The aftermath of Uganda’s General Election of February 18 will continue to shape the country’s politics for some time to come.

The effect will be felt through the various electoral petitions and strategies of a circumscribed opposition, and through the economic impact of excessive spending. It will also be felt through the crisis of legitimacy that surrounds President Museveni’s leadership and the electoral process.

This crisis stems from the fact that, while Museveni officially polled 60.62 per cent of the popular vote, a majority of Ugandans seem to believe that he should not have won — a feeling that is shared by many in the wider region and world.

This conclusion stems in large part from a common understanding of Uganda’s history, whereby the recent election becomes just the most recent example of electoral malpractice.

It is also fuelled by the government’s failure to implement the electoral reforms demanded by the political opposition and civil society, which led many to have little faith in the Electoral Commission before the election had even taken place.

Scepticism was then further heightened by the opaque nature of the tallying process, the difficulties that the opposition has faced in collating their own results, and the house arrest of the opposition leader, Dr Kizza Besigye.

As Nicole Beardsworth and Nic Cheeseman have shown, many of the results “appear far-fetched.” This includes a number of instances of 100 per cent, or close to 100 per cent turnout.

According to Ms Beardsworth and Mr Cheeseman, in Kiruhura District, “67 polling stations logged improbable turnouts of 100 per cent. 43 of those stations made the even more dubious claim of 100 per cent votes in favour of the incumbent. In the same district, a further 59 stations recorded turnout of between 98 and 99.99 per cent of the registered voters.”

Such results are not clear proof of malpractice, but, as Ms Beardsworth and Mr Cheeseman note, the danger of suspicions of electoral malpractice is that, “even if it does not change the actual result … it undermines the credibility of the government. This has clearly happened in Uganda, where Dr Besigye has won a moral, if not an actual, victory.”

This crisis is made worse by the strength of feeling among many who voted for the opposition, and the lack of conviction among many who voted for the ruling National Resistance Movement.

Regarding the former, given the uneven playing field and, more specifically, the inducements and threats that were made by members of the NRM, a vote for the opposition often reflected a strong rejection of President Museveni as someone who had “overstayed.”

In turn, many Ugandans voted for the incumbent — not because they liked or supported him — but because they either felt that there was no point voting for the opposition or because they feared to do so.

These feelings were informed by a strong sense that President Museveni would be announced the winner whatever happened. It was then reinforced by an NRM campaign that promised development projects if an area voted for the government, but which simultaneously threatened economic marginalisation if an area did not, and which also raised the spectre of a return to war in the instance of an opposition victory.

The result is a situation where you have around 40 per cent of the country who actively sought to oust the incumbent and who are frustrated and depressed by the outcome; and an additional (albeit unknowable) percentage who feel little loyalty to the current government and are highly suspicious of the results announced.

In the consequent crisis of legitimacy, serious questions surround the government’s future and electoral politics.

There is the question of whether Museveni will try to stand again and, if not, who will succeed him. Critically, at the age of 71, if President Museveni is to contest the next election, he will have to change the Constitution to do away with an upper age limit for presidential candidates of 75.

This is perhaps something that NRM could push through, but it would be highly unpopular and would reinforce a perception that it is only President Museveni who will be allowed to win.

However, if the president steps down, it is unclear who could rally the kind of support that he still enjoys from within the NRM. To date, President Museveni has relied on his record of peace and development, which no other party insider or family member can plausibly claim to a similar extent. This means that any successor would have to come up with new campaign messages and new strategies.

Quite clearly, many Ugandans now have little confidence in the country’s elections. Instead, many see them as an expensive piece of theatre, incapable of bringing real change. For some commentators, this lack of confidence raises questions about the future of democracy.

However, I see this credibility crisis as stemming, not from Ugandans’ lack of interest in democracy, but from a popular sense of frustration with the kind of democracy that Ugandans have. What people want is better elections.

The question then is how can this be achieved. Clearly, if Museveni stands down, there will be a change of leadership even if NRM goes on to win the presidential race. This would be an important symbolic moment for Uganda given that, to date, presidents have only been replaced through the barrel of the gun.

In addition, it is important that the country returns to the issue of electoral reform, and that some changes actually take place. Particularly important in this regard is the leadership of the Electoral Commission, which needs to be seen as more independent from the state. There is also the question of increasing the transparency of tallying processes, and of ensuring more reliable oversight by party agents.

Perhaps most important however, is a general shift in political culture where the political opposition is allowed to compete on a more level playing field.

This would include less excessive campaign spending by the ruling party and their supporters, but also a more independent press, and a reduction in tensions and an associated fear of protest and state repression.

It would also require a situation where criticism and dissent is tolerated, and where a history of violence and underdevelopment is not used to intimidate local populations into feeling that they have no choice.

These are big demands to make, and only time will tell how Uganda’s electoral system evolves and whether the country will move from a situation, that many define as a competitive or electoral authoritarian state, to a more democratic political system.

Gabrielle Lynch is associate professor of comparative politics at the University of Warwick, UK ([email protected]; @GabrielleLynch6