The South Sudanese mediation process backed by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development failed to meet its latest deadline to reach a political settlement.

Less remarked on has been the circulation of a document entitled “Contribution to the African Union’s Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan.”

The AU has remained mum as to its authorship and contents. But the document is believed to be the dissenting opinion of Prof Mahmood Mamdani, a member of the AU CoISS.

Here is its narrative of the violence: That it took place in two phases — from December 16-18, 2013 in Juba, largely targeting the Nuer; and immediately following, around Bor, Bentiu and Malakal, largely targeting the Dinka although also the Nuer and Shilluk in Malakal.

It says that the former constituted ethnic cleansing with the political “intent and effect” of polarising the population along ethnic lines and destroying the middle ground. That the latter comprised both a rebellion of the Nuer in the army as well as an uprising by youth affiliated to the so-called White Army with the intent of both revenge and pillage.

Its recommendations are where it gets interesting. Political accountability is placed squarely on the shoulders of the so-called Troika (Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States) for enabling the ascendency of a “politically unchallenged armed power” through the negotiations of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

As for the transition, the document declares state sovereignty does not apply. It terms South Sudan “a juridical fiction,” not an “institutional reality” and that it is “a dictatorship of all armed groups.” It concludes: “Where state sovereignty is used to license mass murder, the Commission is of the view that state sovereignty must be temporarily subordinated to African sovereignty.”

The proposal is, specifically, for the establishment of a High Level Oversight Panel, appointed by the AU’s Peace and Security Council and mandated by the United Nations Security Council.

The South Sudanese parliament, being representative and, while ineffective in halting the violence, not implicated in it, is allowed to remain in place. However, a transitional executive — notably not to include any of those politically accountable for the violence — is to be established on the basis of nominations, vetting by the South Sudanese Political Parties’ Convention together with civil society and the church and ratification by parliament.

Enforcement is to be through an African Oversight Force — not including any troops from neighbouring countries or those already involved.

Financing is to be from oil revenues deposited into an escrow account established by the African Development Bank together with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank but overseen by the Panel.

The recommendations are thus so out-of-the-box as to be deemed completely radical.

The document has broken free of the “liberal peace” model applied in Africa under the false guise of being “an African solution.” The belligerents are not to be rewarded for their ability to instigate violence. They are to be excluded.

L. Muthoni Wanyeki is Amnesty International’s regional director for East Africa