serious concerns. Much of the funding promised under Mission 300 comes in the form of concessional loans. Even at a one percent interest rate over 40 years, this is debt — and for a continent where 40 countries face rising debt levels, and at least 19 are at high risk of debt distress, adding more liabilities to public balance sheets to fund fossil-dependent infrastructure is not development — it is exploitation.

African nations sink deeper into debt crisis. Their external debt has reached a staggering $11.4 trillion in 2023. According to a report by Christian Aid, across Africa, 32 countries now spend more on debt than healthcare, with $85 billion paid to external creditors in 2023, projected to increase to $104 billion in 2024.

As debt burdens grow heavier across the continent, the wave of billion-dollar pledges and commitments deserves careful attention.

The Africa Energy Summit generated headlines with pledges of over $5 billion from donors like the Rockefeller Foundation, AIIB, and Islamic Development Bank, but bigger numbers don’t always mean better outcomes.

With over $50 billion now committed to Mission 300, including $48 billion from the AfDB and World Bank by 2030, there is still no public guarantee of how these funds will be deployed.

This lack of transparency and the sidelining of critical climate concerns only amplifies the deeper contradictions within the World Bank/IMF policies and deeply alarms African civil society and vulnerable communities in Africa.

The World Bank committed at the 2023 Annual Meetings in Marrakech to a new mission: A liveable planet, in addition to poverty eradication. This new vision is now marginalised possibly due to fears of withdrawal by the Trump administration, revealing a major contradiction.

Regarding climate finance, Bretton Woods institutions must strengthen their climate financing capacities, particularly in ways that don’t create additional barriers for developing countries. The September 2024 report on MDB’s Joint Report on climate finance shows that MDBs contributed a record $125 billion in 2023.

But these funds often come in the form of debt and non-concessional finance, which limits the fiscal space of developing countries already struggling with climate impacts and high debt levels. There is an urgent need to significantly increase grant-based and highly concessional finance within their portfolios.

Gender has also been sidelined in World Bank discussions for far too long. Despite the Bank’s ambitious Gender Strategy for 2024-30, which promises to prioritise gender equality in global development, the reality remains far removed from these claims. Women’s needs, particularly in vital sectors like energy access, continue to be neglected.

Nearly 900 million people in Africa still rely on harmful biomass for cooking, and the burden falls disproportionately on women. This is not merely a climate or environmental issue— it’s a health crisis, a significant economic vulnerability, and an unaddressed inequality. Reliance on polluting fuels costs $791.4 billion annually, with health-related impacts accounting for $526.3 billion.

The Spring Meetings must be seized as a turning point. While the hopes may be tempered by the complexities and challenges ahead, giving up is worse. Expectations are low, given the history of unfulfilled promises and empty rhetoric. Yet, this moment presents a critical opportunity for African leaders to reject outdated models of debt-driven growth, fossil-fuelled development, and gender-blind planning.

Dr Wafa Misrar is the Campaign and Policy Officer at CAN Africa, and Said Skounti is a researcher at IMAL Initiative.

In Uganda, there is a similarity between this year’s Easter week and that of 1979 – unstable power supply. In 1979, the blackouts were related to an external (military) force entering Uganda; today they are related to an external (business) force exiting Uganda.

The war that removed Uganda’s military government with the overrunning of Kampala on April 11 had started six months earlier in Kagera, the north-western region of Tanzania.

On the eve of Uganda’s Independence Day, October 8, 1978, the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces finally returned the fire to the plundering Uganda Army which had earlier invaded and annexed Kagera region, even provocatively naming a Ugandan district commissioner for it.

In February 1979 as the war advanced northwards on Ugandan soil, the country started experiencing power blackouts. Rumours attributed this to sabotage by Ugandan guerrillas working with Tanzanians to overthrow President Idi Amin.

By the time of the Catholic Centenary in Uganda on February 17, power cuts had become daily. Guests from all over the world including the main celebrant from the Vatican (it was a world Catholic event courtesy of the 22 Uganda Martyrs) had a taste of what celebrating amid wartime darkness is like.

As Amin fled eastwards after losing power on April 11, a new fear arose over the safety of Owen Falls Dam at Jinja and its vital bridge that connects Mombasa/Kenya to Kampala.

For in his last broadcasts over Radio Uganda, he had promised dire consequences should he lose power to invaders and their “unpatriotic collaborators”. However, Amin passed Jinja without blowing up the dam and exited Uganda to exile where he died peacefully 25 years later.

After Amin’s exit that 46 years ago threatened to reduce Uganda’s hydro electricity generation from 150MW to 0, the country’s generation continued deteriorating for two decades, until the Museveni government with partners like HH The Aga Khan got production capacity growing again and has now grown 15 times higher to over 2,000MW.

Partnering with the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Uganda expanded power distribution that had shrunk due to a deteriorating grid network, now 10 times up from 250,000 to now 2.5million connections.

Then this April, with the exit of the CDC-led distribution consortium called Umeme, the long-forgotten power outages returned, hopefully temporarily. But citizens aged 50 and above can relate this Easter season to the power cuts of April 1979 when Amin was exiting.

Read: Uganda scrambles to fund Umeme exit as deadline looms

The power cuts related to the Umeme exit of March 31 could have been due to two or more reasons. First, the expected physical stripping by junior technicians unsure of their jobs under new management could have ‘disappeared’ a few kilometres of wire from the grid and a few thousand litres of transformer oils and other consumables.

Second is the stalled investment in grid maintenance (which should be constant) that must have arisen during the lengthy uncertain transition when the distributor was on the way out.

The replacement —the state agency for whose mandate Umeme had been executing —the Uganda Electricity Distribution and Corporation Ltd (UEDCL) — is subject to government procurement procedures that are lengthy and bureaucratic.

But grid maintenance and expansion are all about procuring transformers, wires, poles and securing passage across thousands of kilometres, period.

Last week UEDCL was engaging the government procurement agency to waive bureaucratic delays, otherwise the vultures that influence public tenders can reverse the gains of grid expansion and consistent power supply backwards by three decades in a short time, aggravating inconsistent lighting this Easter to widespread blackouts by Christmas and total darkness by the time of the general election time next year. We don’t want that, do we?

