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Donors too nuanced, sophisticated to cut off aid to Rwanda over Congo

Saturday July 07 2012

A few days ago, someone sent me an e-mail out of the blue. They wanted to know what repercussions Rwanda’s “latest adventure in Congo” might have on US and UK aid to the country.

The e-mail came after I had spent two days listening to and participating in intense debate about Rwanda at a conference at the University of Antwerp in Belgium.

The convener of the conference, renowned jurist and irrepressible RPF and Kagame critic Prof Filip Reyntjens, had intended to help narrow the wide gap between the two broad sides of scholarship on Rwanda: Those to whom the post-genocide government is steeped in totalitarianism that risks plunging the country into another genocide, and those that see the country as a developmental state with an imperfect but learning government that is trying its best to better the lives of the people it leads.

As a first step, the conference was hardly futile. But as the Rwandans say with regard to their state-building efforts, we still have a long way to go.

At first I was inclined not to respond to the e-mail. After two days during which I often wondered whether the country being discussed was the one I have come to know well, the last thing I needed was a question calling for a detailed answer. After a moment’s reflection, however, I went ahead and wrote back. I had considered ignoring the e-mail because of what I considered to be the telling use of the word “adventure.” Adventures are things people indulge in for pleasure. I therefore figured that in my correspondent’s mind Rwanda was already involved in Congo, for fun.

Over the past three weeks or so I have read and listened to many claims about what is going on in the Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo. At least one thing about events there is straightforward and uncontroversial: The armed forces of the DRC, the FARDC, are battling rebels who for one reason or another, have decided to challenge its authority. Governments do not like this sort of behaviour and respond with force when defied. When the defiant are armed groups, they respond with deadly force.

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Where the government whose authority is being defied has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the physical engagements do not last; the “rebels” are often clobbered quickly and it’s all quiet again, leaving the government to carry on with the business of governing. Where that monopoly has been lost, however, as has long been the case in the DRC, there is no telling in advance which side will prevail.
In some countries, it ends in the collapse of governments and the emergence of new ones, as was the case in Rwanda in 1994, neighbouring Uganda in 1986, Ethiopia in 1991, Cote d’Ivoire in 2010, and most recently, Libya. Elsewhere, governments may hang on and negotiate their way out of unwinnable wars, as happened in Mozambique when the Frelimo government, stymied by the tenacious Renamo forces, finally agreed to talks. Yet in other cases, wars of this sort result in stalemates that last decades.

There are, however, many controversial aspects of the fighting in the DRC. One is about who is doing the shooting, and with whose help or encouragement. On the surface, it is all properly clear: the FARDC is fighting the M23 rebels. Nonetheless, beneath the surface is a complex mosaic of state and non-state actors, including an assortment of local and foreign freebooters and crooks.

However, according to “non-state actors,” a fancy term that actually refers to human rights and so-called civil society groups, the Kabila government and UN-hired experts, the chief culprit is the government of Rwanda. It stands accused of not only arming the rebels, but also recruiting fighters for them, with the direct, on-the-ground involvement of its most senior army officers. Reports to back up the claims have been produced. Rwanda, as expected, has dismissed them.

Strikingly, there is little discussion by the accusers, of why Rwanda might be involved. Many have been seduced by the accusations and are happy to repeat them without pausing to ask whether Rwanda created the M23 rebels. Now, of course, it is fairly easy to create or form a rebel group. However, rebel groups thrive only in favourable environments, usually areas inhabited by sympathetic populations, where they can hide and also find means of sustenance. While external actors can create rebel groups, they cannot manufacture local sympathy towards them. This is part of the complexity allegations of Rwanda’s involvement miss. And this is where I come to the answer to the question my correspondent posed.

It is unlikely the conflict will have repercussions for UK and the US aid to Rwanda. The reason is simple: The issues involved are far more complex than Rwanda’s accusers are making them appear. So far it appears the UK and the US have an appropriately sophisticated and nuanced view of things and won’t be forced into knee-jerk reactions that address the symptoms rather than the cause of the DRC’s woes.

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