As the presidential election campaigns heat up in Uganda, most analysts are predicting a relatively comfortable win for the incumbent President Yoweri Museveni of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Nevertheless, the situation can still change between now and February.

Working in the opposition’s favour is a growing sense of fatigue with President Museveni’s 30-year long rule. In addition, the presidential candidacy of former prime minister Amama Mbabazi on a “Go forward” ticket — together with a large number of independent candidates at the parliamentary level — could split the NRM vote and push the presidential elections to a second round.

However, while the opposition still has much to play for, it seems that part of its current strategy — namely, claims that it will call mass demonstrations across the country if Museveni is announced the victor — may actually be playing into the government’s hands. The fact is that many Ugandans appear to be put off by the possibility of violence.

The support for President Museveni is due, at least in part, to the fact that his leadership has brought some socio-economic growth, while it has also been associated with various development projects.

In addition, Museveni’s presidency has been associated with what many refer to as a commercialisation of politics, whereby voters increasingly expect presidential and parliamentary candidates to provide them with direct assistance.

To this end, Museveni and the NRM clearly enjoy the benefits of incumbency, while the principal opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), suffers from much more limited funding.

Interestingly, opposition activists are currently trying to turn this logic on its head. As in, instead of giving out money and other goodies at his rallies, supporters increasingly give Besigye gifts of everything from a few shillings to a new sofa set to help him fund his presidential campaign.

However, in practice, this new development rests on reciprocity, as the narrative is that Besigye will provide assistance to such supporters once elected. The patronage expected is thus delayed rather than suspended or eliminated.

At the same time, the pressure on Museveni and NRM to distribute resources continues to mount, as they fight both the official opposition and the growing competition within the party. However, as Michaela Collord from Oxford University recently argued, the costs of such electoral excess will mainly come after the polls in the form of inflation and debt, as was the case in 2011.

However, development projects and the short-term benefits of patronage are not the only reasons why many Ugandans may choose to vote for Museveni next February. There are also the issues of security and stability.

On the one hand, Museveni is credited for bringing relatively high levels of stability to the country. On the other hand, many see the incumbent as the only person who can either ensure ongoing stability or trigger chaos. The latter linked to the idea that, if the opposition does manage to win the next election, then Museveni is the one who will decide whether to accept this and go home and herd his cattle, or refuse to hand over power.

This dilemma rests on the possibility that the opposition could still win the election. Indeed, despite opinion polls suggestive of a clear Museveni win, many opposition supporters remain publicly confident of a Besigye victory.

In short, many insist that Besigye actually won the past two presidential elections, but had victory stolen from him by a state-controlled electoral commission. In turn, they argue that the opposition will garner even more votes this time round for two main reasons.

First, it is evident that an increasing number of Ugandans have grown tired of a president who has been in power for 30 years, and desire change. Many are also increasingly angry about the problems of corruption, ethnic bias, widespread underemployment, and poverty.

Critically, this sense of fatigue appears to be particularly strong among younger voters who cannot remember the pre-Museveni era and are thus less impressed by the President’s claims of having helped bring stability to the country.

Second, Mr Mbabazi’s candidacy is likely to attract some former NRM adherents who are tired of Museveni’s leadership, but who are put off by Mr Besigye’s more radical stance. For these conservative voters, a vote for Mr Mbabazi will be seen as a way to achieve a less uncertain transition.

However, it is currently unclear how many voters Mr Mbabazi is likely to attract, especially since the NRM vote is largely located in the rural areas, which are far more difficult for the “Go Forward” campaign to penetrate and sway in the time that remains.

While publicly confident of their capacity to win, opposition supporters simultaneously insist that Museveni may steal the election or prove unwilling to accept defeat. More than this, many insist that such rigging will no longer be accepted, and outline how they are already organising supporters to go out and demonstrate.

The suggestion is that simultaneous mass demonstrations across the country in the instance of a Museveni win would overwhelm the police and force a transition.

Such combative rhetoric clearly helps galvanise some opposition supporters behind the FDC. At the same time, it also has the unintended consequence of putting off some potential opposition supporters, as an FDC victory becomes associated with the possibility of violence and insecurity, and the negative impact that this would have on local businesses and development.

As a result, the spectre of uncertainty and violence is currently playing into the government’s hands – a fact that many in NRM appear keenly aware. More specifically, it seems that some in NRM may purposefully be playing with the threat of insecurity, for example, by exaggerating the numbers of “Crime Preventers” that have been recruited across the country.

More specifically, the timing of the recruitment and training of the crime preventers fostered suspicions that they would be used to intimidate opposition supporters and to mobilise support for NRM, a claim that has gained some credence from allegations made during the recent party primaries.

In this context, large numbers of crime preventers suggest that widespread demonstrations would lead to violent clashes, not only with the police, but also with these militarised youth.

The Ugandan elections are still many weeks off, and the official campaign period is only just starting. The situation is thus in flux. Nevertheless, it seems that the issue of order and stability will play a critical role and that, once again, it will help bolster wavering support for the incumbent.

Gabrielle Lynch, associate professor of comparative politics at the University of Warwick, UK ([email protected]) @GabrielleLynch6)