Buwembo is a Kampala-based journalist. Email: [email protected]

In 1977, Kenya police banned the performance of Ngaahika Ndeenda by Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Ngugi wa Mirii. The actors were small-scale farmers and workers in and around Kamirithu Village.

The play, directed by Kimani Gecau, was performed in an open-air makeshift theatre in the middle of the village. Before its stoppage, thousands of people had travelled from afar to watch the play.

The play showed how the church allied with the political class to keep the poor in subjugation. It narrated the story of how ordinary people rose up against British colonialism. It disputed the depiction of African culture as savage.

The play showed that the anti-colonial ideals were the true basis for a more progressive and democratic country. The play utilised the dramatic resources of art to tell its multi-themed story.

The banning of the play was the less harsh response by Jomo Kenyatta’ s regime. Ngugi wa Thiong’o was abducted at night and detained without trial at Kamiti Maximum Security Prison.

Kimani and Mirii evaded a police dragnet and escaped into exile. Later, the police descended on the theatre in Kamirithu and in avenging fury razed it to the ground.

In 2022, Ngaahika Ndeenda was performed at the Kenya National Theatre. I took my Gen-Z daughter and nephew to watch the performance. I listened carefully to their assessment. They remarked on the dramatic and comedic elements.

Neither of them said they were inspired to commandeer a tank to storm government buildings. We emerged from the theatre to find throngs of mostly young people excitedly debating the merits and demerits of the performance.

The play was an artistic experience, not a call to arms. If there was any revolutionary seed planted, it was in their understanding of history, and the hypocrisy of individuals and society.

History has repeated itself. A few days ago, armed Kenya police raided the venue of a secondary schools' drama festival to stop the rehearsal and performance of a play.

Echoes of War by Cleophas Malala was to be performed by Butere Girls School. Police threw tear gas to disperse the girls and reporters.

Echoes of War talks about the cultural and political divide between the older and younger generations. The characters decry bad governance.

Like their real-life Gen-Z counterparts, the characters use social media to criticise bad governance and corruption. In the end, the dictator in the play agrees to listen to his youthful critics, and they all resolve to work together for the good of the country.

Echoes of War, like Ngaahika Ndeenda, does not call for violent rebellion. The play is a simple dramatisation of normal political discourse we have daily on TV and radio. Only fully fledged or fledgling dictatorships can be so thin-skinned.

The violent overreaction even embarrassed the ODM side of the regime. Had the regime allowed the play, we might never have heard of it, and Ruto’s regime would not have dug itself even deeper in the hole of ignominy.

Tee Ngugi is a Nairobi-based political and social commentator.

At current budget estimates, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (Aussom) will need nearly $1 billion to avert a complete security collapse in the Horn of Africa nation.

The AU also needs $96 million to clear arrears of the previous mission, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis).

There is one problem, though. No one knows for sure where this money will come from. The usual donors are backing away, hesitant to commit or just speaking in vague terms.

This sums up the outcome of Friday’s Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State, the ministerial session that preceded it, as well as meetings of senior officials and military chiefs from countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions in Somalia.

Read: EAC ministers meet in Arusha to address security challenges, cash crunch

It’s a stalemate, and not helped by the fact that in the lead up to the summit held at State House Entebbe, Uganda, the AU dropped some sobering numbers to soften the hearts of key donors, to pledge cash and avert the colossal funding crisis that Aussom faces, to no avail.

Towards the end of his presentation, US Ambassador to Uganda William W Popp asserted that Washington DC would not fund Aussom, not under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 and not even under a hybrid arrangement.

“The US position on Aussom financing remains the same as it has been over the past year,” he said, attracting silent stares and effectively killing the earlier appeal by AU chief Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, that UNSC Resolution 2719 “remains our best bet”.

“US will not support the application of [UNSC Resolution] 2719 framework to Aussom as we do not believe Somalia is the right context for this application. We also will not support the hybrid model of the 2719 framework as we believe it undercuts the spirit and intent of the resolution,” Mr Popp explained.

Read: Trump snubs Aussom funding as threats from Somalia rise

The representatives of the key donors – US envoy, UK High Commissioner to Uganda Lisa Chesney and the EU Head of Delegation to Kampala Jan Sadek – all spoke after a short presentation by Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.

Grim reality

In just five slides, Adeoye laid bare the grim reality that the mission faces. Since its deployment on January 1, 2025, Aussom has an unpaid $45 million bill for the January-March period, and a similar figure for the April-June period before its mandate begins in earnest on July 1, 2025.

“We need $15 million per month. That’s the fact. And we do not have that money currently,” he told Foreign and Defence ministers at the Mestil Hotel in Kampala, where the TCCs ministerial session was held.

He explained that $15 million is needed to cover troops’ salaries in Somalia. But the AU has only $16.7 million for one year. “This is the arithmetic that we must deal with as AU member states, and of course, the troop and police contributing countries.”

According to the AU Peace and Security Council, Aussom has a total cash requirement of $190 million for this year, but has only $16.7 million – the bulk of which is what the AU Peace Fund has in its coffers, and a committed $3 million and $1 million from Japan and China respectively.

This covers just 8.7 percent of the need.

That is not all. The previous force, Atmis, has arrears of $96 million for the 2022-2024 period, most of it racked up when Somalia requested “technical pause” to delay the force drawdown.

“This is because of the consistent extension of the drawdown, authorised by the Peace and Security Council of the AU and endorsed by the UNSC,” Adeoye explained.

In total, for the five-year Aussom budget and Atmis arrears, the AU needs $1.046 billion. The bulk of the budget covers troop allowances at the rate of $1,000 per person per month, while death and disability compensation and mission subsistence allowance for troops, police and civilian staff account for the rest of the costs.

Read: AU, Somalia agree on troop numbers for new mission

As it stands, the AU pins hope on the outcome of the Independent Strategic Report of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (Unsos), which could operationalise Resolution 2719. But the continental body is also betting on the donors’ conference in Doha, Qatar – scheduled for April on a date yet to be confirmed.

Amid limited options, another throw of the dice is the UN-AU combined mission for Somalia led by AU special envoy Donald Kaberuka, who is currently in Washington DC, seeking additional sources, with an urgent remit to report to Addis before end of this month.

With the Aussom mandate officially kicking off on July 1, time is now of essence. Next month, the donors, convened by the UK, will meet to resolve their final position on Resolution 2719, and update the UNSC.

The EU envoy to Uganda Jan Sadek says that however complex the path, the TCCs and all Somalia partners must recognise that new thinking and funding arrangements are needed to enable equal burden-sharing between long standing and new donors.

Brussels, the largest funder of the previous AU-led missions, in which it spent about €2.7 billion ($3.07 billion), favours the hybrid implementation of Resolution 2719 as the only viable pathway to sustainable and predictable funding for Aussom.

The EU explains that its member states already contribute a quarter of all UN assessed contributions, and welcomes the strategic review and restructuring of the Unsos as part of preparations for the implementation of Resolution 2719 as requested under Resolution 2767.

Read: EU seeks ‘fair’ burden sharing in Somalia peace mission

Addressing TCCs for the first time in his capacity as AUC Chairperson since being elected to the position in February, Youssouf Ali appealed to the international community to come to Somalia’s aid or to sit back and witness the Horn of Africa explode into a regional security nightmare.

“In order to consolidate recovery of territories, the transition from Atmis to Aussom must not fail. Yes, the mission is confronted to financial challenges. There are still reluctances to implement Resolution 2719. We at the Commission are working very hard to make it happen,” he said.

Somalia has a 3,000km shoreline that straddles strategic trade routes linking Asia, Africa and Europe. In 2010 and 2011, Somali pirates seized ships for fun in the Gulf of Aden – offshore of Somalia – which cost insurance firms and shipowners in the world close to $7 billion.

At a time when al-Shabaab is resurgent and allegedly building bases near Mogadishu, the AUC boss argues it is not far-fetched for the extremist militants to exploit the potential security vacuum in Somalia, offer protection to pirates and abet the vice in the region’s high seas.

Read: Somali President Mohamud: Shabaab have made six attempts on my life

“Today, we are asking for Aussom only $190 million over the course of this year, without taking into account arrears. The stability and security of Somalia is beneficial to global peace,” Youssouf said.

Soipan Tuya, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Defence, said the TCCs are already overburdened by having to sustain troops outside the Atmis arrangement, as the current six-month period remains unfunded,

“Any extra requirement would place an unsustainable financial burden on the troop contributing countries,” she said, warning that while UN has supported logistics, and the EU contributed to troop allowances, “it is evident that we are faced with donor fatigue”. 

Without unanimity on UNSC Resolution 2719 of 2023 – which proposes funding of the mission up to 75 percent through UN-assessed contributions and seeking the remainder from partners -- Aussom may continue to struggle.

British Foreign Service officials told The EastAfrican that there is an unspecified pledge from the UK, which is the penholder on Somalia at the UNSC, but details remain scanty, further raising questions of the predictability and adequacy of the funding, and whether London – in the absence of the US and a reluctant EU – would singlehandedly support Aussom till 2029.   

Indeed, Ms Chesney did not divulge any figures in her submission but observed “the funding gap is real” and there “is no quick fix”, adding that burden sharing and finding additional donors will be key.

She however, hinted that the AU should find out the remaining issues relating to the composition and the laydown of financing.

The April 23-25 summit was agreed at State House, Entebbe during the official visit of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to his Ugandan counterpart Yoweri Museveni on February 7, 2025, to address the funding crisis but also establish a political oversight body to ensure liberation of Somalia. 

For the first time, Egypt joined the TCCs -- Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Egypt replaces longtime contributor Burundi, which exited after a dispute with Mogadishu over troop allocation numbers.

Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, Somalia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, reminded the donors that the Horn of Africa country’s greatest challenge remains security: combating the terrorist Al Shabaab group and stabilising liberated areas. 

“This is where Aussom remains indispensable. Yes, the Somali National Army is growing stronger but we are not yet at the point where we can finish this fight alone,” he said.

In recent weeks, al-Shabaab has intensified attacks particularly in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle regions, as well as mortar fire in Mogadishu, reminding the governmentthat terr orism remains a persistent threat not only to Somalia but to regional stability. 

Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have agreed to refrain from providing state military support to each other’s non-state armed groups within and across their borders, in a declaration of principles signed under the auspices of a US-brokered agreement on Friday.

The agreement, signed in Washington and facilitated by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, opens the door to a possible peace deal between the two countries, which have long traded accusations of backing each other’s rebels.

Both countries agreed to “commit to explore the establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism to counter non-state armed groups and criminal organisations that threaten the Participants’ legitimate security concerns,” according to part of the agreement.

In the deal, which is seen as a way to halt hostilities in the restive eastern DRC region, both countries also pledged to “mutually acknowledge each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and commit to a pathway to resolve their disputes by peaceful means grounded in diplomacy and negotiation rather than hostile force or rhetoric.”

The agreement comes two days after a Qatar-mediated face-to-face dialogue between AFC/M23 rebels and the DRC government, which resulted in both parties agreeing to a ceasefire.

Read: Hope and frustration: Congo, M23 rebels agree ceasefire in Qatar

Rwanda has been widely accused of backing the M23 rebels, who have overrun and captured two major cities in eastern DRC – Goma and Bukavu – in the past three months and showed no signs of slowing down.

The latest development is seen as a major reprieve, especially for the people of eastern DRC, who have known no peace for years, with hundreds of thousands living in internally displaced camps.

As part of the Declaration of Principles, the two sides also committed to facilitating the safe and voluntary return of internally displaced persons to their original places of residence in eastern DRC, as well as Congolese refugees.

The DRC and Rwanda also committed to drafting a peace deal by May 2, a goal that now seems within reach given the recent thawing of hostilities and rhetoric from all parties.

“Today marks not an end but a beginning, a necessary step towards peace taken with resolve and purpose. This moment carries particular weight for the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” said DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner after signing the declaration.

“In Goma, in Bukavu, and beyond, the reality of displacement, insecurity, and hardship continues. For us, the urgency of this initiative is not theoretical, it is human.

“We are clear in the Great Lakes region: peace must come first, followed by the rebuilding of trust, and then — only when conditions are right — the careful reopening of a path to meaningful bilateral cooperation. Too many past efforts have failed because sequencing was ignored and accountability postponed,” she added.

Rwanda’s Foreign Affairs Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe noted that the agreement marks an important step towards addressing the region’s existing security concerns, which, if tackled, could unlock its economic potential.

