We are nearing the end of the year. A quick run through of what’s been going on: We are still watching the unravelling provoked by Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to stand for a third term.

While the standoff remains political, ethnicity increasingly matters too. Because resistance to the third-term has also been about power sharing, in ethnic terms. Many see the undoing of term limits as the undoing of power sharing under the Arusha agreements.

Burundi has just rejected the African Union’s peacekeeping proposal under Article 4 of the Constitutive Act — which allows for its intervention in the case of the commission of international crimes.

We all hold our breath to see whether Burundi shows up for the Ugandan-led mediation under the East African Community on December 28. Mediation is now the only way to de-escalate.

The third term is also an issue in the DRC. Relative to Burundi, however, civil society (including the youth movement drawing inspiration from Burkina Faso and Senegal) and the political opposition have managed to hold the third term at bay.

Not so in Rwanda, where the referendum to change the Constitution to allow for two five-year terms saw the population vote, by a large majority, in favour of what is, effectively, resetting the start button to enable Paul Kagame to run again.

Not so in Uganda, where Yoweri Museveni dealt with the third term along time ago. That, however, together with the failure of the political opposition to join forces, hasn’t deterred him from outrageous but ultimately run-of-the-mill misuse of state security services to harass and intimidate opposition candidates and supporters.

In both Ethiopia and Sudan, the electoral issue wasn’t the third term. Just extreme — not run-of-the-mill — repression. A crackdown on independent media, journalists, civil society and the political opposition.

Incumbent political parties and their presidential candidates, unsurprisingly, returned to power. But, in the case of Sudan, a successful boycott called by civil society and the opposition meant that the “win” was undermined by the tiny size of the electorate that turned out to vote, despite extensions of polling.

Last but not least is Tanzania. Most successful political transitions in Africa occur not because of the strength of the political opposition but because of the fracturing of the ruling political party, with erstwhile die-hards and stalwarts moving into the political opposition.

For a minute, it seemed that would happen in Tanzania. The irony here being the unappealing reputation of the leading political opposition candidate. No matter. The incumbent’s candidate “won,” moving on swiftly to endear himself if not to Tanzanians, then at least to those across the border for whom the sheer gluttony of the political class has become sickening.

The moral of the story? First, incumbency matters. Second, insecure incumbents are dangerous. Third, term limits matter too.

Yes, they are arbitrarily set. But given our particular circumstances they are an important device to allow for the possibility of alternation of power. To signal the potential for change. It’s bleak. But it’s not hopeless.

L. Muthoni Wanyeki is Amnesty International’s regional director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes.