Elections and electioneering now feature prominently in public discussion in the Great Lakes region of East and Central Africa.

Whether the polls are only months away in some countries or up to two years in others, debate is lamentably narrowly focused on whether the incumbents, some serving out their last constitutional terms, should leave or stay. Wider issues of political evolution and institution building and, where applicable, national cohesion, do not feature.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, where analysts suggest there is more opposition to President Joseph Kabila than support for the opposition, violence has already broken out over his alleged manoeuvring to prolong his stay without the inconvenience of holding elections.

In Burundi, there is much talk of a likely descent into violence should President Pierre Nkurunziza ignore the “advice” of his opponents and critics and run again, claims that well-placed insiders dismiss as alarmist. In both countries, the zero-sum politicking has left no room for sober consideration of possible compromises from which all concerned would stand to gain.

In Uganda, opponents of “continuity” under President Yoweri Museveni who as usual have already started campaigning before campaigns are officially authorised, have ironically virtually conceded defeat two years before the elections.

The reason they have given, according to those who are happy to admit to their fatalism, is apparently that Museveni has all the money he needs to buy popular support, and even the backing of the military and the rest of the security establishment. And so whatever is left of public debate is interminable discussions about what he did to defeat his opponents in the past, and how terrible it is that he is unwilling to create conditions for them to defeat him.

A common refrain is that his “popularity” does not reflect the true feelings of the electorate. Little if anything is said about what a post-Museveni Uganda should be like, let alone about the road map and the logistics for getting there.

In Rwanda, although President Paul Kagame made it clear long ago that he intends to stand down, for some time now, many have continued to wonder about whether he is really leaving.

Behind the uncertainty has always been the idea that until they are actually gone, one should not believe African leaders when they say they are leaving. Of late, however, as reports emerge of an apparent groundswell of opinion in favour of his staying, the question, at least internally, has changed to whether he will agree. Driving the discussion is his own history of meaning what he says and sticking to his commitments.

Meanwhile, some ruling party cadres are quietly emphatic: He alone will not determine his future role; the RPF and wider society must have a say. For now, however, there is lamentably little open discussion about the likely process and what would or should happen were he to insist on leaving and persuade the party and society to allow him to do so.

As for how succession ought to be handled in the long term given Rwanda’s complex political arrangements, it is also still an open question in which Rwandans seem to have no obvious interest.

In Tanzania, where there is no debate about whether Kikwete will go or stay, public discussions about what to expect tend to rotate around whether his successor will be one of the CCM’s Old Guard who will emulate his allegedly lacklustre performance, or a Young Turk with the potential to shake up the system.

The constitutional review process that once seemed to promise deep discussions about wider governance and institutional issues has, according to commentators, delivered far less than was promised.

Kenyans are seemingly too preoccupied by security concerns and figuring out what difference their new Constitution has made, with some already questioning whether it is “fit for purpose” given their context, to bother about electoral issues.

There is a great deal more missing from all the talk and fighting about incumbents and their succession. For example, there is no discussion about what type of government is likely to work for ordinary people. How do they get it, and what do they have to do to ensure that it does what it is supposed to do?

There is ample agreement, for example, that save for Rwanda where the story of the past 20 years is one of massive achievements across a wide range of domains, elsewhere sitting governments have performed rather poorly in terms of uplifting people’s living standards in general and in such domains as building effective institutions.

Consequently, there is a certain popular yearning for improved performance. Where will it come from? A new study by researchers from the UK’s Overseas Development Institute and the University of Leiden in the Netherlands argues that governments that take a problem-solving approach to decision-making, privileging consensus over contestation, and have bureaucracies that can insulate policy from the effects of change in political leadership, are key.

Frequent leadership change and adherence to good governance standards are not necessarily what counts. Meanwhile, in Africa, we seem to believe they make all the difference. Isn’t it time we raised the quality of political debate?

Frederick Golooba-Mutebi is a Kampala- and Kigali-based researcher and writer on politics and public affairs. E-mail: [email protected]