“Today, we are talking about the real issues, the root causes that must be addressed to achieve a lasting peace in our region. Those include, first and foremost, security, as well as the return of refugees.

“In addition, and very importantly, we are discussing how to build new regional economic value chains that link our countries, including with American private sector investment. Our goal is a secure region, free of violent ethnic extremism, which is well-governed. Working together, our region can be an engine of prosperity for all our peoples, and indeed Africa as a whole,” said Mr Nduhungirehe.

Securing the eastern part of the DRC is expected to unlock significant investment opportunities, “including those facilitated by the US government and US private sector, aimed at transforming the regional economy to the benefit of all participating countries.”

The US recently signed a minerals deal with the DRC and is reported to be pursuing a similar agreement with Rwanda. Addressing the hostilities in the mineral-rich region — home to resources such as tantalum and gold — is seen as key to securing US government investments and interests in the Great Lakes region.

Belgium said on Friday that while it still considers Rwanda a key player in the region and well-placed to resolve the conflict in eastern Congo, it cannot be complacent about Rwanda’s violation of Congo’s territorial integrity.

Maxime Prévot, Belgium’s Vice-Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Affairs and Development Cooperation, said this during a meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.

While the Belgian official sought President Museveni’s tact in defusing the crisis in eastern Congo, it is also understood that the meeting was double-barrelled, seeking the veteran Ugandan leader’s reach to mend relations between Belgium and Rwanda.

In his own words, Mr Prévot described President Museveni as “a very valuable go-between in diplomatic contacts.”

At a press conference in Kampala, Mr Prévot, who is on a tour of Uganda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), said he had met Mr Museveni first to tap into his knowledge of the region and the respect he commands among his peers — qualities Belgium views as key to resolving the conflict in eastern Congo and fostering rapprochement between Belgium and Rwanda.

The Belgian foreign minister’s itinerary skips Rwanda, following the recent diplomatic fallout between Kigali and Brussels, which saw Kigali sever ties with Belgium.

“Unfortunately, it is at this stage no longer possible for me to visit Rwanda following its decision to break down our diplomatic relations. I explained to President Museveni that there is a lot of disinformation about this situation. A breakdown of diplomatic relations is not a solution to divergent views,” Mr Prévot said.

Read: Rwanda and Belgium expel each other’s diplomats over Congo conflict

The two leaders discussed the current state of the conflict in eastern DRC, a situation that remains extremely precarious, with the local population paying the price every day. They agreed there is urgent need to act.

“During the meeting, I also underlined that the root causes of the conflict must be addressed in order to break the cycle of violence,” he added.

The Belgian official explained that respecting the territorial integrity of all countries in the region, promoting regional economic integration, resolving refugee issues, ending the threat posed by the FDLR, combating hate speech targeting specific communities, and improving governance and respect for human rights would help de-escalate the conflict and the tension between the DRC and Rwanda.

FDLR is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, a Hutu rebel group that includes perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide and is active in eastern Congo.

On relations with Kigali, Mr Prévot said Brussels believes there is always room for dialogue and a better understanding of each other’s perspectives, noting that even with the Russian Federation under sanctions after Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, Belgium has maintained diplomatic relations, albeit at a more limited level.

However, the Belgian chief diplomat said his country cannot be complacent about Rwanda’s violation of the DRC’s territorial integrity, although Belgium is not seeking an escalation of the situation.

Belgium said it welcomed the announcement by the DRC and rebel group M23/AFC to work towards a truce and a ceasefire leading to dialogue to restore lasting peace in the mineral-rich and conflict-plagued eastern Congo.

At the same time, a further boost of positive news came from Washington, where the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda signed a declaration of principles under the auspices of the US, which recently struck deals with Kinshasa to help end the crisis in eastern Congo.

Brussels says these are crucial steps towards ending the violence, and also hails the mediation efforts of Qatar, the African Union, and regional blocs East African Community and Southern African Development Community.

A close coordination of these initiatives is of the utmost importance, the Belgian embassy in Kampala said in a statement issued after the meeting between Mr Prévot and President Museveni.

“The Belgian position will continue to be anchored in respect for international law, human rights and the rule of law,” the statement added.

The Congolese Minister for Information and Communication Patrick Muyaya spoke with Jackson Mutinda on peace in eastern DRC and why Kinshasa is frustrated with some of the processes.

Information and Communication Minister Patrick Muyaya talks during the East African Entrepreneurship Conference & Expo in Kinshasa, DRC on November 2, 2023. PHOTO | COURTESY

First, let’s talk about the security situation in eastern Congo. How is it now?

We cannot say that the situation is good while our population is under occupation by Rwandan military and M23. Because, on daily basis, there are reports of human rights abuse and violations and attack on civilians. So, we cannot say the situation is good.

So, what is the government or military doing about the situation?

The question, actually, is not at the military level, because we have a diplomatic process. If you read the last resolution of the United Nations (Security Council), it’s clear that it’s not the military. So, we are working on diplomatic ways to find a quick way to make sure our police and army get back to Goma and Bukavu and other parts of these (Kivu) provinces to handle the security of our population.

I understand that the Qatar process has broken down. What happened?

I don’t think the discussions have broken down. I don’t know why this is being said, but we need to refer to the mediation. You remember the President (Tshisekedi), and President Kagame met with the Emir, the leader of Qatar (Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani) and a statement was made.

I don’t know the status, but in our perspective, we met in Qatar following the meeting of both presidents and the conversation went well. We expect to see more progress on the ground. Currently, there is respect of the ceasefire, there is no confrontation.

Read: Hope and frustration: Congo, M23 rebels agree ceasefire in Qatar

Aren’t there too many peace processes going on? Which one are you really working with: Qatar, EAC-SADC, AU?

There is one process -- what is happening in Qatar. And what is happening currently under the Togolese president (Faure Gnassingbé) has the same objective.

In Qatar, there’s direct conversation between security experts from the (DRC) government and people from M23, and I think this will be connected, because, you know, in the past, we had, the Luanda Process under the Angolan president, who has been replaced by the Togolese president, and we have the Nairobi Process.

One part of the Nairobi Process travelled to Qatar to make sure we are moving quickly to bring back peace in this part of our country. So, there is one process with only one objective -- to bring back peace in eastern part of the country.

