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In Uganda, money can buy an EALA seat; in Rwanda it is godfathers

Friday February 24 2017

For the past couple of weeks, the media in Uganda has been awash with claims of vote buying by individuals vying to represent the country in the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA).

And mayhem reportedly marred internal elections in the ruling NRM party, which had been organised to determine its representatives to EALA and the party chairman, President Yoweri Museveni had to intervene to save the exercise.

Under the headline: “EALA votes up for sale in Parliament,” the Daily Monitor said: “As the campaign for the much coveted EALA seats heats up, votes in parliament are up to the highest bidder with legislators demanding cash and other inducements in exchange for their vote.”

Uganda, like other EAC member states is represented by nine individuals in EALA. These individuals are elected by parliament and the final vote in that country’s parliament takes place on February 28.

Comparatively, it is inconceivable that individuals interested in representing Rwanda in the EALA can buy votes or that members of the ruling RPF can fight over who should represent them at EALA.

So, why is money a factor in elections in Uganda and in-fighting between members of the same party over representation rife while in Rwanda, neither the latter nor the former is a factor?

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Of course, the demand and supply of money for votes is determined by varied factors such as the erosion of the social contract or loss of trust in leaders and a disconnect between provision of social services and holding elected office; the retrenchment of politics of ideas and tolerating vote buying.

For me however, the electoral systems explain why the probability of buying elections is lower in Rwanda and higher in Uganda.

Let me explain.

First, an electoral system is a legal relationship between the candidate or political party in need of votes; voters and power/seats in parliament and can establish a direct link between voters and candidates such as Uganda’s majoritarian system or with political parties and voters such as Rwanda’s proportional representation system.

In Rwanda’s case, voters cast their ballot for the party (list of candidates) instead of individuals as is the case in majoritarian systems such as Uganda’s.

In Rwanda, each party makes a list of its candidates and presents it to the electoral commission and it is from this list that voters choose who to cast their ballot for.

This makes it hard for voters to demand money from aspirants since parties campaign for their list rather than for individuals.

In Uganda’s case, with 290 constituencies in which only one person can win, individuals campaign for themselves despite party support. This makes it easier for voters to demand payment since they can directly link their vote to an individual.

Of course, even in Rwanda, individuals can contest as independents but because the whole country is curved out as a single electoral district in which a candidate or party must get at least five per cent of the total national vote, it’s nearly impossible for individuals to win and very few contest.

Rwanda’s electoral system gives political parties and their bosses — who draw up the list of candidates — too much power to determine who can or can’t be members of parliament. In fact, just by looking at the list of candidates for each party presented to the electoral commission in Rwanda, it is possible to tell who will or will not be an MP even before the vote is cast; especially since their electoral strength can be discerned from previous elections.

To that extent, we could say that while money can buy you seats in Uganda’s parliament, in Rwanda, only godfathers can.

But which system is better? Uganda’s or Rwanda’s?

Both have flaws. For instance, while majoritarian electoral system such as Uganda’s sustain tribal politics, Rwanda’s proportional representation may erode the independence of MPs since their fortunes are tied to the wishes of party leaders than to the electorate.

I think proportional representation is better in societies still organised around tribe, ethnicity and poverty than on ideology.

But to end vote buying, the cost of engaging in the vice has to be increased, otherwise no electoral system can end it on its own.

Christopher Kayumba, PhD. Senior Lecturer, School of Journalism and Communication, UR; Lead consultant, MGC Consult International Ltd. E-mail: [email protected]; twitter account: @Ckayumba Website:www.mgcconsult.com