Now we have a new (AU) mediator, the Togo president. Some critics wonder if he will succeed where Lourenço and Uhuru Kenyatta failed.

Well, I’m not sure both processes failed. Because there are things, agreements, programmes… We cannot just wake up and say in Luanda there’s nothing. Today, we have the foundation of what can bring definitive solutions. But one thing is critical in this process: political will. Because, if the Rwandan president had the political will I think on December 15 (2024), an agreement would have been signed (in Luanda). I hope, this time, with the mediation of the Togolese president, things will move in good direction.

Read: Togo’s President Gnassingbé walks into Great Lakes region powder keg

There have been fears among countries whose embassies were attacked in Kinshasa in January. Has the situation been resolved?

First, we, as government condemned those acts of violence against the embassies. Some of our populations can be really mad about the situation, but we cannot condone attacks on embassies. My colleague from Foreign Affairs had occasion to speak with all the affected countries to express our apologies about what happened. Today, the situation is totally different.

Kenya was demanding compensation for the property destroyed. How is that going?

Those type of questions are under my Foreign Affairs colleague, but you saw that there was a Congolese delegation that went to see President Ruto. And that’s why Kenya’s role is very critical. You said that the Nairobi Process failed. If this process failed, it’s a failure of Kenya.

President Ruto has political will to deliver. When he speaks publicly, he says that he’s committed to peace, but you cannot be committed to peace just by saying it -- you need to act. Maybe he should act more, as should all the heads of state in the region, so we can move quickly to achieve the peace we want for the region.

Yea, Nairobi hosted (AFC leader Corneille) Nangaa when he launched the Congo River Alliance, and (Joseph) Kabila was here this year to meet with his party leaders. How do you take that for a country that is supposed to be negotiating for peace?

Nangaa started his movement in Nairobi. We made it clear we cannot accept that a country we’ve been working with to bring back peace in the region was chosen as the country where another rebellion was being launched. This is not acceptable, and we made that clear, and I hope people in Kenya are watching where it’s going. President Ruto is committed for peace, the most important thing is to see him act.

The return of former President Kabila in Congo seems to have brought a new dimension to the conflict…

We all know that President Kabila, when he decided to come back, came to support M23. He made a statement, justifying what M23 is doing. It’s just incredible to see that the president will be fighting with those proxies he fought against years when he was in power. Today, he’s backing them. It’s a big contradiction.

So why has government sanctioned his party?

Because we all know that he’s not working for himself, and there is some intelligence that there is a link between him and AFC.

Read: Congo suspends former president Joseph Kabila’s political party

And why is his property being seized?

I cannot comment on that because it in under Justice, and I think they will come out and explain what is going on with that.

Let’s talk about the American role in in the Congo. We have read that after Trump’s Special Adviser visited, there is a deal between Congo and America for America to support peace and Congo to provide minerals, is that the correct position?

I would like to remind you that there is a very old relationship between the United States and Congo. We signed one contract for a mining site. Dr (Massad) Boulos made it clear to the President Kagame that he should withdraw his troops from eastern DRC and stop supporting M23.

Read: Congo, Rwanda take step towards peace with US accord amid mineral talks

So where does the US private military contractor Erik Prince fit in all this?

I don’t have any details on that matter.

Read: US Blackwater founder Erik Prince reaches deal with Congo to secure mines

Now, a while back, you spoke about the hopes of Kinshasa in joining the EAC. What is your assessment? Has DR Congo gained anything from the East African bloc?

When President Tshisekedi decided to join East African Community, some Congolese were not happy. So why the President make that decision? Because he believes we should connect our populations.

But you cannot attack a country you’re in an organisation with. We cannot talk about business, about the economy, about sharing, about connection between countries, because we have war, and I think it’s crucial for the leaders of the East African Community to work to make sure the peace is back.

Once the peace will be back in the region, it will be good for the EAC because one of its top objectives is to see people do business in the region. But you cannot do business, you cannot become prosperous in a region where there is war.

Final thoughts?

We as DRC are committed to work closely with all the African countries, especially from East African Community, and especially Kenya, to strengthen our economic relationship and move forward. For example, there is two main Kenyan banks here in DRC and this should be considered by the Kenyan administration when taking some decisions.

Because it’s very critical to keep our economic relations good for our two populations. So I hope that all the stakeholders, especially on the Kenyan side, will continue to work to bring back peace.

The Council of Ministers of the East African Community (EAC) met in Arusha this week, amid a looming crisis blamed on an acute shortage of money for programmes and staff salaries, which are threatening to ground operations at the secretariat.

The Council, while announcing the latest Arusha retreat, admitted that the cash crunch was one of the top agendas. Another one was security.

Efforts to have the partner states remit their annual budget obligations have been disheartening. According to data from the EAC that The EastAfrican has seen, as of March 2025, member states owed the bloc a whopping $58,048,678.

Only Kenya and Tanzania had fully paid their mandatory $7,007,747, and Uganda had remitted $6,966,933 – 99 percent of its due contribution.

The continued default by the partner states has presented a dilemma to the Veronica Nduva-led Secretariat and its organs, most of which have been forced to slow down their operations and skip others all together.

The East African Legislative Assembly (Eala), for instance, has had to skip sittings due to a lack of resources and the East African Court of Justice has been grappling with a backlog of cases partly blamed on financial constraints.

Read: Eala defers business indefinitely over cash crisis

At the EACJ’s third Judicial conference in Kigali, last February, speaker after speaker raised concerns about the lack of funds to run the critical functions of the EAC organs.

EACJ president Nestor Kayobera blamed the slowdown of the wheels of justice on budgetary constraints, exacerbated by judges serving on adhoc basis.

Justice Kayobera said more than 200 cases were then pending hearing and determination before the court.

“Budgetary constraints are hampering the operations of the court. As we speak now, we have more than 260 cases which are still pending, and the issue is that the judges are not permanent, they are serving on adhoc basis, except the President and the Principal Judge, who are permanent in Arusha,” the judge said.

“So, we sit only quarterly, and this means four times for the First Instance Division and four times for the Appellate Division in a year. This is very little time, given the number of cases that have been filed before the court that need to be looked into by the partner states.”

Read: We need financial autonomy, regional court tells states

But it is the looming staffing crisis that is a new headache for the secretariat bosses. Up to 150 staff vacancies remain unfilled since last year, when hiring was frozen.

Another 30 senior cadre staff are set to exit at the end of the 2024/25 financial year, following the expiry of their contracts, and their replacement is uncertain due to the cash crisis.

Secretary-General Nduva was this week optimistic that the Council would provide a way forward on remittances as the clock ticks to the end of the financial year.

The other matters were the status of the integration of DRC, Somalia and South Sudan, who are yet to fully align their fiscal policies with those of the EAC.

“The key discussion is on the budget for the upcoming fiscal year. The Council will also discuss different reports,including the reports of the Office of the secretary-general, Audit Commission on the Audited Financial Statements of the Community for the Financial Year ended June 30, 2024, and the status of integration of new partner states into the community,” the EAC boss told The EastAfrican.

During last year’s heads of state summit, the Council prioritised discussions on staffing, to be held in May this year.

“We are aware of the staffing issue,” said Deng Alor Kuol, South Sudan’s Minister in charge of EAC Affairs, who was the Council chairperson then. “The Council will hold a special retreat in May to discuss the staffing gaps. Thereafter we plan to hold an extraordinary summit to discuss the matter.”

Kenya’s EAC Cabinet Secretary Beatrice Askul is the current chairperson. The CS is also concerned about the poor remittances. “We are going to discuss this matter, among other issues,” she said.

By press time, the resolutions of the Arusha meetings were yet to be made public. As the Council convened in Arusha on Friday, the Eala Budget Committee Chairperson Kennedy Mukulia questioned the continued default by some partner states on contributions to the Community.

“It is disappointing that not all the EAC partner states have remitted their contributions on time. It’s only next month and the EAC will be reading the next budget (in June 2025),” the MP told The EastAfrican.

According to him, the EAC secretariat is not doing much to alleviate both the staffing and financial woes.

“Maybe some partner states are not paying because, what is the value proposition for remitting to the EAC? Perhaps the EAC secretariat is not doing enough talking to the presidents,” said the South Sudanese MP, whose country is one of the perennial defaulters, owing $15 million by March.

While Rwanda has paid 75 percent of its quota ($5.2 million), Burundi, South Sudan, Somalia and DR Congo continue to lag. DRC owes $20,711,995, Burundi $16,793,141 and South Sudan 15,118,076, according to the March 2025 data. Somalia owed $3,507,747, which Mukulia said it had recently paid. Burundi had also sent “about $1 million.”

“DRC looks like they are not interested in the EAC. The problem right now is that we are curtailed. We (Eala MPs) cannot meet and by not meeting we have nowhere to bring up this matter out,” said a frustrated Mukulia.

He blamed both the Council and the secretariat for cancelling this year’s Assembly sessions.

“We wanted to hold sessions even with no resources. We could meet virtually, do meetings in the partner states but they said ‘no, do not convene any meeting, there are no resources,’” he said.

DR Congo, which started on a high note, promising to inject new life into the intra-regional trade, has been the reluctant member of the EAC even as staff and Eala MPs from the country enjoy salaries, allowances and other benefits.

Since joining the group, they have remitted a paltry $1million.

Effects of war

Contacted for comment, DRC Government Spokesman Patrick Muyaya said, while Kinshasa was interested in the EAC, the war in the east had derailed its integration. That partner states Rwanda and Kenya are seen to support the M23 rebellion has not helped matters.

Read: How M23 war has disrupted East Africa trade with Congo

Burundi’s financial year is yet to be aligned with that of the EAC have arrears. Its financial year runs from January to December, as opposed to July to June. This has been partly blamed for the delay in remittances.

Mr Mukulia said the EAC nowadays exists “only to pay staff salaries”.

“You cannot keep paying salaries to people who are not working!”

Yet the bloc is facing a staffing crisis. Of the required 400 staffers, the Secretariat has a shortfall of 150, even as dozens exit by the end of the year.

The staffing gaps exist in senior roles, including directors-general, heads of institutions, and directors in legal, communication, immigration, labour and in finance departments.

Mukulia wants the freeze on employment lifted. “You cannot freeze staffing when the institutions and organs are not having the required staff. A freeze should only be imposed on partner states that do not remit their annual contributions to the EAC,” the MP suggested.

Staff recruitment at the EAC has been an emotive issue since 2021 when the Council was forced to suspend recruitment.

MPs also want the EAC Staff Rules and Regulations of 2006 to be reviewed to capture the current state of the expanding community.

At current budget estimates, the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (Aussom) will need nearly $1 billion to avert a complete security collapse in the Horn of Africa nation.

The AU also needs $96 million to clear arrears of the previous mission, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (Atmis).

There is one problem, though. No one knows for sure where this money will come from. The usual donors are backing away, hesitant to commit or just speaking in vague terms.

This sums up the outcome of Friday’s Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State, the ministerial session that preceded it, as well as meetings of senior officials and military chiefs from countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping missions in Somalia.

Read: EAC ministers meet in Arusha to address security challenges, cash crunch

It’s a stalemate, and not helped by the fact that in the lead up to the summit held at State House Entebbe, Uganda, the AU dropped some sobering numbers to soften the hearts of key donors, to pledge cash and avert the colossal funding crisis that Aussom faces, to no avail.

Towards the end of his presentation, US Ambassador to Uganda William W Popp asserted that Washington DC would not fund Aussom, not under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 and not even under a hybrid arrangement.

“The US position on Aussom financing remains the same as it has been over the past year,” he said, attracting silent stares and effectively killing the earlier appeal by AU chief Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, that UNSC Resolution 2719 “remains our best bet”.

“US will not support the application of [UNSC Resolution] 2719 framework to Aussom as we do not believe Somalia is the right context for this application. We also will not support the hybrid model of the 2719 framework as we believe it undercuts the spirit and intent of the resolution,” Mr Popp explained.

Read: Trump snubs Aussom funding as threats from Somalia rise

The representatives of the key donors – US envoy, UK High Commissioner to Uganda Lisa Chesney and the EU Head of Delegation to Kampala Jan Sadek – all spoke after a short presentation by Bankole Adeoye, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security.

Grim reality

In just five slides, Adeoye laid bare the grim reality that the mission faces. Since its deployment on January 1, 2025, Aussom has an unpaid $45 million bill for the January-March period, and a similar figure for the April-June period before its mandate begins in earnest on July 1, 2025.

“We need $15 million per month. That’s the fact. And we do not have that money currently,” he told Foreign and Defence ministers at the Mestil Hotel in Kampala, where the TCCs ministerial session was held.

He explained that $15 million is needed to cover troops’ salaries in Somalia. But the AU has only $16.7 million for one year. “This is the arithmetic that we must deal with as AU member states, and of course, the troop and police contributing countries.”

According to the AU Peace and Security Council, Aussom has a total cash requirement of $190 million for this year, but has only $16.7 million – the bulk of which is what the AU Peace Fund has in its coffers, and a committed $3 million and $1 million from Japan and China respectively.

This covers just 8.7 percent of the need.

That is not all. The previous force, Atmis, has arrears of $96 million for the 2022-2024 period, most of it racked up when Somalia requested “technical pause” to delay the force drawdown.

“This is because of the consistent extension of the drawdown, authorised by the Peace and Security Council of the AU and endorsed by the UNSC,” Adeoye explained.

In total, for the five-year Aussom budget and Atmis arrears, the AU needs $1.046 billion. The bulk of the budget covers troop allowances at the rate of $1,000 per person per month, while death and disability compensation and mission subsistence allowance for troops, police and civilian staff account for the rest of the costs.

Read: AU, Somalia agree on troop numbers for new mission

As it stands, the AU pins hope on the outcome of the Independent Strategic Report of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (Unsos), which could operationalise Resolution 2719. But the continental body is also betting on the donors’ conference in Doha, Qatar – scheduled for April on a date yet to be confirmed.

Amid limited options, another throw of the dice is the UN-AU combined mission for Somalia led by AU special envoy Donald Kaberuka, who is currently in Washington DC, seeking additional sources, with an urgent remit to report to Addis before end of this month.

With the Aussom mandate officially kicking off on July 1, time is now of essence. Next month, the donors, convened by the UK, will meet to resolve their final position on Resolution 2719, and update the UNSC.

The EU envoy to Uganda Jan Sadek says that however complex the path, the TCCs and all Somalia partners must recognise that new thinking and funding arrangements are needed to enable equal burden-sharing between long standing and new donors.

Brussels, the largest funder of the previous AU-led missions, in which it spent about €2.7 billion ($3.07 billion), favours the hybrid implementation of Resolution 2719 as the only viable pathway to sustainable and predictable funding for Aussom.

The EU explains that its member states already contribute a quarter of all UN assessed contributions, and welcomes the strategic review and restructuring of the Unsos as part of preparations for the implementation of Resolution 2719 as requested under Resolution 2767.

Read: EU seeks ‘fair’ burden sharing in Somalia peace mission

Addressing TCCs for the first time in his capacity as AUC Chairperson since being elected to the position in February, Youssouf Ali appealed to the international community to come to Somalia’s aid or to sit back and witness the Horn of Africa explode into a regional security nightmare.

“In order to consolidate recovery of territories, the transition from Atmis to Aussom must not fail. Yes, the mission is confronted to financial challenges. There are still reluctances to implement Resolution 2719. We at the Commission are working very hard to make it happen,” he said.

Somalia has a 3,000km shoreline that straddles strategic trade routes linking Asia, Africa and Europe. In 2010 and 2011, Somali pirates seized ships for fun in the Gulf of Aden – offshore of Somalia – which cost insurance firms and shipowners in the world close to $7 billion.

At a time when al-Shabaab is resurgent and allegedly building bases near Mogadishu, the AUC boss argues it is not far-fetched for the extremist militants to exploit the potential security vacuum in Somalia, offer protection to pirates and abet the vice in the region’s high seas.

Read: Somali President Mohamud: Shabaab have made six attempts on my life

“Today, we are asking for Aussom only $190 million over the course of this year, without taking into account arrears. The stability and security of Somalia is beneficial to global peace,” Youssouf said.

Soipan Tuya, Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Defence, said the TCCs are already overburdened by having to sustain troops outside the Atmis arrangement, as the current six-month period remains unfunded,

“Any extra requirement would place an unsustainable financial burden on the troop contributing countries,” she said, warning that while UN has supported logistics, and the EU contributed to troop allowances, “it is evident that we are faced with donor fatigue”. 

Without unanimity on UNSC Resolution 2719 of 2023 – which proposes funding of the mission up to 75 percent through UN-assessed contributions and seeking the remainder from partners -- Aussom may continue to struggle.

British Foreign Service officials told The EastAfrican that there is an unspecified pledge from the UK, which is the penholder on Somalia at the UNSC, but details remain scanty, further raising questions of the predictability and adequacy of the funding, and whether London – in the absence of the US and a reluctant EU – would singlehandedly support Aussom till 2029.   

Indeed, Ms Chesney did not divulge any figures in her submission but observed “the funding gap is real” and there “is no quick fix”, adding that burden sharing and finding additional donors will be key.

She however, hinted that the AU should find out the remaining issues relating to the composition and the laydown of financing.

The April 23-25 summit was agreed at State House, Entebbe during the official visit of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to his Ugandan counterpart Yoweri Museveni on February 7, 2025, to address the funding crisis but also establish a political oversight body to ensure liberation of Somalia. 

For the first time, Egypt joined the TCCs -- Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. Egypt replaces longtime contributor Burundi, which exited after a dispute with Mogadishu over troop allocation numbers.

Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, Somalia’s Foreign Affairs Minister, reminded the donors that the Horn of Africa country’s greatest challenge remains security: combating the terrorist Al Shabaab group and stabilising liberated areas. 

“This is where Aussom remains indispensable. Yes, the Somali National Army is growing stronger but we are not yet at the point where we can finish this fight alone,” he said.

In recent weeks, al-Shabaab has intensified attacks particularly in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle regions, as well as mortar fire in Mogadishu, reminding the governmentthat terr orism remains a persistent threat not only to Somalia but to regional stability. 

Strict data protection laws in Kenya have kept private sector data processors on their toes, making them the most compliant in East Africa. But the State – which ought to lead in safeguarding citizens’ data – continues to lag.

A new index ranking the quality of personal data protection across public and private institutions in East Africa places Kenya at the top, but points out that government departments and agencies remain the weakest link, particularly in their lack of transparency and safeguards.

The index, developed by Uganda-based digital rights non-profit Unwanted Witness, assessed 189 organisations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda, including banks, telecom firms, health providers, tax authorities, and national identity management bodies.

It focused on their data privacy practices in compliance with national laws and global standards.

Kenya scored the highest overall, except for state-linked organisations, where it fell behind. Uganda came second, Mauritius third, Rwanda fourth, then Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

The index assessed institutions based on the accessibility of privacy policies, clarity of consent collection, third-party data transfer policies, data security practices, availability of transparency reports and how the firms resolve internal data breaches.

It also checked for registration with the national data protection regulator, which is mandatory in Kenya.

“While Kenya stands out as the leader in data protection practices, many other countries, including Mauritius, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, face difficulties in strengthening or maintaining their data protection frameworks,” noted Unwanted Witness in a report on the region’s data privacy scorecard.

“These countries need to focus on enhancing regulatory enforcement, updating privacy laws, and ensuring that their frameworks are aligned with international standards to improve their scores and foster greater trust in data privacy.”

While Kenya tops the overall ranking, Uganda outperforms it certain areas.

Kenyan firms perform best in registration with the national regulator, tying with Uganda at 63 percent. They also do better in accessibility of privacy policy (74 percent), transparency in pre-collection of data (54 percent), restriction of third-party data transfer (20 percent), and internal breach resolution (11 percent).

They, however, trail Ugandan and Mauritian companies in having robust data security frameworks and regular publication of transparency reports.

Generally, companies in the banking, insurance and telecommunication sectors across the region do better in data privacy, while government ad health sector organisations perform worst.

In telecommunication, for instance, Kenyan companies scored an average of 45 percent in 2024, while Zimbabwean and Mauritian companies’ compliance levels were at 34.5 percent and 36 percent respectively on average. In this sector, only Ugandan companies do better with an average compliance rate of 48 percent.

Kenyan firms also outshine the others in banking, insurance, e-commerce, betting, digital lending and health, with Ugandan firms closely following behind, and in some cases, slightly ahead.

Government entities, however, perform much poorer than both private firms in Kenya and their peers in the region. State-linked data handlers such as e-Citizen and Huduma Kenya have been outshone by government entities across Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Rwanda.

While Kenya Revenue Authority is the most compliant across the region with 47 percent compliance rate, the Rwandan Information Society Authority, Uganda National Bureau of Statistics, Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, and the Rwandan Social Security Board beat the other Kenyan public entities in compliance.

Huduma Kenya is one of the worst performers overall, with a compliance rate of just 3 percent, while the Rwandan equivalent, IremboGov, scored 33 percent.

“The low scores in several Kenyan agencies point to critical weaknesses in data protection, which could lead to privacy risks such as unauthorized access and misuse of personal data,” said Unwanted Witness.

Other than the state agencies polled by Unwanted Witness, many that handle Kenyans’ personal data are yet to even register with the national regulator, six years after enactment of the new laws that require mandatory registration.

A study by the Kenya ICT Action Network last year revealed that nearly two thirds of State agencies and corporations are yet to register with the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner.

Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have agreed to refrain from providing state military support to each other’s non-state armed groups within and across their borders, in a declaration of principles signed under the auspices of a US-brokered agreement on Friday.

The agreement, signed in Washington and facilitated by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, opens the door to a possible peace deal between the two countries, which have long traded accusations of backing each other’s rebels.

Both countries agreed to “commit to explore the establishment of a joint security coordination mechanism to counter non-state armed groups and criminal organisations that threaten the Participants’ legitimate security concerns,” according to part of the agreement.

In the deal, which is seen as a way to halt hostilities in the restive eastern DRC region, both countries also pledged to “mutually acknowledge each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and commit to a pathway to resolve their disputes by peaceful means grounded in diplomacy and negotiation rather than hostile force or rhetoric.”

The agreement comes two days after a Qatar-mediated face-to-face dialogue between AFC/M23 rebels and the DRC government, which resulted in both parties agreeing to a ceasefire.

Read: Hope and frustration: Congo, M23 rebels agree ceasefire in Qatar

Rwanda has been widely accused of backing the M23 rebels, who have overrun and captured two major cities in eastern DRC – Goma and Bukavu – in the past three months and showed no signs of slowing down.

The latest development is seen as a major reprieve, especially for the people of eastern DRC, who have known no peace for years, with hundreds of thousands living in internally displaced camps.

As part of the Declaration of Principles, the two sides also committed to facilitating the safe and voluntary return of internally displaced persons to their original places of residence in eastern DRC, as well as Congolese refugees.

The DRC and Rwanda also committed to drafting a peace deal by May 2, a goal that now seems within reach given the recent thawing of hostilities and rhetoric from all parties.

“Today marks not an end but a beginning, a necessary step towards peace taken with resolve and purpose. This moment carries particular weight for the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” said DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner after signing the declaration.

“In Goma, in Bukavu, and beyond, the reality of displacement, insecurity, and hardship continues. For us, the urgency of this initiative is not theoretical, it is human.

“We are clear in the Great Lakes region: peace must come first, followed by the rebuilding of trust, and then — only when conditions are right — the careful reopening of a path to meaningful bilateral cooperation. Too many past efforts have failed because sequencing was ignored and accountability postponed,” she added.

Rwanda’s Foreign Affairs Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe noted that the agreement marks an important step towards addressing the region’s existing security concerns, which, if tackled, could unlock its economic potential.

“Today, we are talking about the real issues, the root causes that must be addressed to achieve a lasting peace in our region. Those include, first and foremost, security, as well as the return of refugees.

“In addition, and very importantly, we are discussing how to build new regional economic value chains that link our countries, including with American private sector investment. Our goal is a secure region, free of violent ethnic extremism, which is well-governed. Working together, our region can be an engine of prosperity for all our peoples, and indeed Africa as a whole,” said Mr Nduhungirehe.

Securing the eastern part of the DRC is expected to unlock significant investment opportunities, “including those facilitated by the US government and US private sector, aimed at transforming the regional economy to the benefit of all participating countries.”

The US recently signed a minerals deal with the DRC and is reported to be pursuing a similar agreement with Rwanda. Addressing the hostilities in the mineral-rich region — home to resources such as tantalum and gold — is seen as key to securing US government investments and interests in the Great Lakes region.